A Commentary On Kant's Transcendental Deduction

 

To begin with the question is: what is a deduction? Kant answers this question in A84/B116:

 

“When teachers of law talk about rights and claims, they distinguish in a legal action the question regarding what is legal (quid juris) from the question concerning fact (quid facti), and they demand proof of both. The first proof, which is to establish the right, or for that matter the legal entitlement, they call the deduction. We employ a multitude of empirical concepts without being challenged by anyone. And we consider ourselves justified, even without having offered a deduction, to assign to these empirical concepts a meaning and imagined signification, because we always have experience available to us to prove their objective reality. But there are also concepts that we usurp, as, e.g. fortune, fate. And although these concepts run loose with our almost universal forbearance, yet they are sometimes confronted by the question of their legality, quid juris. This question then leaves us in considerable perplexity regarding the deduction of these concepts; for neither from experience nor from reason can we adduce any distinct legal basis from which the right to use them emerges distinctly.”

 

Deduction is a proof that establishes right or legal entitlement but the proof of entitlement is different from the proof of the fact of entitlement and the latter presupposes the former. My citizenship may be proved by producing certain relevant documents but that assumes that there is a criteria for determining citizenship and the document merely proves the fact of citizenship and all the rights that come with it, informing us what a citizen will entitled to. So the question of who should be counted as a citizen is different from the question whether or not I am a citizen. The latter question depends on the application of a criteria and so the proof of the criteria cannot be settled by fact of application. Before giving a proof we need to inquire into what constitutes a proof. In answer to the question who should be counted a citizen one cannot answer anyone who has a certificate of citizenship because the question is who should be issued such a certificate in the first place. So the question of objectivity of truth or of moral values can be settled not by practical use but by establishing which fact would count as a relevant fact – as establishing the truth or falsehood of something or the morality or immorality of an action. This is how Kant understood Hume’s problem pertaining to the question of objective validity of the concepts of cause-effect but which question could be raised across the board for all concept. As he notes painfully in Prolegomena that none of Hume’s opponents really understood him because: “The question was not, whether the concept of cause is right, useful, and, with respect to all cognition of nature, indispensable, for this Hume had never put in doubt; it was rather whether it is thought through reason a priori, and in this way has an inner truth independent of all experience, and hence also a much more widely extended use that is not limited merely to objects of experience: regarding this Hume awaited enlightenment. The discussion was only about the origin of this concept, not about its indispensability in use; if the former were only discovered, the conditions of its use and the sphere in which it can be valid would already be given.” (4:259).

 

So the proof of objective validity, the proof of right or entitlement and the problem of finding the origin of a concept and the question about meaning or significance of a concept are here linked. Deduction constitutes a proof of objective validity by demonstrating the meaning or significance of a concept which requires us to trace the origin of a concept back to its source. Next Kant tries to circumscribe which kind of concepts require a deduction. The first criteria is obvious, those whose objective reality is in doubt. One may doubt for instance whether there is such a thing as fate or fortune. But which are those concepts whose validity is not in doubt? These are concepts whose objects can be given to us either in experience, they can be concepts of objects given to us in experience and which have their source in these experiences and so can be regarded as a-posteriori and also there are mathematical concepts for instance the concept of a triangle can be constructed by a geometer in pure intuition and thereby he can assure himself of the objective reality of his concepts. The concepts that concern us cannot be given to us in experience and so must be a-priori and unlike mathematical concepts we cannot simply construct them in pure intuition. These concepts are pure concepts of understanding which have been put into doubt by Hume. In the case of causality we saw our problem was what was the source of our knowledge of causal relation? Hume’s answer was found defective because no knowledge of necessary connection is possible from experience and he did not recognize reason as a source of such knowledge. Kant generalizes this problem in terms of possibility of the synthetic a-priori judgements and his account of reason aims to show how we connect different ideas together to form a unity that can be given to us in intuition, pure and empirical. For this reason we need a transcendental deduction rather than an empirical one. The former deduction demands (A85/B117) an explanation of how a concept can refer to an object a-priori. The problem with an empirical deduction is that it explains only the fact of possession i.e. the question quid facti but not the possibility of possession itself. We have two problems here, first we need to show that pure concepts of understanding must refer to objects a-priori and we need to explain how concepts come to refer to objects a-priori:

 

Hume failed to demonstrate the objective validity of concepts of cause-effect because he was unable to show how these concepts can be more than autobiographical predictions and can be truly found in the objects themselves. He failed because he did not trace the origin of these concepts in the understanding itself when he failed to find their source in experience. How is it that the necessity found in the concept that refers to experience yet whose source cannot be found within experience could still refer to it in the first place?

 

“But he was quite unable to explain how it is possible that concepts not in themselves combined in the understanding should nonetheless have to be thought by it as necessarily combined in the object. Nor did it occur to him that perhaps the understanding itself might, through these concepts, be the author of the experience wherein we encounter the understanding's objects. Thus, in his plight, he derived these concepts from experience (viz., from habit, a subjective necessity that arises in experience through repeated association and that ultimately is falsely regarded as objective).” (A94/B127).

 

Kant’s solution will be to find these concepts combined necessarily within understanding itself and to find them within the object of experience also. First he shall prove that pure concepts of understanding refer to objects of intuition and then he shall prove the objective validity of these concepts or the possibility of necessary reference of pure concepts to intuition by tracing their origin back to understanding and thereby explaining how these pure concepts despite having their source within understanding still refer to objects of possible experience a-priori.

 

Having seen his point of departure from empiricists we shall see he departs also from his rationalist predecessors. We saw that rationalists believe there is continuity between the human and divine intellect and in the case of Spinoza and Leibniz this possibility meant that we do not need a special proof of objective validity. Kant would agree that in this they are right and perhaps would also agree that the proof of objective validity would be circular by presupposing this continuity between human and divine intellects. We saw Descartes infer the objective reality of the concept of God by showing that no finite being could be the source of the idea of God and by referring this idea back to its source within God’s intellect he proved the idea’s objective reality and validity. Yet he could not have done so without presupposing metaphysical ideas whose possession has now been rendered into doubt. As regards Spinoza and Leibniz, Kant would emphasize that there is no continuity between human and divine intellects. Human understanding is discursive rather than intuitive which means which means that understanding provides the law or the rules but the object for applying these rules understanding finds from without. There are two heterogeneous sources of human cognition: sensibility or receptivity and understanding or spontaneity, the former is responsible for the matter of cognition or what can be called the object of cognition which is an appearance and the latter is the source of form or the rules for combining the data of intuition. We need to understand here the critical nature of Kant’s inquiry. We have already seen that Hume has put pure concepts of understanding to doubt and we have seen a possible solution to the problem specific to cause-effect requires us to assume the existence of God who combines these objects into the relevant relation. In Leibniz’s case the relevant relation is harmony, God seeks to maximize goodness by maximizing order and so he groups certain objects into relations like cause-effect that allow confer an orderliness in the world and since God is both the source of existence and knowledge, our own perceptions and concepts are in harmony with the order of existence. But Kant’s critical inquiry has to perform to borrow Husserl’s way of putting it an epoche. He is not looking for the possibility or condition of existence of something whose form is not already within us but instead of our cognition and hence he cannot assume the existence of God till he has not demonstrated the objective validity of the concept of God. From a critical point of view Leibniz’s solution means nothing to us because we cannot find the source of these ideas within ourselves that would validate these concepts for us. It is within us, through a survey of our own cognitive powers that we have to find a solution of this problem – the source of these concepts within our faculties and their objective validity. The problem would appear simple if we think that through consciousness directed inward we could possibly find their presence within us. But Kant is embarking not on a phenomenological but a transcendental investigation. Self-Consciousness or cogito of Descartes is a point where our knowledge of essence and existence coincides violating the discursivity thesis. As a matter of fact atleast as far back as Plotinus the fact of self-consciousness or self-reflexivity has been used to prove the distinction of the human soul from matter and its continuity with divine intellect. Kant however takes finite human cognition very seriously and he traces all our ideas to two heterogeneous sources and their heterogeneity is essential to the success of Kant’s endeavour. Against the empiricists he traces the form of our cognition to its source in understanding and against the rationalists he traces the origin of matter of cognition to receptivity. Knowledge of essence does not suffice for knowledge of existence and vica-versa but despite their heterogeneity we find them combined within human cognition and this coming together or working together of these two different faculties is necessary for cognition or the possibility of experience.

 

It becomes important to emphasize here how misplaced are recent discussions of conceptualism and non-conceptualism applied to Kant and his relation to his empiricist and rationalist predecessors. The question is not whether or not we can be aware of sensibly given objects without any concepts or conceptual abilities or whether the object in order to be given us must have a conceptual structure or not. Kant does mention that the conditions for something to be thought are different from conditions from something to be given to us in our sensibility. But at minimum this does not require as Kant urges against rationalists a metaphysical distinction rather than a logical distinction between the content of sense and understanding. Even for Leibniz et al, concepts are not necessary for something to be given to us. The question is about rules or laws that are operative in human cognition and we are not talking about physiological laws. For instance in Leibniz’s case a sensible object is given to our senses when one monad expresses its relation to another monad in a confused way but his conceptual abilities can reduce this lack of clarity and confusion by making the content more clear. The relevant point is that the relation of sense to understanding is one of expression or representation, no one would probably dispute that our concepts represent our objects given to us via our senses but the important point is how do we explain this relation of expression which Leibniz explains through its source in God but in Kant it has to be explained by finding its source in human cognitive powers or faculties because for Kant the crucial question is not just the establishment of a law but the way this law itself is deduced so that this law must also mean something to us which is possible only if we are the source of the law itself. Again we see against empiricists Kant emphasizes a transcendental rather than an empirical deduction and when it comes to rationalists his disagreement is again in terms of the kind of deduction that is at stake. His transcendental deduction is a departure from both an empirical and the metaphysical deduction of the rationalists which involves tracing our judgements back to their first principles which are like axioms in a deductive system and which are grounded within God’s intellect and his will. And so in departing from these two paradigms one may say justifiably Kant’s way is unique. Clarifying the need of transcendental deduction is also relevant to the current conceptualism-non-conceptualism debate. For one we see that lack of historical sensitivity creates an echo chamber for us by moulding the past in the image of the present thereby distorting our vision of what is different and unique about the past. We should be able to see that the questions contemporary philosophers are asking are not the same questions that bothered philosophers like Leibniz, Kant and Hume and not because they are not important but answering these questions about determining the content of concepts or phenomenal content demand pushing the inquiry still further, to understand what a concept is, how the content of the concept can be determined and most importantly what are the laws that connect sense and understanding and what are the source or origin of our ideas, whether all concepts are empirical or are there some that relate to objects a-priori. From Kant’s standpoint it is imperative to make a transcendental inquiry into the nature of thought or the pure concepts of understanding which at the same time is an inquiry into the possibility of experience in light of which questions about concepts can be raised and answered. To emphasize the point further we see the justification of our concepts to be linked to understanding. The relevant question is if our concepts are objectively valid then we need to know how they are related to objects given to us through our senses. To answer this question we need to understand the rational connexion between sense and understanding. Intuition and understanding may be two disparate faculties but it is through their co-operation that there is an object of experience and so there must a way to subject intuitions to rules of understanding and there must be a rational connexion between the two. Not just Kant but also Leibniz and Hume and philosophers like them in these two different traditions sought to find the source of these rules or norms that we tacitly assume in our everyday life. And it is in the way their source can be found, where their source must be found, that is where these philosophers tend to differ from one another. Kant wants to find the possibility of experience within us while like of Leibniz and Descartes think we need to appeal to an infinite understanding to explain this possibility. But this question is seldom asked in more recent times and we just assume that it must have been the case in the past too whereby we miss the opportunity to engage with past philosophers in order to broaden our own horizon. One final relevant point to this debate, a contemporary philosopher could simply assume the presence of rules within us as part of our innate endowment that explain our relating concepts to intuitions. This answer Kant classified as preformationist and argued against it:

