SCHOOLS OF INDIAN THOUGHT - PART 2 - NYAYA EPISTEMOLOGY

 

I. JNANA

Jnana is usually translated as cognition. Cognition is the only thing that has intentionality or the property of being directed at the world. It reveals objects in the world towards which goal directed action can be initiated. It is of the nature of illumination like a lamp and generates awareness in the subject of is objects. It is always used in an episodic sense and never in a dispositional sense. The later job is done by samskaras. Jnana is used to connote mental states like perception, memory, introspection, assumption, doubt, belief etc. Jnana is divided into anubhava and smriti. Anubhava is of the nature of presentation of its object while smriti is recollection of a previous experience. Anubhava of an object makes an impression in the mind of the subject and is stored there. When it is revived due to diverse factors it leads to memory of its object. So anubhava is presentational, of the form ‘I experience an object’, while memory is derivative on anubhava for its content. Hence it is through anubhava that new information is gained by the subject. Also it is anubhava which is true or false judged by the way it reveals the world. Anubhava is divided into: Perception, Inference, Verbal Testimony etc. depending on which modes of awareness we regard as pramanas. Pramana-s are instruments of valid cognition. Prama is valid cognition or knowledge.

 

II. PARATAH PRAMANYA

In virtue of which pramana leads to prama is called pramanya. Pramanya refers to the abstract quality in virtue of which a pramana has the status it does. The subject of knowledge is called pramatri. Pramanya is translated as validity and is similar to the notion of justification in western epistemology. Pramana is called the instrumental cause of valid knowledge. An instrumental cause is that which has a vyapara (operation) which culminates in producing the effect. For example the axe which cuts the tree is the instrumental cause and the contact of axe with the tree is the operation of the instrumental cause.

 

Mimamsakas argue that pramanya is conferred intrinsically while Nyaya believes that pramanya is conferred extrinsically. The former theory is known as svatah pramanya and the latter paratah pramanya.  Svatah pramanya vada holds that in order to explain the validity of a cognition we need not appeal to anything outside the cognition. For cognition is self-valid. The causes that produce cognition are also productive of the cognition's validity. When we have a cognition we immediately take it to be true and don’t entertain a doubt regarding its validity. Only when we have a doubt do we make an attempt to determine whether a cognition is valid or not. Thus there are two theories here, jnapti vada and utpatti vada. The former which seeks to answer the question of production of valid knowledge is utpatti vada and the latter which seeks to answer the question of grasping valid knowledge is jnapti vada. The argument for utpatti vada is given by Kumarila in (Slokavartika, Codana 49-53) the interpretation of which is under dispute: "The validity of all pramanas should be accepted as intrinsic for a capacity not already existing by itself cannot be produced by anything else......” Cognition is born with valid or invalid for we grasp its validity as it arises. It is not that cognition arises first and then validity is conferred on it. For jnapti vada the argument is if cognition’s validity is not conferred immediately then it would not preclude doubt about its object and not lead to goal-oriented activity. Kumarila also motivates his theory by pointing out that if a cognition is not self valid then its validity will have to be determined by another cognition, of this cognition we may also raise the question of its validity and invalidity to adjudicate which we would need to appeal to a still another cognition and the question of this cognition’s validity would similarly arise and would have to be dealt with by appealing to another cognition and this leads to an infinite regress. A cognition is a pramana if it is not sublated by another cognition.

Nyaya motivates paratah pramanya vada by pointing out that cognition is valid in virtue of being faithful or not to the object it presents. Cognition has merits and demerits in virtue of which it corresponds with its objects or not. So its validity is determined by adjudging whether it corresponds with an object in the world, something which we cannot decide merely on the basis of cognition. For suppose cognition presents us with a shell in front of us. Merely on the basis of this we cannot decide whether our cognition is true or not. When we go about and pick up the object, this successful activity towards its object leads us to infer the validity of cognition. This does not lead to an infinite regress because inquiry ends with determination of an object and we do not doubt this certifying cognition and hence we don’t need to decide its validity, for validity is determined only when we have a doubt. Nyaya thus agrees with Mimamsaka that we never doubt our cognitions but also hold that this condition is not sufficient for the truth of the cognition. Rather this trust to our cognitions is due to habit and their faithfulness in past but when doubt arises we do have to check the validity of cognition by appealing to factors outside the cognition. We can also sometimes entertain doubt about our cognition as soon as it arises. Seeing ground filled with water in warm summer evokes surprise and doubt not certitude. Hence there is not rule that as soon as cognition arises it leads to certitude about its object. There are conditions where such a rule may not hold. This motivates jnapti vada. For utpatti vada the argument is that causes of a cognition are common to error and valid cognitions hence they cannot be the unique cause of valid cognition. To escape this objection some Mimamsakas argue that there can be no invalid cognition. Nyaya believes that we can have true and false cognitions. But Mimamsakas point out that invalid cognition is only pseudo cognition and not really cognition at all. Thus to settle this question both sides have to debate on the possibility of invalid cognition.

