The question is ambiguous between - does anything that exists have a cause, and does anything that exists have a reason or a purpose? In Platonism, mechanical causation is not possible without teleological causation and ‘reason’ is a broader category than causation. For example, for Leibniz, an infinite regress of cause and effects is possible, but the entire series must have a reason for existing, and this reason must be outside them. The infamous PSR is not a theory of mechanical causation, but a principle of harmony that says God orders everything according to the best and the existence of something is its compossibility in relation to the whole. This is to say that a monad is compossible or exists not because of its logical possibility but its ability to add to the overall purpose of things. In this worldview, the purpose is the ‘why’ of things, and this teleology is immanent within the thing itself and not externally imposed. To exist is to exist as a thing that acts to fulfil its...
The problem with creation is this: God is infinite, so nothing outside it can exist. What is limited by something outside itself is finite. On the other hand, the finite being must exist for there to be any creation at all. This is how the problem was solved in earlier times: what is finite is composed of two principles, essence and existence. The finite entity does not have any genuine existence; its existence is derivative, i.e. through another, and no finite being can explain the existence of any other finite entity because it too would have its existence through another. Hence, whatever is finite is explained only by reference to the infinite. The Infinite, on the other hand, is a simple entity, it’s very essence involves its existence, hence its existence is not through another. Plotinus regarded this infinite being as self-caused, but to be the cause of oneself is to suppose a distance from oneself. It seems, however, his intention was only to point out that God is the uncaused c...