 

“If such a middle course were proposed, the following would decide against it (apart from the fact that with such a hypothesis one can see no end to how far the presupposition of predetermined predispositions to future judgments might be carried): viz., that the categories would in that case lack the necessity which belongs essentially to the concept of them. For, the concept of cause, e.g., which asserts the necessity of a result under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on an arbitrary subjective necessity, implanted in us, to link certain empirical representations according to such a rule of relation. I could then not say that the effect is connected with the cause in the object (i.e., connected with it necessarily), but could say only that I am so equipped that I cannot think this representation otherwise than as thus connected. And this is just what the skeptic most longs [to hear]. For then all our insight, achieved through the supposed objective validity of our judgments, is nothing but sheer illusion; and there would also be no lack of people who would not concede this subjective necessity (which must be felt) in themselves. At the very least one could not quarrel with anyone about something that rests merely on the way in which his [self as) subject is organized.” (B168)

 

Some commentators assume that rationalists are being criticized in this passage because Kant uses the metaphor of pre-established harmony to state this view, yet Kant never relates this view to rationalists and he never says that the problem with this school was that they give a mere subjective validity to the concepts of understanding which as a matter of fact is a charge he makes against Hume. Finally unlike most philosophers today Kant understood rationalism correctly as not positing innate representations but like him innate faculties or cognitive powers and hence rationalism cannot be equated with preformationism but some contemporary philosophers can be ranked under this term who do believe in innate contents drilled into our head by evolution.

 

In A88/B120 Kant hints that this transcendental inquiry is incumbent on us because if pure concepts of understanding lack objective validity then that will have repercussions even for the objective reality of mathematical concepts and empirical concepts. Now that we have considered what is a transcendental deduction and why it is necessary we need to move further to consider what should be the structure of the proof of objective validity of pure concepts of understanding.

 

1.1 What is the structure of the proof of objective validity and why does Kant adopt this manner of proof? This is the question that will be discussed in this section. First it should be noted that for Kant a representation refers to object if either (i) the representation makes the object possible or (ii) the object makes the representation possible:

 

“Only two cases are possible where synthetic representation and its objects can concur, can necessarily refer to each other, and can-as it were-meet each other: viz., either if the object makes the representation possible, or if the representation alone makes the object possible. If the object makes the representation possible, then the reference is only empirical and the representation is never possible a priori.” (A92/B124)

 

There can be no representation that is not a representation of an object – an object is the individuation condition for a representation. So it is reasonable to suppose that every representation that is related to or refers to an object must have been made possible by the object or in the case of a-priori cognition must make the object possible. This becomes clear when Kant argues that it is not possible that a concept be completely a-priori and refer to an object but does not contribute to the possibility of experience:

 

“It is wholly contradictory and impossible that a concept should be produced completely a priori and yet refer to an object, if that concept neither were itself included in the concept of possible experience nor consisted of elements of a possible experience. For then it would have no content, because no intuition would correspond to it; for intuitions as such, through which objects can be given to us, make up the realm, or the entire object, of possible experience. An a priori concept that did not refer to experience would be only the logical form for a concept, but would not be the concept itself through which something is thought.” (A95)

 

Thought would merely be formal if it did not refer to an object and the object to which thought can be related is one which is conditioned by our sensibility and is therefore an intuition, what corresponds to matter or the object given within experience. Only through intuition an object can be given to us which was the conclusion of Transcendental Aesthetic and so thought can be given an object only via intuition. Next Kant explains the way we need to understand the proof of objective validity of concepts:

 

“Now the question arises whether concepts do not also a priori precede [objects], as conditions under which alone something can be, if not intuited, yet thought as object as such. For in that case all empirical cognition of objects necessarily conforms to such concepts, because nothing is possible as object of experience unless these concepts are presupposed. But all experience, besides containing the senses' intuition through which something is given, does also contain a concept of an object that is given in intuition, or that appears. Accordingly, concepts of objects as such presumably underlie all experiential cognition as its a priori conditions. Hence presumably the objective validity of the categories, as a priori concepts, rests on the fact that through them alone is experience possible (as far as the form of thought in it is concerned). For in that case the categories refer to objects of experience necessarily and a priori, because only by means of them can any experiential object whatsoever be thought at all. Hence the transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts has a principle to which the entire investigation must be directed: viz., the principle that these concepts must be cognized as a priori conditions for the possibility of experience (whether the possibility of the intuition found in experience, or the possibility of the thought). If concepts serve as the objective basis for the possibility of experience, then-precisely because of this-they are necessary. But to unfold the experience in which these concepts are found is not to deduce them (but is only to illustrate them); for otherwise they would, after all, be only contingent. Without that original reference of these concepts to possible experience wherein all objects of cognition occur, their reference to any object whatever would be quite incomprehensible.” (A93-94/B126)

 

Pure Concepts of understanding or categories are objectively valid only if they are the a-priori conditions for the possibility of experience. A pure concept of understanding itself is defined as a concept that universally and sufficiently expresses the formal and objective condition of experience (A96). Kant used Baumgarten’s Metaphysics as a textbook. In section 14 of that textbook Kant defines condition in a marginal note: “A condition is that which when not posited another is not posited”, and a ground is that: “which when something is posited another is posited according to a rule.” In A97 Kant reiterates this point: “And if we can prove that only by means of the categories can an object be thought, this will already suffice as a deduction of them and as a justification of their objective validity.” If we relate this passage to the footnote in the Preface to his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science then we see that this proof depends on the following assumptions: a) “that the table of categories contains all pure concepts of the understanding, just as it contains all formal actions of the understanding in judging”, b) “that the understanding by its nature contains synthetic a priori principles, through which it subjects all objects that may be given to it to these categories, and, therefore, there must also be intuitions given a priori that contain the conditions required for the application of these pure concepts of the understanding, because without intuition there can be no object”, c) “that these pure intuitions can never be anything other than mere forms of the appearances of outer or of inner sense (space and time), and therefore of the objects of possible experience alone.” Kant proved a) in metaphysical deduction of categories, b) depends on Kant’s formulation of analytic-synthetic distinction and his denial that we have a non-discursive understanding and c) was proved in Transcendental Aesthetic. If all these premises have already been proven then the Transcendental Deduction becomes redundant. However Kant says that the TD aims at a far more important conclusion, as we find in the footnote itself:

 

“It then follows: that all use of pure reason can never extend to anything other than objects of experience, and, since nothing empirical can be the condition of a priori principles, the latter can be nothing more than principles of the possibility of experience in general. This alone is the true

and sufficient basis for the determination of the limits of pure reason, but not the solution to the problem how experience is now possible by means of these categories, and only through these categories alone. The latter problem, although without it the structure still stands firm, has great importance nonetheless, and, as I now understand it, [it can be solved with] just as much ease, since it can almost be accomplished through a single inference from the precisely determined definition of a judgment in general (an action through which given representations first become cognitions of an object).”

 

In the revised B-Edition Kant gives us the almost single inference through which the second conclusion regarding how understanding is the author of possible experience. Most commentators believe that Kant revised the B-Edition deduction despite Kant’s declaration that only the manner of representation has changed, not the content. I shall argue that A-Edition Deduction and B-Edition Deduction have the same argumentative structure and no substantial change can be found between the two. This can be seen from what Kant further says in A97:

 

“However, not only our power to think is engaged in such a thought, i.e. not only the understanding, but something more. Moreover, the understanding itself, as a cognitive power that is to refer to objects, likewise needs to be elucidated, viz., as regards the possibility of that reference. Hence we must first examine, in terms not of their empirical but of their transcendental character, the subjective sources that make up the a priori foundation for the possibility of experience.”

 

This is a very important passage and it shows that in the footnote to the Preface of Metaphysics Foundations Kant does not say anything different from what he has said in the A-Edition Deduction. The following points should be noted: a) Kant says that something more than understanding or the power to think is engaged in thinking an object b) understanding is called a cognitive power to refer to objects, c) the possibility of understanding itself is in need of being elucidated in terms of elucidating the possibility of reference i.e. there would be no understanding if it did not refer to objects of possible experience and finally d) Kant seeks to find the subjective source that makes up the a-priori foundation of the possibility of experience and by extension the possibility of reference to objects of possible experience and so the possibility of understanding itself. How do we find these subjective sources? Kant answers in A97 itself:

 

“Now, these three syntheses guide us to three subjective sources of cognition that make possible the understanding itself and, through it, all experience, which is an empirical product of the understanding.”

 

Here we see again the relevant problem is how understanding is possible. Just before this passage Kant says that spontaneity is the basis of this threefold synthesis i.e. synthesis of apprehension, of reproduction and recognition. So this indicates that spontaneity is somehow prior to and so can determine the possibility of understanding. Kant also refers to receptivity and says in a way that reminds one of Hume that no single representation can be entirely foreign or isolated from another and so even in the synopsis of sense there is something that corresponds to a synthesis.

 

Concentrating on spontaneity now the question is: is it the basis of a synthesis? To answer this question we need to go back to A77-78/B103 the section 9 which deals with pure concepts of understanding and where Kant defines a synthesis:

 

“By synthesis, in the most general sense of the term, I mean the act of putting various representations with one another and of comprising their manifoldness in one cognition. Such synthesis is pure if the manifold is given not empirically but a priori (as is the manifold in space and time). …..yet synthesis is what in fact gathers the elements for cognition and unites them to [form] a certain content. Hence if we want to make a judgment about the first origin of our cognition, then we must first direct our attention to synthesis. Synthesis as such, as we shall see hereafter, is the mere effect produced by the imagination, which is a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we would have no cognition whatsoever, but of which we are conscious only very rarely.”

 

In A68/B93 Kant defines a function as the unity of the act of arranging various representations under one common representation. Synthesis is an activity of the soul, the effect of imagination whose task is to bring together various representations, in bringing unity in a manifold. To understand how spontaneity is the basis of a synthesis we need to direct our attention to how Kant further defines a pure synthesis in A78/B104:

 

“Now pure synthesis, conceived of generally, yields the pure concept of understanding. By pure synthesis I mean the synthesis that rests on a basis of synthetic a priori unity. E.g., our act of counting (as is more noticeable primarily with larger numbers) is a synthesis according to concepts, because it is performed according to a common basis of unity (such as the decimal system). Hence under this concept the unity of the manifold's synthesis becomes necessary.”

 

When I count certain objects, I bring them under a single concept i.e. the manifold of an intuition is brought to a unity by a synthesis in accordance with the rule which gives unity to the act of synthesis itself. A synthesis is an action of bringing unity to a manifold of synthesis and so it is said to be based on a unity and in the act of counting the unity is based on a concept (decimal system). Pure Concepts of understanding are defined in this passage as conceptions of a pure synthesis and in A78-79/B104 Kant refers to concepts of understanding as the source of the unity of pure synthesis. If the logic of the former passage is followed pure concepts of understanding cannot precede pure synthesis and if the latter passage is referred to then all synthesis depends on a unity for the sake of cognition and these concepts come from understanding. I reckon the term ‘understanding’ is being used into two different senses, in the one it is prior to the categories and brings about the categories and is what Kant refers to as spontaneity in A97 and in the second sense understanding is bringing to consciousness the rule on which pure synthesis is based. This reading will be justified if we jump ahead to passages in the A-Edition Deduction where Kant discusses Transcendental Apperception. I will argue that it is this apperception which is referred to above as the synthetic a-priori unity on which pure synthesis is based and pure concepts of understanding are conceptions of this unity which is pre-categorial and responsible for the production of understanding.

