SCHOOLS OF INDIAN THOUGHT – PART 1 – RAMANUJA’S VISHISTHADVAITA VEDANTA

 SCHOOLS OF INDIAN THOUGHT – PART 1 – RAMANUJA’S VISHISTHADVAITA VEDANTA

APRITHAKSIDDHI:

The central concept of VisishtAdvaita Philosophy is that Brahman alone is organically related to the soul (chit) and matter (achit) and is the ultimate reality. Chit and Achit are absolutely different and yet inseparable from Brahman. Though these two entities draw their very existence from Brahman. Brahman is independent of them just as the soul is independent from the body but remains the inner controller of both chit and achit. This relationship of inseparability is called Aprithaksiddhi.

Empirically we find that a substance and an attribute though different yet are related to each other inseparably. Take for example a blue jar. The jar is different from the colour blue but both are referred to in the judgment, “This is a blue jar”. Perception reveals them to be identical but yet they cannot be identical, for jar is certainly different from the blue colour and not all jars are blue nor is blue-ness found only in case of a jar. Thus we perceive a blue jar as two entities tied together. Both their inseparability and difference is perceived. But it is wrong to conceive the relation between the substance and the attribute as simultaneously identical and different from each other. For both are contradictory properties and hence cannot qualify the same locus. Nor could it be said that both are identical for they are perceived as having a relation with each other and to have a relation implies a difference as two entities. “Aprithaksiddhi” is just a name to denote the fact of two things being found to be so related that they are inseparable and different.

A substance is defined as that which is the substratum for changes or modifications. The modifications do not affect the substratum for they are adventitious. An attribute is that which is subject to modifications. Accordingly there is a difference between a defining characteristic and an attribute. The former is the very essence of the thing. A substance shall suffer a complete change if the modification is of its very essence. But such is not the case with an attribute. For example cowness is the very essence of a cow. Since it is also the basis of differentiating a cow from other animals like a goat or a buffalo, it can also be said that the difference is the very nature of an entity since that difference is defined as that which leads to the empirical usage of the words, ‘this is different from that’ (TMK 5.13). A cow cannot but cease to be a cow if it ceases to have cow-ness. But cow-ness is not something over and above the fact of being a cow i.e. a cow having such properties like a dewlap etc.

However a jar which has a blue colour can have a change of colour without ceasing to be a jar. In a similar fashion, chit and achit are attributes of Brahman. The classic example that is given to explain the dependence of chit and achit on Brahman is through the body-soul example. The body is defined by Sri Ramanuja as that substance which a sentient self can completely control and support for its own purposes. The body is entirely dependent on the self (SB 2.1.9). Thus when it is said that the whole universe as chit and achit constitute the body of Brahman, the term ‘body’ is used in a very technical sense to denote their absolute dependence on Brahman. Their existence is by Brahman and for Brahman. They exist for the sake of Brahman and apart from that they have no meaning. By their very nature they are dependent or subordinate entities. Brahman is their very soul and pervades them and controls them. However, chit and achit are organically related to Brahman. There is identity between the two but not absolute identity but a rather qualified identity, which is the reason this school of thought is known as Qualified Monism or VisishtAdvaita Brahman. This is the solution offered by Sri Ramanuja to the problem of relating the ‘One’ ultimate reality to the world of multiplicity.

CHIT AND ACHIT:

The self is of the very nature of knowledge and also has knowledge as its attribute. It is infinite in number, the knowing subject, the agent of action, the enjoyer of the fruits of its karma and is eternal. Knowledge as the very nature of the soul is known as svarupajnana and as the attribute of the soul is dharmabhutajnana. The self is a monad whose very nature is knowledge. Knowledge, however, is not only an attribute but also a substance. Knowledge suffers modifications as we see ‘knowledge states’ arising in reference to different objects. It also suffers from contraction and expansion. In the state of pralaya (dissolution) or deep sleep we see that knowledge contracts and in awake state we see its expansion. However the soul is conceived of being omniscient. The expansion of its knowledge is obstructed by avidya or ignorance in the form of karma which restricts the expansion aspect of knowledge and causes contraction, the result of which are the different knowledge states experienced in the everyday world.