III. NUMBER OF PRAMANAS

Nyaya believes there are four pramanas – perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Vaisesika delete comparison and verbal testimony from the list as both can be assimilated to inference. Buddhists likewise believe there are only two pramanas- perception and inference. Mimamsakas believe there are six pramanas – perception, inference, comparison, implication, non-apprehension and verbal testimony. Implication (Arthapatti) leads to postulate a new state of affairs to explain an otherwise incompatible set of propositions. For example if we know that Devadatta is stout and is not eating anything in the morning, then we postulate the state of affairs that Devadatta eats at night to explain these seemingly incompatible propositions. Nyaya however take this to be inference. Comparison (Upmana) is differently used in Nyaya and Mimamsa. In Nyaya it leads to knowledge of new meanings of words. For Mimamsa it leads to knowledge of similarity. Non-Apprehension (Anuplabdhi) leads to knowledge of absence. Nyaya believes that absence is cognized through perception. When we see an empty floor where we were expecting to see a pot, we recollect the pot and see the ground as qualified by absence of a pot. There are four kinds of absence in Nyaya: a) prior absence, this is the status of an object when it is absent before its production b) posterior absence, this refers to an object that has been destroyed c) absolute absence, this is absence of an object in a locus in all three periods of time and d) mutual absence, this is absence of identity between two objects. The entity negated is called the pratiyogin or counterpositive of the negation, for example, when we say a pot is absent from the floor, the pot is the pratiyogin or the counterpositive.

IV. PERCEPTION

Perception is defined as cognition produced through sense organs. It is of two types: Indeterminate Perception and Determinate Perception. In Indeterminate Perception sense organs merely make contact with an object but this does not lead to determination of the object. This happens at the second stage where we realize that the object in front of me for example is really a table. Perceiving an object for first time, infant and animal perception are examples of indeterminate perception. Determinate Perception arises when an object is cognized in virtue of being the object it is: To see a table qua its being a table. Here memory and sense organs both need to operate. Perception of mental states is also included in this. Pleasure, pain etc. are cognized. The common cause of all cognitions is contact of the self – mind – sense organs – object.

V. INFERENCE

Inference or anumana in Nyaya is a pramana, it leads to valid knowledge of some object based on another object which acts as a sign or mark for the presence of the former object. The previous knowledge of invariable concomitance between the sign and the signified and the knowledge of their presence in a certain locus based on the above said relation leads to anumana. To illustrate with the help of an example, someone notices smoke on a mountain. Smoke reminds him of fire and also that he has noticed their co-presence in a kitchen or a hearth and their co-absence in a lake and thus he knows that smoke is invariably accompanied by fire. Based on this knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyapti) between smoke and fire, the person believes that the smoke on the mountain also must be accompanied by fire and he concludes this must be the case. Here the Naiyayika is not saying that psychologically we always go through this long process when we infer something for a difference is made between inference for oneself and for another. When we present our inferential knowledge we always do so in a syllogistic form and the above description was of a way to convey one’s inferential knowledge. The Nyaya syllogism consists of five steps:

1. Theory (Pratijna): The Mountain possesses fire

2. Reason (hetu): because of smoke

3. Example (udharana): where there is smoke there is fire as in a kitchen

4. Application (upanaya): This Mountain similarly possesses smoke which is invariable concomitant with fire

5. Conclusion (nigamana): Therefore the mountain possesses fire.

Here smoke is the hetu or the middle term, fire is the sadhya or the major term and mountain is the paksha or the minor term. The instances which have the co-presence of the smoke and fire is the sapaksha and where such a relation is not found that is called the vipaksha.

It should be noted that all examples brought in an argument and counter argument to support an empirical generalization must be acceptable to both the parties.

There are three different types of inferences in Nyaya:

1. Kevalanvayi (only positive): when the hetu and the sadhya have only a sapaksha but no vipaksha. For example: All that is knowable is nameable. The pot is knowable and hence is nameable. Here knowable and nameable pervade the whole world and hence there is no instance where their co-absence may be found. (For Nyaya there is no instance where knowability and nameability are absent).

2. Kevala Vyatireki (only negative): here the hetu and sadhya have no positive instance of agreement in presence. An example will suffice here: no non-soul is animate. All living beings are animate. Therefore all living beings have souls. Here the hetu ‘animate’ is said to be found only in living beings or beings possessing a soul and nowhere else and hence no positive instance apart from the disputed case can be found. Therefore the concomitance is established negatively, between absence of possessing a soul and absence of ‘animate-ness’.