 

In the A-Edition Deduction Kant introduces the topic of Transcendental Deduction by first discussing the relation of cognition to its object, a discussion that is reminiscent of the discussion of the same topic in the Letters to Herz written almost ten years before the publication of the Critique:

 

“What, then, do we mean when we talk about an object corresponding to, and hence also distinct from, cognition? We can easily see that this object must be thought only as something as such = x. For, after all, outside our cognition we have nothing that we could contrast with this cognition as something corresponding to it. We find, however, that our thought of the reference of all cognition to its object carries with it something concerning necessity. It does so inasmuch as this object is regarded as what keeps our cognitions from being determined haphazardly or arbitrarily, [and as what ensures], rather, that they are determined a priori in a certain way. For these cognitions are to refer to an object, and hence in reference to this object they must also necessarily agree with one another, i.e., they must have that unity in which the concept of an object consists.” (A104)

 

What is the relation of a cognition to its object? Is the object of cognition distinct from the cognition that can be thought of as an unknown something = x. Kant repudiates this suggestion because such an unknown object would not mean anything to us and can hardly be regarded as an object of cognition because the relation of a cognition to its object carries with it a conception of necessity, a cognition necessarily refers to its object and if it did not then there would be no cognition and no object of cognition, the relation of reference is necessary for both, for one to be counted as a cognition and another as its object. We cannot go outside our cognition to determine an object of cognition and hence there must be a necessary relation between the two. What is this relation? Kant says that they must agree with one another and this agreement he understands in terms of the unity of the concept which at the same time is found within the object. In the next passage Kant elucidates this unity:

 

“We are, however, dealing only with the manifold of our representations. And since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is to be something distinct from all of our representations, this object is nothing for us. Clearly, therefore, the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the representations. When we have brought about synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition this is when we say that we cognize the object. This unity is impossible, however, unless the intuition can be produced according to a rule through a [certain] function of synthesis, viz., a function of synthesis that makes the reproduction of the manifold necessary a priori and makes possible a concept in which this manifold is united. Thus when we think of a triangle as an object, we do so by being conscious of the assembly of three straight lines according to a rule whereby such an intuition can always be exhibited. Now this unity of the rule determines all that is manifold, and limits it to conditions that make possible the unity of apperception. And the concept of this unity is the representation of the object = x, i.e., the object that I think through the mentioned predicates of a triangle.” (A105)

 

The unity in the object is identified with the formal unity of consciousness, ‘in the synthesis of the manifold of our representations’ i.e. the object is a unity of a manifold of representations brought about by a synthesis which is based on a formal unity of consciousness. When this synthetic unity i.e. the unity found in the manifold of intuitions is brought about by a synthesis that is when we say we have a cognition of an object. So the same synthesis which is responsible for bringing unity of consciousness to a manifold of intuition which is constitutive of the object of cognition is at the same time responsible for the cognition of the object thereby securing the necessary reference or agreement between cognition and the object. Next Kant says ‘this unity is impossible’ or this synthetic unity is impossible without a rule for reproduction of the manifold which reproduction is necessary and a-priori because the rule on which this synthesis of reproduction is based is necessary and a-priori which also makes possible a concept in which a manifold is united. Similar to the arithmetical example of counting Kant here gives the example of constructing a triangle from geometry. We think of a triangle of an object which is to be conscious of an ‘assembly’ of three straight lines in accordance with a rule i.e. a synthesis that proceeds in accordance with a rule whereby an object is given to us or exhibited in intuition. The object is exhibited in intuition only because there is a rule for the construction or generation of this object which if followed through allows an object to be given to us and every time we would follow this rule to construct this object, this same object will be given to us. When we think this object we think it as both exhibited in an intuition and as also exhibiting the rule or the concept that brings together the manifold elements of intuition i.e. we do not simply see an arrangement of three straight lines but an arrangement brought about in accordance with a rule where the exhibited object is thought by means of this rule and every time the rule is applied to a manifold of intuition we would get the same result.

 

Finally Kant comes to transcendental apperception:

 

“Any necessity is always based on a transcendental condition. There must, therefore, be a transcendental basis to be found: a transcendental basis of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions; and hence a transcendental basis also of the concepts of objects as such, and consequently also of all objects of experience a transcendental basis without which it would be impossible to think any object for our intuitions. For this object is nothing more than that something whose concept expresses such a necessity of synthesis. This original and transcendental condition is none other than transcendental apperception. Now there is, in inner perception, consciousness of oneself in terms of the determinations of one's state. This consciousness of oneself is merely empirical and always mutable; it can give us no constant or enduring self in this flow of inner appearances. It is usually called inner sense, or empirical apperception. But what is to be presented necessarily as numerically identical cannot be thought as such through empirical data. A condition that is to validate such a transcendental presupposition must be one that precedes all experience and that makes experience itself possible. Now there can take place in us no cognitions, and no connection and unity of cognitions among one another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by reference to which all representation of objects is alone possible. Now this pure, original, and immutable consciousness I shall call transcendental apperception. That this apperception deserves this name is evident already from the fact that even the purest objective unity, viz., that of the a priori concepts (space and time), is possible only by referring the intuitions to this apperception. Hence the numerical unity of this apperception lies a priori at the basis of all concepts, just as the manifoldness of space and time lies a priori at the basis of the intuitions of sensibility.” (A106-107)

 

Any necessity is based on a transcendental condition because it brings into relation two representations where one cannot be said to analytically contain the other and so it has a synthetic a-priori structure since it relates concepts to intuitions or cognition to its object and to unearth this relation is possible only through a transcendental inquiry into the possibility of reference of cognition to its object. This necessary reference Kant has explicated in terms of unity of consciousness which determines a manifold of intuition through a synthesis in accordance with a concept or a concept that is universal and serves as a rule (A106). So Kant says that there must a transcendental basis of this unity of consciousness which is the necessary reference of cognition to an object and so if we find the basis of this unity we shall also find what makes this necessary reference possible or what is then the transcendental condition of the necessary reference of a cognition to its object and the concept of the object and since experience itself is not possible without thinking an object of intuition in accordance with a concept our investigation would unearth the transcendental basis of the possibility of experience itself. The object of experience is the object of intuition whose concept expresses the ‘necessity of a synthesis’ i.e. a concept is nothing more than a conception or expression of the rule that is responsible for the unity or the necessity of the synthesis. By bringing this rule to consciousness or by thinking this rule i.e. expressing or conceiving this rule, which rule is responsible for determining a manifold of intuition one has both a concept of an object and the exhibition of an object as determined by that rule in intuition and this explains cognition of an object which always involves a concept either clearly or obscurely (A106). To make this clearer in counting certain objects I am aware of an inner activity of constructing or determining a manifold of intuition in accordance with a rule, which activity is what we call a synthesis which is responsible for bringing a synthetic unity in a manifold that leads to cognition. This inner awareness of rule governed synthesis is responsible for forming a concept of a number which is an expression or a clearer and distinct consciousness of or a representation of this rule for synthesis which at the same time determines an object of intuition as exhibited in intuition in accordance with the rule. The concept is nothing but the rule for constructing or exhibiting an object in intuition. Similarly I am aware of a triangle as a triangle when I think the rule for constructing a triangle whereby it is exhibited or given to me in an intuition. The concept expresses the rule for constructing a triangle and the object contains a unity of a manifold of intuition in accordance with a rule expressed in a concept. We can relate this thought to an often cited passage A79/ B105:

 

“The same function that gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition. This unity speaking generally is called pure concept of understanding. Hence the same understanding and indeed through the same acts whereby it brought about, in concepts, the logical form of a judgment by means of analytic unity also brings into its representations a transcendental content, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition as such; and because of this, these representations are called pure concepts of understanding applying a priori to objects.”

 

In A99 Kant tells us that even though an intuition contains a manifold yet the intuition cannot present a manifold as a manifold i.e. as contained in one representation as in the representation of space or it cannot present a unity of intuition unless its individual elements are ‘gone through and gathered together’ and this synthesis which presents the manifold of intuition as a manifold of intuition is called the synthesis of apprehension and is the product of imagination. Sensibility offers us only a manifold which is united in a representation only through a synthesis. Here Kant says that the same function of the synthesis that unites representations in a judgements also unites the representation in an intuition. This unity as found in pure synthesis is what Kant calls pure concept of understanding. The object of intuition is like an example of the concept in intuition which is the representation of the unity of the rule of the synthesis that unites both concepts to form a judgement in one end counted as cognition and on the other end as an object of intuition as displaying the activity of the rule-governed synthesis. The example and the exemplified must contain a common basis due to which an example can be counted as an example of some concept. The same unity so to say is manifest in one direction in the form of concepts themselves further united in judgements and on the other end is manifested in an object of intuition. A concept contains the rule for synthesis of a manifold of intuition and the object contains a manifold of intuition united in accordance with the rule expressed in its concept. Both necessarily refer to each other because both contain the same function of a synthesis which brings on the one hand unity to judgements and on the other hand unity to a manifold of intuition. This synthesis brings about a necessary synthetic unity within a manifold because it is itself based on a unity. This should become clearer as we further explore Kant’s theory of transcendental apperception.

 

This unity or this transcendental basis of concepts and the object of intuition and of the entire possibility of experience itself, is transcendental apperception. Kant further says that there is an inner perception or a consciousness of oneself in terms of determination of one’s state i.e. certain inner states are taken as my states or belonging to me. Kant counts this inner awareness within inner sense conditioned by time, an empirical apperception. One does not find any subject of this awareness within the inner states as Hume said we always stumble upon some perception or other but we do not catch hold of a self in inner perception. Kant does not see this as a problem for consciousness of one’s own identity does not depend on something empirical and so is a-priori and Kant adds that its transcendental condition must be not just prior to all experience but must be what makes experience itself possible. Further Kant tells us that no cognition, no connection between cognitions is possible without the unity of consciousness that Kant calls transcendental apperception to which all one’s representations, intuitions and concepts must ultimately be referred back to because this apperception precedes them and makes them possible. Kant continues his explanation of transcendental unity of apperception in A108:

 

“Now this transcendental unity of apperception brings about, from all possible appearances whatever that can be together in one experience, a coherence of all these representations according to laws. For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind, in cognizing the manifold, could not become conscious of the identity of function whereby it synthetically combines the manifold in one cognition. Hence the original and necessary consciousness of one's own identity is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts - these concepts being rules that not only make these appearances necessarily reproducible, but that thereby also determine an object for our intuition of these appearances, i.e., determine a concept of something wherein these appearances necessarily cohere. For the mind could not possibly think its own identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and moreover think this identity a priori, if it did not have present to it the identity of its act - the act that subjects all synthesis of apprehension (a synthesis that is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and thereby first makes possible the coherence of those representations according to a priori rules.”