At this point it may be recalled that a substance was defined as that which was the locus for modifications. The modification of knowledge takes place only in relation to dharmabhutajnana and not substantive knowledge or svarupajnana. If it is asked as to how can the knower be the same when the corresponding knowledge is manifold or in other words how can there be one knower of ‘many’ knowledges without that knower suffering modifications, it may be said that the conditions of knowledge affect the knower’s attributive knowledge or dharmabhutajnana and not its very nature or svarupajnana. Knowledge is defined in SB 1.1.1 as that which by its intrinsic nature reveals as another to its subject. The self is by its very nature is a knower analogous to Brahman and apprehends an object revealed to it by its attributive knowledge. The relation between the soul and knowledge is explained by the example of the flame of a lamp and its luminosity. They are distinct but not physically separable. Like the self, knowledge too is eternal though it suffers from modification. However, the two facts are not conceived as contradictory because of the substance-attribute theory accepted by this school.

Now, both the soul and knowledge being substances, how can it be logically conceived that a substance can be qualified by another substance? It is possible just as the luminosity is an attribute of a flame though both are substances. The manner in which a substance is defined in this system precludes any logical difficulty in conceiving a substance to act as a substance and yet be an attribute of another substance. As the soul is conceived of being a moral agent, a question may arise as to how can a man be an independent agent of action and yet dependent on Brahman? Does he have free will or not? The solution offered by VisishtAdvaita Vedanta is that Brahman is the cause of the actions of the jiva in as much without Him there can be no possibility to perform any action, good or bad. A person acts in accordance with his dispositions which are determined by his past actions or karma. Thus he is the agent of his action and reaps its fruits too. But Brahman is just the witness who has out of his free will bestowed on the soul the independence to act as he may like. Brahman guides him to the performance of scripturally approved actions in order to free himself from the bond of karma, and also by incarnating Himself in the midst of human beings. But He does not show partiality towards anyone and all are free to choose Him or reject Him. Brahman is thus like oxygen, freely available and necessary for the performance of daily activities. However, He is not responsible for the particular choices that people make.

Achit is insentient matter. Prakriti is the totality of insentient universe. It is the material cause in respect of inanimate nature. It is in a state of equilibrium with the three gunas: sattva, rajas and tamas. When this equilibrium is disturbed by the will of the Lord, it begins to evolve into inanimate universe. Time is considered here to be a separate category. Time is a substance which appears limited through various limiting adjuncts into moments etc. It is the material cause in respect to its modifications which are nothing but temporal divisions. Another category is called Nityavibhuti which is a category of immateriality. Suddhasattva or just sattva is described as a Nityavibhuti untainted by rajas and tamas. It is the substance through which the spiritual bodies of Isvara and liberated jivas are composed and also the various spiritual realms are its products. All these are eternally dependent on Brahman.

BRAHMAN:

Brahman is the one ultimate reality known only through the means of the scriptures. However the scriptures describe Brahman sometimes as qualified by attributes and at other times as attributeless. The Advaitins give more importance to the nirguna (attributeless) texts than the saguna (with attributes) and hence resort to a secondary meaning of the latter. However all the words of scriptures should be given equal importance and should be interpreted in their primary meaning. Accordingly the texts which call Brahman nirguna intend to convey that Brahman does not possess any inauspicious qualities and is free from the bondage of matter, space and time. Brahman is all-pervasive and infinite. Truth, consciousness, bliss, purity etc. are the essential qualities of Brahman. Other attributes like knowledge, strength, lordship, virility, splendor, etc. are predicated on Brahman. Some secondary characteristics like love, omnipotence, omniscience, friendly disposition, compassion etc. are also attributes of Brahman.

