A Philosopher's Ruminations

  Reality or Tattva is an abstract noun formed by adding the inflection –ness to the demonstrative ‘that’ which we use to point out to something. So that-ness means something that is capable of being referred to as a that or in other words something that has a certain character or svabhava. Nagarjuna believes that svabhava is really a prajnapti sat or merely a conventional existent like say a chariot, the chariot is neither in the parts nor a whole apart from the parts nor a configuration of the parts, it is merely a name. Depending on certain factors or collocations something is conferred with a name and mind takes it to be an independent existing reality. So there are then two ways to refer to reality, one from an ordinary standpoint where the name has a practical significance in worldly transactions. The sage does not upset conventional truths. Another standpoint is the transcendental standpoint where reality is referred to as essentially ni-svabhava, taking it to have a svabhav...

  Anyatha-khyati-vada basically says that error involves seeing something different from the way it actually is. Every cognition is structured in a certain way; we see something as something. Thus in the cognition: This is a red tomato; tomato is seen as possessing red color; so schematically the cognition is of the form a-R-b where (a) is the qualificand and (b) the qualifier and R the relation between the two which in this case is inherence. The qualifier resides in the qualificand and distinguishes it from everything else that does not possess that qualifier. Thus red color here is the distinguishing feature of tomato which is the qualificand and distinguishes it from anything else possessing a different color. In erroneous cognition the qualificand is seen as qualified by something that does not reside within it e.g. black color in case of a cognition of what really is a red tomato seen as black. Now for Nyaya in a false cognition a and b are both real entities but they are wro...

  In the Buddhist View Knowledge of absence arises as follows: First there is perception of something - like the bare ground where one expects to see a jar but finds it missing. Knowledge of absence arises because of its counter-positive (pratiyogin) i.e. the absentee. The manner in which the counter-positive figures in the negative judgement determines how we acquire knowledge of absence of something. The primary role here is played by thwarted expectation and a negative judgement is formed by inference to the effect that if a jar would have been there it would have been perceived; since it is not perceived it is absent. For Buddhists there are no negative facts. Negation is just the presence of something else than what one expected to see. It is the product of the imaginative activity of the mind. For Buddhists the division of subject, cognition and object of cognition is an imaginary distinction; what is real is a series of conscious moments. On the other hand for Nyaya cognizab...

  The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the arguments given by Vasubandhu in Vimsatika and Dignaga in his Alambana-Pariksha on the one hand and George Berkeley in favour of idealism on the other.   BERKELEY’S ESSE IS PERCIPI ARGUMENT   Berkeley's argument for esse is percipi idealism is   (1) ideas can exist only in being perceived   (2) sensible objects (stones, trees, mountains,etc.) are ideas   (3) therefore, sensible objects can exist only in being perceive     The rationale for premise (1) can be explained through contrasting it with the views of Locke’s theory of Ideas which is opposed by Berkeley:   “I must here in the Entrance beg pardon of my Reader, for the frequent use of the Word Idea, which he will find in the following Treatise. It being that Term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks . . . or whatsoever it is, w...

  Uddyotakara was a Nyaya philosopher coming after Dignaga. His exact dates cannot be known but we know that while he was aware of Dignaga’s views he is unaware of Dharmakirti just like Kumarila. Thus his date falls between the two. Poet Subandhu author of the famous work Vasavadatta refers to him as someone who has defended Nyaya from Buddhist scholars. Conjecture is he lived in 6th Century C.E. He is the author of Nyaya-Vartikka, a commentary on Nyaya Bhashya of Vatsyayana, which itself is a commentary on Nyaya Sutras. This work has been translated into English by Ganganath Jha. He says his intention is writing the commentary is to refute Buddhist logicians and in the work he is more concerned about polemics than exposition. Most of his arguments are sophistical and do not really affect Buddhist philosophers who quite easily exposed the sophistry. His work lacks sincerity and thoroughness of a Kumarila whose critique of Buddhist philosophy undoubtedly was the first strong respo...