 

Transcendental Unity of Consciousness is the source of the law that unites all representations in one experience or in a coherent whole. How does it make this unity possible? Because of the consciousness of one’s own identity which is not empirical but a-priori and which results from inward awareness of the unity of the act of synthesis. The mind can think its own identity a-priori only through the identity of the act of synthesis that subjects all representations to transcendental unity which first makes the coherence of representations possible, which coherence is understood in terms of concepts that are rules for reproduction of appearances and in this capacity concepts determine an object for representations and ensure the coherence between cognition and its objects. The important point to note is that (i) the mind needs an act of synthesis to become conscious of its own identity, (ii) the act of synthesis is directed towards a manifold of intuition and hence consciousness of identity is also dependent on intuition because it is dependent on the act of synthesis, (iii) one’s own identity is given in the act of synthesis and hence identity is not created within one’s representations but is brought to consciousness through it (iv) the act of synthesis on the one hand allows mind to represent its own identity and on the other it subjects manifold of intuition to transcendental unity and thereby brings coherence within representations thereby ensuring the possibility of experience and (v) finally note that the reference to one experience in this passage and in other passages like A110 is from the standpoint of transcendental apperception not empirical apperception.

 

This brings us to the key of transcendental deduction that “the a-priori conditions for a possible experience as such are at the same time the conditions for the possibility of objects of experience.” (A111). The proof of objective validity of categories, the pure concepts of understanding is that all thought of an object of experience are the conditions of thought in a possible experience just as space and time are the conditions of intuition for the same experience. This means that any thinking, any intuition whether empirical or pure must conform to the condition that makes them possible. But experience demands that the manifold of intuition must also conform to thought as such and all thinking itself is possible only through contents supplied to it through intuition. This implies that experience itself is possible when both an object of intuition and its thought are subject to a condition to which both must conform:

 

“But the possibility of these categories-indeed, even their necessity rests on the reference that our entire sensibility, and with it also all possible appearances, have to original apperception. In original apperception everything must necessarily conform to the conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness. I.e., in it everything must necessarily be subject to the universal functions of synthesis, viz., of that synthesis according to concepts in which alone apperception can prove a priori its thoroughgoing and necessary identity. Thus the concept of a cause is nothing but a synthesis according to concepts (where what follows in the time series is synthesized with other appearances); and without such unity, which has its a priori rule and which subjects appearances to itself, no thoroughgoing and universal and hence necessary unity of consciousness would be encountered in the manifold of perceptions. But then these perceptions would also not belong to any experience, and hence would be without an object; they would be nothing but a blind play of representations i.e., they would be less than a dream.” (A111-112)

 

Note that the categories themselves are possible only if sensibility or the data provided by it is subject to the transcendental unity of consciousness that Kant here also calls original apperception. The first and original rule for synthesis is that every representation must conform to the conditions of unity of self-consciousness. All manifold of intuition must be subject to a ‘universal function of synthesis’, which subjects appearances or the manifold of intuition to necessary unity of consciousness without we would have a manifold of representations so incoherent as to be ‘less than a dream’, and so it is this synthesis that makes possible the representation of the necessary identity of consciousness within the manifold of appearances and thereby makes thought itself possible. The transcendental unity of consciousness has its own a priori rule to effect a synthesis which we find to be the first condition for meaning of concepts themselves and the transcendental deduction begins with this rule that all representations must be subject to the unity of consciousness:

 

“All intuitions are nothing for us and are of no concern to us whatsoever if they cannot be taken up into consciousness, whether they impinge upon it directly or indirectly; and solely through consciousness is cognition possible. We are conscious a priori of the thoroughgoing identity of ourselves in regard to all representations that can ever belong to our cognition, and are conscious of it as a necessary condition for the possibility of all representations. (For any such representations present something in me only inasmuch as together with all others they belong to one consciousness; and hence they must at least be capable of being connected in it.) This principle holds a priori, and may be called the transcendental principle of the unity of whatever is manifold in our representations (and hence also in intuition). Now the unity of the manifold in a subject is synthetic; therefore pure apperception provides us with a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition.” (A116)

 

The B-Edition Deduction in section 16 (B132) formulates the same rule that the I Think must be capable of accompanying all my representations because otherwise ‘something would be presented to me that could not be thought at all’, which means either that the representation itself is not possible or that if possible it would mean nothing to me. We should note here how closely Kant associates all thought and intuition such that he is ready to countenance the impossibility of a representation if it could not be thought. The first principle for all thought is thereby this transcendental rule that all intuition must conform to conditions of necessary unity of consciousness ‘I Think’ which is thinks the identity or unity of consciousness i.e. brings it this identity to consciousness because of the inward perception of the act of synthesis which on the one hand makes thought possible and on the other hand makes the object of thought possible i.e. the conditions for the possibility of thought and the possibility of the object of thought are the same. Why does Kant say in A111-112 that universal function of synthesis is synthesis according to concepts if the possibility of concepts itself is at stake here? Because transcendental apperception has its own a-priori rule to effect a synthesis and the first rule without which categories themselves would not be possible is this rule that I Think must be capable of accompanying all representations, thereby all thinking and all intuitions must conform to this condition of transcendental apperception whose unity we find in the concept in the form of a rule for synthesis which synthesis subjects a manifold of appearances to this rule and so at once necessarily relates a cognition to its object. Also only through thinking this rule is the cogito thought ‘I Think’ itself possible i.e. as Kant says only through a concept which governs a synthesis of a manifold is it possible for the mind to prove its own identity a-priori. One may recall here passage from A78 that a pure concept of understanding is pure synthesis conceived generally. Transcendental Apperception is the source of the rule that unites the manifold of all representations in one consciousness and the pure concepts are conceptions of this rule and so it can be said that Transcendental Apperception is the author of experience itself through these concepts because these concepts are rules for uniting a manifold of intuitions and an object is nothing more than a unity of a manifold in whose concept is the rule for a necessary synthesis for reproduction according of appearances in accordance with that rule. In the object we find the rule which we have put there in the manifold of intuition through a synthesis.

 

All empirical affinity presupposes transcendental affinity is the conclusion of the deduction and is in essence Kant’s reply to Hume. This means that all empirical association is possible only due to uniformity of nature understood in terms of coherence of all representations in accordance with laws whose source is within transcendental apperception:

 

“As regards the empirical rule of association, on the other hand, we must indeed assume it throughout when we say that everything in a sequence of events is subject to rules to the point that nothing ever happens without being preceded by something that it always follows. This rule, taken as a law of nature on what, I ask, does it rest? And how is even this association possible? The basis for the possibility of the manifold's association, insofar as this basis lies in the object, is called the manifold's affinity. I ask, therefore, how do you make comprehensible to yourselves the thoroughgoing affinity of appearances (whereby they are, and must be, subject to constant laws)?” (A113)

 

Earlier Kant gave the example of a cinnabar which at one moment turns red then green then black thereby not giving imagination any constancy to latch on and thereby to form an association. For two things to be associated in the mind whereby thought of one according to a rule brings thought of another there must be some regularity in nature. The affinity of appearances cannot be explained through associative imagination because the latter presupposes the former. But if this affinity was independent of consciousness as such one would have to depend on experience for its knowledge rendering it contingent because it would count as an empirical deduction. The source of this affinity must be found within ourselves:

 

“On my principles the possibility of this affinity is quite readily comprehensible. All possible appearances belong, as representations, to the entire possible self-consciousness. But from this self- consciousness, taken as a transcendental representation, numerical identity is inseparable and is a priori certain. For nothing can enter cognition without doing so by means of this original apperception. This identity must, then, necessarily enter into the synthesis of everything manifold in appearances, insofar as this synthesis is to become empirical cognition. Hence appearances are subject to a priori conditions to which their synthesis (of apprehension) must conform thoroughly. But the representation of a universal condition according to which a certain manifold can be posited (hence posited in one and the same way) is called a rule; and if the manifold must be so posited, then the representation is called a law. Therefore all appearances stand in a thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws, and hence stand in a transcendental affinity of which the empirical affinity is the mere consequence.”

 

With any representation the numerical identity of consciousness cannot be separated but for this identity to be given to consciousness or the very possibility of self-consciousness i.e. the I Think is itself possible through a universal condition that unites the manifold in accordance with this rule by a synthesis which act is performed by imagination which connects concepts with intuition. If the synthesis of the manifold of intuition is conceived as necessary then it is called a law, in A109-110 Kant calls it a transcendental law to distinguish it from empirical laws and the transcendental deduction is meant to be proof that all empirical laws are possible only on the basis of a transcendental law which itself is possible only due to transcendental unity of apperception:

 

“This transcendental law says that all appearances must, insofar as objects are to be given to us through them, be subject toll a priori rules of the synthetic unity of appearances, a priori rules according to which alone their relation in empirical intuition is possible. I.e., the transcendental law says: just as appearances must in mere intuition be subject to the formal conditions of space and time, so must appearances in experience be subject to conditions of the necessary unity of apperception indeed, this law says that through these conditions alone does any cognition first becomes possible.”

 

In the Deduction itself Transcendental Apperception is called Pure Understanding:

 

“The unity of apperception [considered] in reference to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding; and the same unity as referred to the transcendental synthesis of imagination is pure understanding. Hence there are in the understanding pure a priori cognitions that contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of imagination in regard to all possible appearances. These cognitions, however, are the categories, i.e., the pure concepts of understanding. Consequently man's empirical cognitive power contains necessarily an understanding that refers to all objects of the senses, although it does so only by means of intuition and the synthesis of intuition performed by imagination. Hence all appearances, as data for a possible experience, are subject to this understanding. Now this reference of appearances to possible experience is likewise necessary. (For without this reference appearances would provide us with no cognition whatsoever and hence would not concern us at all.) Thus it follows that pure understanding, by means of the categories, is a formal and synthetic principle of all experiences, and that appearances have a necessary reference to the understanding.” (A119)

 

From Transcendental Apperception we can derive pure a priori cognitions called categories because they are rules for bringing this necessary unity or the representation of the identity of consciousness within the manifold of intuitions. I Think is the unity of apperception in reference to synthesis of imagination and the same unity in relation to transcendental synthesis of imagination which in the passage is also referred to as pure synthesis of imagination is the Transcendental Unity of apperception and is called pure understanding. This difference we notice in the last line, that pure understanding by means of the categories is the synthetic principle of all experiences and the reason why appearances have a necessary reference to the understanding i.e. to the I Think, which thinks this unity of consciousness within the manifold of intuition because of a transcendental synthesis of imagination which is based on an a priori rule which are called the pure concepts of understanding or the categories. The unity brought within the manifold of intuition is the unity of apperception I think, which now accompanies all representations. Its own action of synthesis is simply called the synthesis of imagination and this I Think is equated with understanding which contains a necessary reference to manifold of intuition whose possibility we have explained through transcendental apperception. In A126 Kant adds to the characterization of understanding as power to judge, power of concepts now he calls it our power for rules. Through these rules understanding is considered as the legislator for nature which makes its law governed-ness possible. Without understanding there would be no nature even if there might be the blind play of representations less coherent than a dream. It is because of pure understanding or spontaneity that an individual finds himself in nature confronting a world independent of himself capable of being experienced. Transcendental Deduction is a proof of objective validity of categories in the sense that it finds the subjective ground – apperception which is the transcendental condition for the possibility of experiences through the categories.

The Gap Objection

Synthesis does not bring about unity of consciousness but consciousness of unity and it is itself based on a prior unity. This point will become clearer in considering an objection to a-priori synthesis raised in Paul Guyer’s 1980 article ‘Kant on Apperception and A-Priori Synthesis’. According to Guyer:

 

“The theory of the a priori synthesis or constitution of nature arises from the fact that Kant does not begin his argument from an analytic connection between the concept of the self-ascription of experiences and the existence of synthetic unity among experiences so ascribed, but instead commits himself to the a priori certainty of a thoroughly synthetic connection between consciousness and the self-ascription of experience, or consciousness.”