3. Anvaya Vyatireki (Agreement in presence and absence): Here the hetu and sadhya are both positively and negatively related to each other like in the mountain fire and smoke example.

Inference takes place always when there is pervasion or vyapti between two objects which act as sign and the signified. However vyapti may be of different types or degrees. When the relation between the hetu and the sadhya is in an unfailing relation, here both the objects may act as the sign and signified for each other. For example something is sinful because it is prohibited in the Vedas and something is prohibited in the Vedas because it is sinful. Then there may be an instance where only one object forms the sign for another but not vica verse. For example one may infer fire on the basis of smoke but not vica verse as fire does not pervade smoke like in a red hot iron ball. Thirdly two objects may be mutually exclusive for example the class of cows and the class of horses, where the one is the other is not and hence there is a relation of exclusion between them.

In Nyaya there are no fallacies but blockers or preventers. The so called fallacies in Nyaya block the awareness or cognition of an inference to arise or they themselves may be cognitions that oppose the awareness of inference to arise. Mostly they are based on deviation between the hetu and the sadhya, either there is some instance where the hetu is and sadhya is not or their relation may be conditional. This brings us to the theory of upadhi. Upadhi is something that pervades the sadhya but does not pervade the hetu and hence blocks an inference. For example in the inference mountain has smoke because it has fire, fuel is the upadhi, and it pervades instances of smoke but not of fire for fire may be present in a red hot iron ball.

Tarka is that which removes any doubt about the invariable concomitance between two objects. It starts with an assumption based on the denial of vyapti and shows how it leads to absurdities. For example: If the soul was not eternal, then it may not experience the fruits of past life and hence it is eternal.

 

VI. SHABDA

 

Verbal Testimony (Shabda) is knowledge due to words spoken by a trustworthy person (apta). Expert opinion is included in this. Vedas are valid for Nyaya because they are words of Ishvara who is a perfect being and hence an (apta) trustworthy being. Mimamsakas however believe that Vedas are eternal and not produced by any author not even Ishvara. Nyaya believes that cognition produced by hearing the Vedas has to be determined as true or false on basis on factors outside the cognition. Ishvara’s cognition is perfect and hence can be appealed to determine the validity of Vedas. Mimamsakas believe that it is enough if the cognition is not sublated by another cognition for then it is self-valid and true. Hence no appeal to an omniscient author is needed. Buddhists and Vaisesikas do not take Shabda to be a pramana. For them it is a matter of inference.

First of all verbal knowledge arises from verbal cognition i.e. it arises from knowledge of the meaning of words and hence it is a mediate cognition. A cognition is mediate when in order for a subject S to have cognition of Y; he needs to cognize X which then acts as the instrumental cause (karana) of the cognition of Y.

Instrumental Cause (karana) is the unique cause which has an operation that leads to the effect. For example in the felling of the tree the axe is the instrumental cause and the contact of the axe with the tree is the operation (vyapara). Most of the Nyaya philosophers from Raghunatha onward however take vyapara to be the instrumental cause.

Perception is regarded as immediate because there is no cognition of some X that acts as the instrumental cause of the cognition of Y. In Inference cognition of vyapti (invariable concomitance) is required for inferential cognition. In the case of Verbal cognition it is knowledge of the meaning of the word. The meaning of the word is established by will; human or divine. So a conventional relation exists between the word and the referent of the word. There is no such relation between the hetu (inferential sign) and sadhya (inferred entity) hence word (Shabda) is a separate mode of cognition; different from both inference and perception.

Now the question arises how verbal testimony can be regarded as a source of knowledge. The question is important because we seem to acquire a large chunk of our information from verbal testimony. This is also to say that the importance of testimony lies not in production of knowledge but in transmission of knowledge. And here a serious problem arises: Being told that X is the case does not produce knowledge of X for to gain knowledge of X one should look to perception and inference. So knowledge gained second hand is not knowledge at all. Hence verbal testimony should be reduced to perception or inference - a distinct way of knowing. It could be argued that verbal testimony must be based on the apprehension of trustworthiness of the speaker by the hearer. But how can the hearer know the speaker is trustworthy except through verifying it on the basis of perception and inference.

Against this Nyaya philosophers urge that belief is implicated in the very act of understanding (Shabda-Bodha) the meaning of words and in order to acquire a true belief we need not have a justification for the belief. Moreover we need to set conditions not only on the trustworthiness of the speaker but also on the competence of the hearer. Someone gullible for instance would gulp every falsehood spoken by someone but an intelligent hearer would take information with a pinch of salt. And information would crystallize into knowledge only when there is absence of doubt and the information is true. So in cases where the speaker is qualified and credible and the information conveyed is believable and true then there is no reason to deny knowledge arising from verbal testimony.