As mentioned earlier, Brahman has chit and achit for his body and is regarded as the cause of the world. There are three types of causes: the efficient cause, the material cause and the co-operant cause. The first is the agent for producing modifications akin to a potter, the second is the locus of modifications like clay and the last is that which aids in producing the effect like a potter’s wheel. Since the Sruti text says that Brahman is one, without a second, Brahman is conceived to be all the three types of causes in relation to the world. Since the world is produced due to the will of Brahman, he is justifiably called the efficient cause. But a problem arises when we consider him to be the material cause as well. The problem is how does Brahman become the many without transforming Himself? Brahman is in the causal state when its body consists of the individual selves and physical nature in a subtle condition undistinguishable through differentiation of name and form. Brahman having the individual selves and nature as its body in the gross manifested condition distinguished through differentiations of names and forms is the state of effect. The assumed aspect of manifestation and grossness are described as creation. Chandogya Upanishad 6.2.2 raised the question: "By what logic can existence verily come out of non-existence?" There is no logical possibility. "Existence alone is the reality" says 6.1.4. However, a simple answer is provided as follows: No one has seen a unicorn being produced. There is no entity that can be called the son of a barren woman. That which is non-existent cannot be produced. Hence the world pre-existed in Brahman as chit and achit in a dormant state and existed as an effect when they were in an active state. Terms like cause and effect are relative to each other. They are nothing but different modes of conceiving one underlying substance. One single substance acts as the cause and the effect depending on the relative conditions. In relation to a pot the lump of clay is the cause and the pot is nothing but the lump of clay acquiring a name and form. A cause is the prior condition of a substance without differentiations of name and form and the effect is the posterior condition of the same substance when it has acquired names and form. A boy grows into a youth, a youth attains manhood and then comes old age. These different states affect the body but the soul is not subject to modification. The material causality of Brahman is to be understood in this way. Brahman being the soul of all creation is unaffected by the changes in the conditions of the body. It is chit and achit alone that are subject to modification. Brahman is the substratum of that modification and hence is spoken of as the material cause. So to be the material cause is to be the substratum of modification and in similar manner is Brahman conceived to be the material cause of the world.

 

RAMANUJA AND NIMBARKA:

 

The primary question for any Vedanta philosophy is about what is the relation between Brahman and the world and Brahman and the individual souls. Nimbarka takes this relation to be one of identity and difference. He gives the analogy of a coiled snake and of sun and its rays. Brahman is both immanent and transcendent; the souls and matter are really just the different manifest states of the one Brahman. The concern with such a philosophy is to show that the immanence of Brahman does not compromise its unity and the impurities that accrue to the soul and matter do not thereby affect Brahman.

Ramanuja believes that this is not possible in the Bheda-Abheda system (his criticisms of Bhaskara would with certain modifications apply also to Nimbarka). The reason is identity and difference cannot be affirmed simultaneously of the same object. Identity is an absolute relation or in the logical terminology of Nyaya it is a locus pervading relation. In terms of Modern Logic identity is a reflexive relation. Anything that is; is identical with itself. Not in one part identical with itself and not in another - for identity belongs to a thing fully and completely. So there can be no such thing as a partial identity. And difference is only possible if there is identity for difference exists between two terms and to be a term or a thing is to have an identity. Hence the principle of non-contradiction implies that nothing can be both identical with itself and different from itself. Arguably this is not the way Nimbarka conceived the issue but the burden of proof is on him - he has to make clear in what intelligible sense identity and difference can co-exist and why that would not compromise the unity of Brahman. Instead it seems Nimbarka has merely asserted that this is the case without explaining the grounds for that assertion. He has simply assumed the datum or that which requires explanation or explication.

Secondly, since the identity of Brahman and the the world on one hand and soul on other is asserted there is no reason why the impurities that accrue to the latter shouldn’t accrue to the former too. And since identity is a transitive relation i.e. if A = B, B = C then A = C. Thus since soul and matter are identical with Brahman they should also be identical with each other. How then to account for their difference?

Unlike Nimbarka, Ramanuja does not want to reduce the relation between Brahman and Jiva and Matter to be an a-logical one. To circumvent the second problem he asserts the difference of Jiva and Matter from Brahman. And in order to account for the unity of Brahman he takes both to be inseparable from Brahman in a way that they qualify it or in a way qualities are related to a substance. Think of the body of Brahman as a substance which is subject to modifications that accrue to soul and matter. The body is however inseparably connected with the soul - so that there cannot be one without the other. This is called the concept of Aprithaksiddhi. The difference of the qualification from the qualified does not compromise the unity of the underlying substance because the qualifiers are inseparable from the qualified. The body of Brahman suffers modifications but as its essence or soul Brahman is not subject to those modifications.

 

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