 

Guyer believes that Kant is arguing that consciousness of combination in a manifold requires an act of synthesis by the mind and apperception or consciousness that various thoughts belong to me. The representation of one’s own identity in the manifold of intuition requires a synthetic unity or combination of thoughts by means of a concept other than the concept of the self. From these two premises we get the inference that apperception or consciousness of a continuing identical self requires a synthesis in accord with a concept different from the concept of the self. Guyer then poses the question why must this synthesis be an a-priori synthesis or ‘an actual imposition of order on nature’ and he answers this question by interpreting Kant as saying that since we are a-priori certain of our identity in any empirical manifold then we can be certain that we can synthesize this manifold in accordance with conditions of our consciousness of apperception. But Guyer says that this condition for self-ascription of identity should be given an analytic reading as saying that those representations that I have subjected to a synthesis can be thought as mine but Kant is arguing that all representations whatsoever in order to be counted as a representation must be subject to the conditions for apperception. It is because Kant begins with the latter reading of the transcendental principle – I Think must be able to accompany all my representations that he then feels the need to introduce a transcendental synthesis to subject any representation whatsoever to the conditions for self-ascription of identity or apperception which can only be accomplished for a transcendental synthesis. But for apperception he needs a much more moderate premise, that only those representations that are subject to a synthesis based on concepts other than concept of the self, are needed for apperception. So I think must accompany only those representations which have been subject to conditions for apperception which is an analytic claim. This analytic claim however does not allow one to infer that the conditions for apperception (the transcendental principle – I Think must accompany all representations) are the conditions for the possibility of experience itself. To make this claim Kant would require the premise that representations must fulfil the conditions for apperception in order to be counted as a representation at all or for them to mean anything to us. But Guyer has put into question that such a strong requirement is not needed in order to meet the conditions of apperception which needs a more modest claim to be discharged. This has repercussions for proving objective validity of categories because these categories were deemed valid by Kant on grounds that they were conditions of the possibility of thought in a possible experience (A111) which role they discharged in virtue of being functions of a synthesis that brings unity of consciousness within a manifold of intuition. But now there is only an analytic connexion between categories conceived as conditions for self-ascription of identity of consciousness and self-consciousness and since they cannot be seen as bringing about a more global unity of consciousness in all of one’s representations then they cannot be seen as authors of possible experience as such and hence as not objectively valid.

 

Having now stated Guyer’s case I will argue based on the textual analysis I have given where his arguments go wrong. First he understands transcendental apperception to be consciousness of one’s own identity within a manifold of intuition and hence dependent on the categories. Against this I may add the following text as contradicting this claim:

 

“Apperception is itself the basis of the possibility of the categories, which in tum present nothing but the synthesis of the manifold of intuition insofar as this manifold has unity in apperception. Hence self-consciousness as such is the representation of what is the condition of all unity and is yet itself unconditioned. Hence we can say about the thinking I (the soul) which thinks itself as substance, as simple, as numerically identical in all time, and as the correlate of all existence from which all other existence must be inferred-that it cognizes not so much itself through the categories, but cognizes the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception and hence through itself. Now it is, indeed, very evident that what I must presuppose in order to cognize an object at all cannot itself be cognized as an object by me, and that the determining self (the thinking) is distinct from the determinable self (the thinking subject) as cognition is distinct from the object [cognized]. Nonetheless, nothing is more natural and tempting than the illusion of regarding the unity in the synthesis of thoughts as a perceived unity in the subject of these thoughts. One might call this illusion the subreption of the hypostatized self-consciousness (apperceptionis substantiatae).” (A401-2)

 

Guyer fails to see that Kant distinguishes between spontaneity as pure understanding and understanding itself and that any and every synthesis is based on a unity and consciousness of identity does not depend on the act of synthesis as such but bringing to consciousness the unity of the act or the function of synthesis and this unity is based on the unity of the rule as one can see in the examples given by Kant, decimal system in the case of counting and the geometrical rule for constructing a triangle and in this case too this the transcendental rule has its source in transcendental apperception because Kant defines understanding as the faculty of rules. Synthesis cannot generate or bring about a unity that is not based on a prior rule whose source can only be in pure understanding. Hence categories themselves are generated as pure a-priori cognitions derived from pure understanding.

 

Finally we can now arrive at the proper reading of the transcendental principle that I think must accompany all my representations. This principle must be given the reading Kant in fact gave to it, that in order to be counted as a representation at all or atleast for any representation to mean anything to us they must be accompanied by I Think i.e. be capable of counted as mine. This reading demands a de re reading of the necessity and not a de dicto one. On what grounds can Kant say that all representations must conform to the conditions of unity of consciousness when as Guyer and Kemp Smith find it difficult to understand that unity of consciousness itself is stated by Kant as an accomplishment of a synthesis based on general concepts? The problem can be solved by distinguishing between the unity of consciousness and the consciousness of this unity or one’s own identity in the manifold of intuition. The rule is a rule for bringing about the consciousness of this unity and not the unity itself. Kant was no Hume to exorcize the notion of unity of consciousness and he was not a rationalist to believe that in self-consciousness the form and matter of consciousness coincide and so he believed a synthesis was needed for the sake of self-consciousness. The reason Kant can subject all representations to the rule I Think must… is because that identity is already there but the rule and the synthesis is for the sake of bringing this identity to consciousness of identity and thereby also make an object possible through this self-consciousness. This unity of consciousness is transcendental and pre-categorial and hence cannot be conceived on a substance-inherence model. The first synthesis is to bring the entire manifold of intuition to one single consciousness whereby I think can accompany all one’s representations.

 

If this is kept in mind then one can see how from apperception i.e. from conditions for self-consciousness one can infer objective experience or conditions of the possibility of the object of experience itself. This is because every synthesis is based on a rule which is the transcendental condition of the possibility of the synthetic unity made actual by the synthesis itself. This rule is the unity of the act of synthesis or the function of the synthesis, to combine a manifold of intuition in accordance with a prior synthetic unity. Consciousness of one’s own identity which I call simply apperception instead of transcendental apperception is possible through the inward awareness of the consciousness of the act of synthesis. So on the one side synthesis brings this unity of the rule or concept to self-consciousness or makes self-consciousness itself possible, on the other hand it makes an object as distinguished from self-consciousness possible because the object is nothing over and above the expression or exhibition in a manifold of intuition of a necessary synthesis due to the unity that is found within its concept. Thereby a cognition comes to necessarily refer to its object because the object of intuition itself is made possible by a synthesis that is also the condition for the possibility of the cognition. So through a synthesis every instance of self-consciousness is correlated with an object-consciousness. Finally the categories are regarded as objectively valid because they are the conditions for bringing the manifold of intuition to the highest unity of consciousness – the transcendental unity of consciousness. It is because of the categories that we have a world, a nature capable of being experienced which is yet relative to transcendental apperception as one single experience. It is because of transcendental unity of consciousness that an individual empirical subject encounters a world outside himself that is capable of being experienced. TUA is the source of the rules for combining the manifold of intuition within one single consciousness which at the same time is responsible for consciousness of the object. These rules are logical functions of understanding which when abstracted from all transcendental content are studied under general logic. Categories are these logical functions considered in relation to manifold of intuition. A synthesis is always based on a rule through which a manifold is subjected to the unity found in the rule i.e. a synthetic unity that yields cognition of an object. This rule is nothing but a logical function of understanding and the first rule that makes possible all other concepts is that I Think must accompany all my representations otherwise a representation cannot be counted as a representation or would mean nothing to me. This makes an innumerable number of combinations possible that have to be further narrowed down and it is here that a synthesis based on categories is required and this I will discuss by elaborating the three-fold synthesis discussed in the A-Edition Deduction.

Empirical Synthesis

Synthesis of apprehension, reproduction and recognition are considered as empirical synthesis. In A99 Kant discusses synthesis of apprehension. He argues that every representation within a manifold of intuition would be regarded as an absolute unity in itself lacking any relation to any other representation if this manifold were not subjected to a synthesis which is supplied by imagination, not by the intuition itself. This synthesis converts a manifold of intuition to a unity of intuition by first going through this manifold and then bringing or gathering them together. Here we should notice that this activity itself presupposes the presence of a pre-categorial unity of consciousness otherwise we would have a Humean flux where there is no principle for uniting different ideas together. Anyways, this act of synthesis is called by Kant, synthesis of apprehension. In A100 Kant discusses synthesis of reproduction where he states contra Hume that any empirical association is possible only if there is a law that unites different appearances in a coherent way. The importance of this synthesis of reproduction lies in this that it connects different appearances together in a lawful or regular way without this regularity of appearances no two objects could be connected in thought so that the thought of one naturally brings to mind the thought of another even if the object thought is not present to the senses, such as smoke bringing to mind fire and a word the object it denotes:

 

“Nor could an empirical synthesis of reproduction take place if a certain word were assigned now to this and then to that thing, or if the same thing were called now by this and then by another name, without any of this being governed by a certain rule to which appearances by themselves are already subject.” (A101)

 

This connection for instance of smoke to fire or of the word to its object depends on a law and this law is the law that governs the synthesis of reproduction. To use another example from A106:

 

“Thus the concept of body serves, in terms of the unity of the manifold thought through this concept, as a rule for our cognition of external appearances. But a concept can be a rule for intuitions only by presenting, when appearances are given to us, the necessary reproduction of their manifold and hence the synthetic unity in our consciousness of these appearances. Thus when we perceive something external to us, the concept of body makes necessary the representation of extension, and with it the representations of impenetrability, shape, etc.”

 

Distinct representations contained within a manifold of intuition become related to each other in such a way that they are reproduced as an object is brought to mind when a word is used, as fire is brought to mind when smoke is perceived, when three straight lines are brought to mind when one thinks of a triangle and when extension, impenetrability, shape come to mind as united in the concept of a body. We may take this thought still further. The concept of body is the characteristic mark of the concepts of extension, shape etc. To explain using an example from Kant’s Jasche Logic lectures:

 

 “I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on that which they have in common among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves themselves, and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree.”

 

This is the procedure for ordinary concept formation, first certain appearances or objects are grouped together, then compared with other objects and their similarities and differences are noted. One reflects on the common features of the object by discriminating them from those that lacks those same features. By abstracting from the unique features of these objects that are grouped together one forms a higher concept in this case of a tree which is a mark of the concepts of spruce, willow and linden and thereby the latter objects are classified as trees. These common features like having leaves, branches, a root etc. are brought to mind when one thinks about a tree and when these appearances are perceived they bring to mind as their characteristic a tree. So seeing certain appearances as common features of certain objects like spruce, willow, linden is what allows us to classify these objects under a higher concept (of a tree in this case) which is what Kant calls the characteristic mark of a certain concept or in modern terms its intension. This is possible through a synthesis of reproduction which allows us to classify certain appearances as connected with each other according to rules for the reproduction as specified by a concept. To be more specific certain appearances or objects are grouped together, then compared with other objects and their similarities and differences are noted. One reflects on the common features of the object by discriminating them from those that lacks those same features. By abstracting from the unique features of these objects that are grouped together one forms a higher concept in this case of a tree which is a mark of the concepts of spruce, willow and linden and thereby the latter objects are classified as trees. This entire process of concept formation which allows one to form a higher abstract concept of a tree only if certain features or appearances are seen as united together under a rule which rule is the rule for reproduction of appearances, so similar appearances have to be present to mind when we think an object through its concept. Thereby one is able to note the similarity of appearances and rank them as common features which fall under a mark, the higher concept of a tree in this case. So one may infer that general concepts can be formed only when certain appearances get fixed in the mind as features that can be brought under the general concept which is possible through rule for reproduction of appearances.

