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Schools Of Indian Thought - Part 4 - Advaita Vedanta - The Concept Of Avidya

  Advaita Vedanta like Neo-Platonist philosophers Plotinus and Philo believe that the One is the source of the Many but in such a way that there is no change or loss of perfection in the causal transaction. However unlike other Vedanta schools of philosophy and Neo-Platonism; Advaita believes that the One cannot become the Many without ceasing to be what it is and yet it is the source of the world of diversity. These two ways of thinking are reconciled by denying the reality of the ‘Many’, the world of diversity is merely an appearance that seems to create differences within a difference-less and homogeneous entity - Brahman. Brahman is the source of the world only in the sense that it is the basis or the substratum of the world-illusion; which would thus not exist without Brahman - illusions always being one thing appearing as another they always require a substratum. Without a rope there would be no rope-snake illusion. The principle of the world appearance is however Brahman and Maya - the latter is as it were the stuff out of which illusion is made but which is unreal because it can be negated together with its product in the very substratum within which it was perceived. In order to understand how Brahman appears as many we need to understand the concept of Avidya:

 Avidya is Sat-Asat-Vilakshana i.e. neither existent nor non-existent.

Sat is what cannot be sublated at any time and Asat is what cannot be cognized as existing in any substratum whatsoever. It can be seen here that Asat is not the negation of Sat; so denial of Sat does not imply Asat. Sat and Asat are contraries not contradictory; hence the law of excluded middle is not violated. There cannot be a single thing that is both Sat and Asat but the negation of both Sat and Asat can reside in a single substratum; for example negation of class-character of cow and of horse can reside in a camel but both cannot be found together in a single substratum. This is what is meant by Sat-Asat-Vilakshana and it defines Vyavaharika Satya; it is neither existent nor non-existent.

Can there be something that is neither existent nor non-existent? Consider the definition of Sat - that which cannot be negated at any time whatsoever. Can we apply this definition to the world? No; because the world is sublated in Brahman experience. To what can the definition be applied? It can be applied to the Self; for the Self cannot deny its own existence since the denial would presuppose the Self. Only Brahman / Atman is self-luminous i.e. it is capable of being cognized without being an object of cognition. In case of other objects we can be mistaken about their existence; since they admit of an appearance - reality distinction but in the case of Self-consciousness there is no gap between consciousness and existence; its existence is guaranteed by its consciousness. Hence it is unsublatable while in the case of the world we cannot eliminate the possibility that it might be sublated sometime in the future. Hence the nature of existence in the case of Brahman and the world is different and they have different degrees of reality; Brahman is of a higher order of reality and hence is parmarthika Satya while the world possesses vyavharika satya. The world is not Sat because it is different from Sat.

How can the world be regarded different from Asat? Why is the world not Asat if it is contradicted by Brahman-experience? Remember Asat means that which is not capable of being cognized in any substratum whatsoever. But the world is cognized to exist. Hence it is not Asat. Vyavaharika Satya also means conventional existence. Our practical needs can be met only in Vyavharika realm. This is because Sat is non-dual; but difference between objects is required for action born of desire or repulsion. And something Asat cannot motivate any action nor can ground its success. So successful activity is found only in the vyavharika realm.

Avidya conceals the Self Luminous Brahman and projects the world (in the latter aspect it is called maya and in the former avidya). It is an irrational and indefinable category as explained above.

 

If everything is One; then how do we account for the experience of difference in everyday life? For this purpose we need to introduce the concept of upadhi (property) or a differentiator. There are two kinds of differentiators - essential and indicative. An essential differentiator belongs to a subject like cow-ness or even the color brown - they reside within the subject. An indicative differentiator does not reside in the subject but can serve as the basis of differentiation of the subject. Like the crow in the example: There is a crow sitting on top of Devadatta’s house. The crow is not part and parcel of the house (it is in contact with the house) yet serves to differentiate it. Or to use another example - Devadatta’s house is to the left of Rama’s house. ‘To the left’ of is an indicator of Devadatta’s house. In Advaita Vedanta difference is not real - it is only a notion.

To use an analogy that Advaita writers use compare space-in-a-pot and external space. The pot is only an external denomination of the space. It puts a notional limit on space. But if the pot is destroyed or removed from its place - the space that was occupied by that pot is not destroyed or moved. The space-in-the-pot and the space without were always identical. Notional concepts cannot create a difference where there is none; they only appear to create a difference - which may be useful for practical purposes. When these notional limitors are negated - identity remains as the remainder of the negation. The same is the case with the individual self and universal self (Ishvara). As Shankara explains the limitors of the two are different hence from the practical point of view Ishvara is different from Jiva. In the Upanishadic statement - That Thou Art - That signifies Ishvara, Thou signifies Jiva and Is (Art) signifies Identity. But the sentence is not a contradiction. For when the limiting adjuncts of the two are negated - Brahman is what remains as the remainder of the negations. In this sense the two are identical.

It is imperative to understand - Brahman and the world are polar opposites - they represent two in-commensurable points of view. Even when we say that Brahman is the substratum of the world illusion we ascribe a false notion to Brahman. Brahman ever evades being caught up in the nets of our concepts. There is no passage from illusion to reality - illusion has to be negated in order to get at what is real. This is what Advaita Vedanta believes.

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