 

In A102 Kant says that synthesis of apprehension is inseparably linked with synthesis of reproduction. He gives here the example of drawing a line. If I have to think or construct a line I must first of all have apprehended the representation i.e. the part of a line being combined in accordance with a rule with other parts. But suppose I forgot reproducing following parts failing to combine them with preceding parts then a whole representation of the line could never arise. Kant seems to be arguing here that apprehension i.e. grouping different appearances together like grouping spruce, linden and willow together itself is possible because the mind pre-reflectively finds these appearances similar because they have been united under a rule for reproduction which the individual subject would find only through further scrutinizing these appearances. But there would be no apprehension without noticing these similar features if only obscurely at this stage and hence synthesis of apprehension itself depends on synthesis of reproduction. We would not be able to group certain parts of a line together without a rule for reproduction in mind to group them together.

 

Finally we come to synthesis of recognition discussed by Kant in A103-110 and it is in this section we find the first discussion of transcendental apperception as can be seen in the passages discussed in 1.1. The first line says that synthesis of reproduction depends on recognition:

 

“Without the consciousness that what we are thinking is the same as what we thought an instant before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be futile.”

 

We can discern a pattern over here – a lesser unity is made dependent on a greater unity. The initial obscure act of bringing together certain appearances or synthesis of apprehension is made dependent on a greater unity of synthesis of reproduction and now reproduction itself is possible only through the synthesis of recognition. Again Kant elucidates the point by using the example of drawing a line, this time a line of a definite quantity. If I want to draw a line for instance of 6 centimetres then I must know the measure of the parts of the line I am joining together. Now it is not just the parts of a line but even the quantity of the parts that I am joining together to form a single quantity or number. This means the different parts of the line have to be seen as parts of the same line so that one single line can be seen as 6 centimetres long. For this a simple reproduction of parts will not do, what is needed is the added recognition that the parts are parts of the same or the one single line. Only under this condition can different parts be joined together, as parts of a single line and hence this reproduction of parts depends on recognition because the particular units are seen as units of a whole which depends on the conceiving them as the same i.e. they must be capable of being recognized as the same. Hence the unity of a concept in synthesis of recognition is greater than the unity found in reproduction rule. In the latter we are able to abstract a universal feature but in synthesis of recognition we see an individual as conditioned by a universal kind, i.e. we see it is a member of a universal kind and so we see an individual not in isolation but as related to a universal. Hence unity of the rule found in the concept conditions a synthesis of recognition and this unity is the highest synthetic unity of a concept that has to be exhibited within a manifold of intuition in order for there to be an object of cognition at all for in synthesis of recognition we find an object of cognition that fulfils all requirements of the unity of the rule found in the concept. And thereby we can also see how personal identity or the identity of consciousness can be represented only when a manifold of intuition has been subjected to this synthesis of recognition because thereby we can infer that we have continued the same when we see some object as the same across an expanse of time and space. So subjective consciousness of identity depends on object consciousness because on recognizing an object as the same as that before we also recognize ourselves as the same and both are made possible by a synthesis whose unity depends on a rule or on the concept. Hence in this section we find discussion of concepts, objects of representation and transcendental apperception.

 A Unified Interpretation of A and B-Deduction

In this section I shall discuss the B-Edition Deduction and argue that Kant’s views were unchanged from A-Edition to B-Edition Deduction. The second edition deduction begins with section 15 and ends with section 26. In section 15 Kant argues that any combination of a manifold of intuition cannot come to us through the senses and so this combination cannot be part of our pure form of intuition by which Kant seems to mean receptivity and so he attributes combination to an act of spontaneity which in this section he calls understanding to distinguish it from sensibility (cf. A99). In B130 he calls the act of combining done by understanding, synthesis and formulates his rule of precedence of synthesis over analysis which he also does in A118:

 

“….. we cannot present anything as combined in the object without ourselves' having combined it beforehand; and that, among all representations, combination is the only one that cannot be given through objects, but being an act of the subject's self-activity -- can be performed only by the subject himself. We readily become aware here that this act of synthesis must originally be a single act and must hold equally for all combination; and that resolution or analysis, which seems to be its opposite, yet always presupposes it. For where the understanding has not beforehand combined anything, there it also cannot resolve anything, because only through the understanding could the power of representation have been given something as combined.”

 

Any combination Kant says is a representation of synthetic unity of the manifold, Kant emphasizes that the concept of combination ‘carries with it’, concept of the manifold, the synthesis and in addition the concept of manifold’s unity. One finds the same thought expressed in many passages such A78-79 and A105. Further Kant here quite clearly refers to transcendental unity of consciousness as preceding and making possible all combinations or concepts of combinations and this unity does not belong to any category:

 

“…… the representation of this unity cannot arise from the combination; rather, by being added to the representation of the manifold, it makes possible the concept of combination in the first place. This unity, which thus precedes a priori all concepts of combination, is by no means the category of unity mentioned earlier (in section 10). For all categories are based on logical functions occurring in judgments; but in these functions combination, and hence unity of given concepts, is already thought. Hence a category already presupposes combination. We must therefore search for this unity (which is qualitative unity; section 12) still higher up, viz., in what itself contains the basis for the unity of different concepts in judgments, and hence contains the basis for the possibility of understanding, even as used logically.” (B131)

 

In section 16 Kant mentions the transcendental principle, I think must accompany all my representations which I have discussed above and which we also find in the A-Edition. But we need to pay some attention to Kant’s terminology here. Kant says the representation ‘I Think’ is an act of spontaneity and he calls it pure apperception to distinguish it from empirical apperception. Due to the transcendental principle all manifold of intuition refer to I Think. Further this pure apperception Kant again calls original apperception because it produces the representation ‘I Think’ and “[because it] is one and the same in all consciousness, cannot be accompanied by any further representation.” (B132). Then he adds to this list of terminology by calling this unity of apperception - transcendental unity of self-consciousness, ‘in order to indicate a-priori cognitions can be obtained from it.’ So once again we find that the representation I think does not depend on a synthesis based on the categories but instead on transcendental apperception that makes all concepts possible. Why certain a-priori cognitions can be derived from transcendental unity of apperception. Kant answers this question:

 

“For the manifold representations given in a certain intuition would not one and all be my representations, if they did not one and all belong to one self-consciousness. I.e., as my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as being mine), they surely must conform necessarily to the condition under which alone they can stand together in one universal self-consciousness, since otherwise they would not thoroughly belong to me. And from this original combination much can be inferred.”

 

The manifold of representations would not be counted as mine if they did not conform necessarily to the condition under which they stand together in one universal self-consciousness. So these representations can be counted as mine only because they do already in a pre-categorial sense belong to one universal consciousness.

 

In B133-134 Kant explains how one comes to think one’s identity within the manifold of representations. The reference to a subject’s identity is possible only through consciousness of synthesis:

 

“Hence this reference comes about not through my merely accompanying each representation with consciousness, but through my adding one representation to another and being conscious of their synthesis. Hence only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to present the identity itself of the consciousness in these representations I.e., the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of some synthetic unity of apperception.”

 

This is a consequence of synthesis precedes analysis rule which says I can become of conscious in a combination only what I have combined within the combination i.e. our consciousness of our identity in a manifold of intuition depends on our consciousness of the act of synthesis in which we combine the manifold according to a rule which gives us an object of intuition. The synthetic unity of apperception is the transcendental unity of apperception which in a footnote to this passage Kant also calls the understanding itself:

 

“The analytic unity of consciousness attaches to all concepts that are, and inasmuch as they are, common [to several representations] E.g., in thinking red as such, I present a property that can be found (as a characteristic) in something or other, or can be combined with other representations; hence only by virtue of a possible synthetic unity that I think beforehand can I present the analytic unity. A representation that is to be thought as common to different representations is regarded as belonging to representations that, besides having it, also have something different about them. Consequently it must beforehand be thought in synthetic unity with other representations (even if only possible ones). Only then can I think in it the analytic unity of consciousness that makes the representation a conceptus communis. And thus the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point, to which we must attach all use of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and in accordance with it transcendental philosophy; indeed, this power is the understanding itself.”

 

Following the reasons given in 1.1.2 a conceptus communis depends on a synthesis of recognition. We have a conceptus communis when one concept like red denotes a property that differentiates it from other properties and which makes it possible to combine this concept with another to form a judgement. A synthesis of reproduction is based on a rule in a concept for the reproduction of certain appearances in a manifold of intuition which presupposes the ability to discern a common property through the appearances given in sensibility. For example not always the same three lines or the same shades of red will be given in intuition when one thinks the concept of a triangle or of red but one thinks these objects of intuition in terms of a single concept which contains the rule for reproduction of those appearances which are given to us in intuition every time we cognize them. So one can also see that this synthesis is made possible by a prior one which gives us the ability to recognize this property as one and the same or which gives us the rule on which depends the analytic unity of a concept which can be considered a conceptus communis. It tells us which particular is to be counted as a member of which universal and so it makes possible reproduction of particulars of intuition in accordance with a concept. Further in B135 Kant defines understanding as the power to combine a-priori and to bring manifold of given intuitions under unity of apperception. This definition is similar to the A-Edition definition of understanding as the power to form rules and here instead of pure understanding and understanding we have transcendental or synthetic unity of consciousness identified as understanding and pure apperception or simply unity of apperception or analytic unity of consciousness for the ‘I Think’ which thinks the manifold of representations as mine. The section ends with new terms to reiterate the same point:

 

“Now, it is true that this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself merely an identical and hence an analytic proposition. Yet it does declare as necessary a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition, a synthesis without which that thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness cannot be thought. For through the ‘I’ as simple representation, nothing manifold is given; only in intuition, which is distinct from this representation, can a manifold be given, and only through combination can it be thought in one consciousness. An understanding wherein through self- consciousness alone everything manifold would at the same time be given would be an understanding that intuits. Our understanding can only think, and must seek intuition in the senses. I am, then, conscious of the self as identical, as regards the manifold of the representations given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and all my representations that make up one representation. That, however, is tantamount to saying that I am conscious of a necessary a priori synthesis of them. This synthesis is called the original synthetic unity of apperception. All representations given to me are subject to this unity; but they must also be brought under it through a synthesis.”

 

Guyer cites this passage in his 1980 article to show that Kant’s views changed in B-Edition deduction because he know regards the connection between apperception and conditions for the possibility of self-ascription to be analytic. But on the contrary Kant is emphasizing that even though I Think is an analytic proposition still it presupposes a necessary synthesis of a manifold given in intuition without which the identity of self-consciousness cannot be thought, I emphasize again it is thinking the identity not the identity itself that presupposes the synthesis. Kant explicates the reasons for not regarding the connection between conditions of self-ascription of identity and objectivity as analytic, he says no representation, and no manifold of intuition is given through the ‘I’ as a simple representation. If the conditions were analytic then no manifold of intuitions or no object of intuition would correspond to it. But in I think the cogito thought, understanding brings a synthesis to a manifold of intuition. This is possible only in two ways, first if we have an intuitive understanding in which case through self-consciousness alone would a manifold of intuition would be given to an understanding that intuits. But Kant denies we have an intuitive understanding and adds that we have an understanding that thinks and which must seek intuition in the senses which is the second way the manifold of intuition can be given to thought. In the next line Kant equates the consciousness of identity through a manifold of representations to consciousness of a necessary a-priori synthesis of the manifold and this synthesis Kant calls an original synthetic unity of apperception. This synthetic unity is the application to manifold of intuition of the rule that I Think must accompany all my representations. This means that the field of representations becomes subject to a rule derived from transcendental apperception through a-priori synthesis to the effect that every representation will be subject to this unity i.e. it would now be possible to combine any manifold of intuition such that the identity of self-consciousness could be thought within the manifold. Hence we require a synthetic unity rather than an analytic unity to make possible the representation of I think or to think any representation whatsoever as mine presupposes a synthesis without which the cogito thought I Think i.e. self-consciousness itself is not possible. Although I Think is analytic since it says that all representations brought under synthesis or the conditions of self-ascription are to be counted as mine, it itself is based or made possible by a synthesis preceding it which makes it possible to combine any manifold of representations to count it as mine. Kant clearly distinguishes between the two cases – the analyticity of the rule of self-ascription and the possibility of this rule through a-priori synthesis. The latter is on the transcendental unity of consciousness and Guyer’s problems arise in ignoring this and equating the latter with apperception or consciousness of identity rather than what makes the representation of identity possible through a synthesis. It is the synthetic consciousness that even in B138 Kant regards as the condition of all thought and is differentiated by Kant from the analytic I Think.

 

Further in A-Edition Deduction we saw that every synthesis is based on a rule which is the unity of the act of synthesis and which on one side makes possible the self-consciousness and on the other object-consciousness and transcendental deduction is an inquiry into the possibility of this reference of cognition to its object and so an inquiry about the possibility of understanding itself. The same point we find made in section 17, B137-138:

 

“Understanding speaking generally is the power of cognitions. Cognitions consist in determinate reference of given representations to an object. And an object is that in whose concept the manifold of a given intuition is united. But all unification of representations requires that there be unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently the reference of representations to an object consists solely in this unity of consciousness, and hence so does their objective validity and consequently their becoming cognitions. On this unity, consequently, rests the very possibility of the understanding. Hence the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception is the primary pure cognition of understanding, on which the entire remaining use of the understanding is based; and this cognition is at the same time entirely independent of all conditions of sensible intuition. Thus the mere form of outer sensible intuition, i.e., space, is as yet no cognition at all; it provides only the manifold of a priori intuition for a possible cognition. Rather, in order to cognize something or other---e.g., a line-in space, I must draw it; and hence I must bring about synthetically a determinate combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the concept of a line), and so that an object (a determinate space) is thereby first cognized. The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all cognition. Not only do I myself need this condition in order to cognize an object, but every intuition must be subject to it in order to become an object for me. For otherwise, and without that synthesis, the manifold would not unite in one consciousness.” (Emphasis mine)

 

In B138-139 Kant discusses intuitive understanding again. Against rationalists it is emphasized that the I Think is analytic and hence merely formal and contains no coincidence of form and matter of cognition which is possible only for an intuitive understanding. And so arises the need for synthesis for a human understanding: “Such an understanding would not require, for the unity of consciousness, a special act of synthesis of the manifold. The human understanding, which merely thinks but does not intuit, does need that synthesis. But still, for the human understanding the principle is unavoidably the first principle.” Even though we can infer I exist from I Think analytically, Kant believes that on account of this proposition being analytic no manifold of intuition is given in this representation at all but since self-consciousness presupposes or is not possible without an intuition there must be a synthesis that precedes and makes possible this representation of I Think by uniting a manifold of intuition in one single consciousness so that the identity of consciousness can be represented within a manifold of intuition and hence analytic unity of consciousness presupposes a synthetic unity of consciousness. Above I showed contra Guyer this is how Kant argued in section 17, B135-136. Now because I Think is a purely analytic rule and no manifold of intuition is given in it, it needs a connecting principle to convert this rule into a cognition by determining an object of intuition for this rule to be applied. But if human understanding was an intuitive understanding then there would be no need for a synthesis or connecting principle to bring a content for the thought, there would instead had been an object of intuition readily given to an understanding. Human understanding is not intuitive but discursive and requires a distinct source of cognition in human receptivity which even though provides us with intuitions, does not provide us with objects of intuitions which demands that intuitions be subject to a synthesis based on concepts. Without this connecting principle no cognition is possible because thought would be without an object and no judgement is possible which unites concepts together in a unity only when they contain a reference to an object of intuition. That this unity of judgement or the connecting principle that joins concepts with intuition presupposes a transcendental unity of consciousness is what Kant argues in section 18 and 19. Why not simply posit a synthesis instead of unity of consciousness to explain unity found in the judgement? Because synthesis is based on a rule or a function that gives unity to the synthesis, and so synthesis cannot bring synthetic unity in a manifold if it itself is not based on a synthetic a-priori unity. A synthesis is only an act of combining but the combination has to be based on a rule, only then can an object of intuition be determined for a cognition and unity of judgement itself become possible. So we see section 18 beginning with reference to transcendental unity of consciousness:

 

“The transcendental unity of apperception is the unity whereby everything manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. Hence this unity is called objective, and must be distinguished from subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of inner sense whereby that manifold of intuition for such [objective] combination is given empirically.”

 

It is because of transcendental unity of apperception that a manifold of intuition is united in accordance with the concept of an object. This is the reason this unity is called objective because it is the source of a universal and necessary synthesis which makes cognition possible by determining a manifold of intuition in accordance with a concept. A unity is subjective when the combination is contingent and if the unity of the manifold is based on concepts subject to empirical apperception. This distinction is reminiscent of the distinction between judgement of perception and the judgement of experience made within Prolegomena by Kant. He uses the example of a body being heavy in contrast to feeling heavy, an example we also find in section 19. The transcendental unity of apperception is an objective unity because it alone makes nature or the world of experience possible for us as empirical subjects. Hence not subjective but only objective combinations or objective experience is at stake here, the latter depends on transcendental unity of consciousness and is made possible by it. Considerations about empirical unity of consciousness are explicitly discounted in this particular section.

 

Section 19 contains the almost single inference that leads to transcendental unity of apperception. Kant begins with defining a judgement as a representation of the relation between two concepts. The question arises what is this relation between concepts. Kant answers:

 

“But suppose that I inquire more precisely into the [relation or] reference of given cognitions in every judgment, and that distinguish it, as belonging to the understanding, from the relation in terms of laws of the reproductive imagination (a relation that has only subjective validity). I then find that a judgment is nothing but a way of bringing given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception. This is what the little relational word is in judgments intends [to indicate], in order to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective one. For this word indicates the reference of the representations to original apperception and its necessary unity. The reference to this necessary unity is there even if the judgment itself is empirical and hence contingent--e.g., Bodies are heavy. By this I do not mean that these representations belong necessarily to one another in the empirical intuition. Rather, I mean that they belong to one another by virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions; i.e., they belong to one another according to principles of the objective determination of all representations insofar as these representations can become cognition all of these principles being derived from the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception.”

 

The function of a judgement is to bring cognitions to objective unity of apperception which is what the relational copula ‘is’ denotes in a judgement, a reference to original apperception and its necessary unity. Guyer (2010) objects to this argument on the following ground:

 

“The problem, however, is that by identifying the unity of apperception with objectively valid judgment in this way, Kant has now managed to exclude from the embrace of apperception mere reports about one’s own experience, such as “If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight,” which seem like perfectly good expressions of the self-ascription of experiences that should therefore be included within the scope of the complete unity of apperception whether they can be immediately transformed into judgments about objects or not, and has thereby potentially left a vast number of our properly self-ascribed experiences outside of the domain of the categories altogether. While it would be perfectly sound for Kant to distinguish between the manifold of intuitions of inner sense that is the data for the unity of apperception and the unity of apperception itself as a structured synthesis of such data, his equation of the distinction between the subjective unity of consciousness and the objective unity of apperception with the distinction between objectively valid judgments about objects and mere reports about subjective impressions means that he has ended up excluding many self-ascriptions of experience from the unity of apperception. He has established a connection between apperception and judgment, and thereby between apperception and the categories, only by restricting the domain of apperception and undermining his initial claim that I must be able to attach the “I think” – and thereby the categories – to all of my representations.”

 

Such an objection is strange since Kant quite explicitly claims in this passage that the reference to necessary unity of consciousness is there even if the judgement is merely empirical and contingent. But then Kant also seems to be arguing that judgements of experience are the relevant kind of judgements contain a necessary reference to transcendental unity of apperception. The point is that both statements are true. Judgements of perception or empirical merely contingent judgements are made possible only because transcendental unity of consciousness makes nature itself or a world of experience possible without which no judgements even subjectively valid would be possible. We saw the basic argument in A-Edition deduction where Kant argued that all synthesis of apprehension and synthesis of reproduction or all customary association itself is possible only if there is a law like connection between appearances. Subjectively valid judgement can be converted into objectively valid judgement through the mediation of the categories. For example the judgement body seems heavy can be converted into a judgement body is heavy by applying the category of substance and attribute. The subjectively valid judgement contains a reference to necessary unity of consciousness in so far as any possible combination not necessarily a necessary and universal one is possible only if representations can be combined within a single consciousness in accordance with the transcendental rule whose source lies in transcendental unity of apperception and hence potentially a subjectively valid judgement can be converted into an objectively valid one if one comes to discover that the rule of combination in this case is really a law, necessary and universal for combining appearances and that our subjective association of appearances itself now is seen as made possible by the connection present within nature itself which is made possible by transcendental unity of apperception.

 

In section 20 Kant argues that a manifold of intuition cannot give us a combination or an object of intuition without a synthesis and hence presupposes original synthetic unity of consciousness. The same argument is found also in A-Edition Deduction specially made in reference to synthesis of apprehension in A99. In this section Kant describes the categories: “The categories however, are indeed nothing but precisely these functions of judging insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined in regard to them.” In B128-129 Kant shows how categories determine a manifold of a given intuition in regard to function of judging. An object of intuition is determined for instance as a substance or a final subject of determination by fixing its place in a logical function of judging and thereby a subject of judgement pertaining to an object of intuition is thought as a substance:

 

“The only thing that I still want to do before we start is to explicate the categories: they are concepts of an object as such whereby the object's intuition is regarded as determined in terms of one of the logical functions in judging. Thus the function of the categorical judgment e.g., All bodies are divisible-is that of the relation of subject to predicate. But the understanding's merely logical use left undetermined to which of the two concepts we want to give the function of the subject, and to which the function of the predicate. For we can also say, something divisible is a body. If, on the other hand, I bring the concept of a body under the category of substance, then through this category is determined the fact that the body's empirical intuition in experience must be considered always as subject only, never as mere predicate. And similarly in all the remaining categories.”

 

 

Categories determine one of the terms of the logical functions in judging. For example in a judgement A-R-B, the subject and predicate can interchange their positions. But if the subject term is fixed then in thought the subject term is the final subject which cannot be a predicate and when related through a schema to an empirical intuition we get the concept of a substance to which an object of intuition corresponds and which can be seen as exhibiting a concept in intuition in the way mathematical concepts are exhibited in pure intuition.

 

 

In section 21 Kant further elucidates the role of categories:

 

“Through the synthesis of understanding, a manifold contained in an intuition that I call mine is presented as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness, and this presenting is done by means of the category.”

 

In a footnote added to this passage Kant says that the proof of this lies in unity of intuition which gives us an object of intuition depends on a synthesis of manifold and so necessarily refers to unity of apperception which was Kant’s argument in section 20. The synthetic unity that is brought within a manifold of intuition contains on the one side self-consciousness or the representation that this representation of the object of intuition is mine and on the other side it brings to consciousness an object of intuition whose unity is contained in the rule of synthesis. So categories since they are logical functions that present an object of intuition to consciousness which is considered as mine or belonging to me, are equated with rules of synthesis or logical functions of understanding that determine an object of intuition. From this Kant infers:

 

“Hence the category indicates that the empirical consciousness of a given manifold of one intuition is just as subject to a pure a priori self-consciousness, as empirical intuition is subject to a pure sensible intuition that likewise takes place a priori.”

 

The manifold of intuition united in an object contains a necessary reference to synthetic unity of consciousness but since this unity is brought about by means of a synthesis based on categories, the categories are the means through which transcendental unity of consciousness brings about both self-consciousness and the unity in a manifold of intuition requisite for cognition and so even within an empirical manifold categories indicate the necessary reference this manifold has to necessary unity of consciousness since the empirical manifold presupposes synthesis based on categories which ultimately depends on transcendental unity of consciousness. The next passage has become a field of disputes among commentators because Kant seems to be dividing the argument of the deduction into two steps, one taken from section 15-20 and the last culminating from section 21 to 26 by establishing the objective validity of the categories:

 

“Hence in the above proposition I have made the beginning of a deduction of the pure concepts of understanding. Since the categories are independent of sensibility and arise in the understanding alone, I must still abstract, in this deduction, from the way in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, in order to take account solely of the unity that the understanding contributes to the intuition by means of the category. Afterwards (§ 26) I shall show, from the way in which the empirical intuition is given in sensibility, that the intuition's unity is none other than the unity that (by § 20, above) the category prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition as such; and that hence by my explaining the category's a priori validity regarding all objects of our senses, the deduction's aim will first be fully attained.”

 

The above proposition i.e. categories indicate within empirical consciousness the presence of a necessary unity of consciousness. Categories as logical functions of understanding have their source solely within understanding and Kant as he says in section 18 discounts considerations of empirical consciousness to elucidate the role of categories as the rules or functions for synthesis for bringing a manifold of intuition to unity of consciousness. Kant has at this stage has only indicated how categories are the rules for synthesis of a manifold for all intuition as such and what Kant now seeks to demonstrate is that it is also the rule of synthesis for bringing unity within an empirical manifold specifically. This demonstration is necessary for establishing the transcendental affinity of empirical manifold as Kant argued in the A-Edition Deduction. Instead of transcendental affinity Kant is arguing about the unity of an empirical manifold as referring necessarily to a transcendental unity of consciousness because of the categories. This conclusion will be established in section 26. The entire section then cannot be divided into two arguments or two steps of the same argument, it is the application of the same argument which was made in relation to manifold of intuition in general is now shown to be specifically applied to a manifold of empirical intuition. But since empirical manifold is made possible by a pure manifold of intuition why does Kant need to prove the objective validity of categories specifically in relation to an empirical manifold? Kant answers this question: “From one point, however, I could not abstract in the above proof: viz., from the fact that the manifold for the intuition must be given still prior to the understanding's synthesis, and independently of it; but how it is given remains undetermined here.”

 

Section 22 begins with making a distinction between thought and cognition, the former contains a concept by which an object is thought but the latter refers to an object of intuition. Now all intuition that is possible for us is a sensible one which was the conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic and so Kant infers cognition which is thinking an object by means of pure concepts of understanding is possible only in relation to objects given to us by our senses. Sensible intuition is divided into pure and empirical. Mathematical concepts can be exhibited within pure intuition but they cannot be regarded as cognitions if these mathematical concepts cannot be applied to empirical intuitions. Similarly in the case of categories:

 

“Consequently the categories also do not supply us, by means of intuition, with any cognition of things, except through their possible application to empirical intuition I.e., the categories serve only for the possibility of empirical cognition. Such cognition, however, is called experience. Consequently the categories cannot be used for cognizing things except insofar as these things are taken as objects of possible experience.”

 

Transcendental Apperception cannot be regarded as the progenitor of experience if categories do not determine the objects of experience and this requires applicability of categories not simply to objects of intuition as such but specifically to objects of empirical intuition because experience itself is not possible without empirical intuition. The reference to possible experience determines the sense and bounds of the use of categories and also their objective validity and so their reference to empirical intuitions in specific has to be explained but just as their validity with respect to intuition in general was established so through the same argument i.e. as rules of synthesis for an empirical manifold while also considering the possibility of an empirical manifold (while previously Kant only required the premise that unity of intuition requires a synthesis which argument he makes in section 20). Such an argument presupposes the possibility of referring to intuitions and so the possibility of understanding itself because only then can categories establish that through their applicability to intuition in general or to empirical intuition, this manifold also refers to the transcendental unity of consciousness.

 

Section 23 tells us that by showing how categories apply to objects of empirical intuition their scope of application is restricted to the latter.

 

In Section 24 Kant distinguishes between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis, the latter synthesis is operative in applying categories to the manifold of intuition in general and does not require imagination but only understanding as such because categories are nothing but logical functions of thought for determining a manifold of intuition in general. To apply categories to empirical intuition one needs the use of imagination and this synthesis which eventually also needs a schema is called here a figurative synthesis. Kant here also distinguishes between productive and reproductive imagination. What is called figurative synthesis here was called in A-Edition Deduction Transcendental Synthesis of Imagination. Kant there divides imagination into productive and reproductive and calls the former productive imagination which is responsible for effecting a transcendental affinity presupposed by every empirical association:

 

“The objective unity of all (empirical) consciousness in one consciousness

(i.e., in original apperception) is, therefore, the necessary condition even of all possible perception; and the affinity of all appearances (whether near or remote) is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in imagination that is based a priori on rules. Hence the imagination is also a power of an a priori synthesis, and this is the reason why we give it the name of productive imagination. And insofar as the imagination's aim regarding everything manifold in appearance is nothing more than to provide necessary unity in the synthesis of appearance, this synthesis may be called the transcendental function of the imagination. Hence from what has been said thus far it is indeed evident, although strange, that only by means of this transcendental function of the imagination does even the affinity of appearances become possible, and with it their association, and through this association finally their reproduction according to laws, and consequently experience itself. For without this transcendental function no concepts whatever of objects would meld into one experience.” (A123)

 

And he also distinguishes intellectual with imaginative synthesis:

 

“Now, this apperception is what must be added to pure imagination in order to make its function intellectual. For the synthesis of imagination, although performed a priori, is yet always in itself sensible, because it combines the manifold--e.g., the shape of a triangle-only as it appears in intuition. But through the manifold's relation to the unity of apperception, concepts which belong to the understanding will be able to come about, but only by means of imagination as referred to sensible intuition.” (A124)

 

The rules of understanding can be derived from understanding analytically without referring to a manifold but to bring a cognition through them we need a manifold of intuition and hence this analytic unity presupposes a synthetic unity which relates thought to an object and so brings about a cognition. Synthesis is therefore the means through which concepts are brought in relation to intuition. When we need to focus on logical functions in their capacity of combining any manifold of intuition in general without the need of any manifold being presented to us we talk about an intellectual synthesis but when synthesis is seen as a means of relating concepts to empirical intuition and so brings in the need for exhibition of these concepts in intuition then we talk about figurative synthesis.

 

Further in section 24 Kant argues that we never cognize ourselves as we really are but we intuit our existence in time. Section 25 begins with making the same point we saw made in relation to intuition in general, that the consciousness of my existence only tells us that I am i.e. I exist and it is merely thought and no intuition is given through it and so cognition of ourselves requires in addition an act of synthesis and so cognition of my existence occurs only in inner sense. Here Kant seems to be making the point in relation to empirical apperception. I however regard myself as an intelligent being because intelligence is the power of combination and self-consciousness even in this case is due to the power of combining representations which also leads to cognition of our own existence in time i.e. as conditioned by inner sense.

 

This brings us to the final section 26. Kant clarifies what his aim in this section is:

 

“In the metaphysical deduction we established the a priori origin of the categories as such through their complete concurrence with the universal logical functions of thought. But in the transcendental deduction we exhibited the possibility of them as a priori cognitions of objects of an intuition as such (§§ 20, 21). We must now explain how it is possible, through categories to cognize a priori whatever objects our senses may encounter to so cognize them as regards not the form of their intuition, but the laws of their combination and hence, as it were, to prescribe laws to nature, and even to make nature possible. For without this suitability of the categories, one would fail to see how everything that our senses may encounter would have to be subject to the laws that arise a priori from the understanding alone.”

 

In Section 20 we saw that unity of intuition is possible only through synthesis and in section 21 categories were regarded as objectively valid because they are rules for an intellectual synthesis that applied to intuition in general or any combination of intuition in general. The final step it was mentioned there was to show that the categories are valid in relation to empirical intuition. Again this is what Kant says right at the beginning of this section. General Logic studies these functions for combining intuitions without reference to intuitions but transcendental logic is concerned with origin of these functions and in order to show their origin and prove their validity reference to intuition is essential.

 

How can categories be shown to apply to empirical intuition? They can be applied by referring categories to the form of intuition – space and time. Every empirical intuition must conform to these conditions and if categories are applicable to space and time then every empirical intuition will also be shown to presuppose the categories as functions for combining an empirical manifold. So how can categories be applied to space and time? To this Kant answers in a way very similar to his argument in section 20:

 

“We have a priori, in the representations of space and time, forms of both outer and inner sensible intuition; and to these forms the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always conform, because that synthesis itself can take place only according to this form. But space and time are presented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but as themselves intuitions (containing a manifold), and hence are presented with the determination of the unity of this manifold in them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic). Therefore even unity of synthesis of the manifold outside or within us, and hence also a combination to which everything that is to be presented determinately in space or time must conform, is already given a priori as condition of the synthesis of all apprehension given along with (not in) these intuitions. This synthetic unity, however, can be none other than the unity of the combination, conforming to the categories but applied to our sensible intuition, of the manifold of a given intuition as such in an original consciousness. Consequently all synthesis, the synthesis through which even perception becomes possible, is subject to the categories; and since experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and hence hold a priori also for all objects of experience.”

 

Space and time are not just forms of intuition but formal intuitions (B161n) or intuitions themselves that contain a manifold in them. Synthesis of apprehension (A99) has as its function the act of bringing together scattered elements together which would otherwise be absolute unities. Hence even the synthesis of apprehension conforms to the form of space and time but all synthesis is an act of spontaneity or understanding and hence formal intuitions of space and time themselves are brought through a synthesis undertaken by understanding. Synthesis of apprehension presupposes as its a-priori condition the unity of synthesis and a combination i.e. synthetic unity itself which is the unity of combination. As we saw in our previous discussion the unity of synthesis is due to a rule which combines a manifold of intuition in which an object of intuition combines within it a manifold as reflected in the unity of the rule or the concept. Since space and time as formal intuitions presuppose a synthesis and a unity of a synthesis due to a rule which rule is nothing else but the categories one can infer that space and time in order to be formal intuitions as given in synthesis of apprehension must conform along with forms of intuition also to the categories and so since all empirical intuitions presuppose space and time as formal intuitions they must also presuppose categories, since whatever can be cognized is cognized in space and time which cognition depends on a synthesis and the unity of synthesis due to rules. The argument is the same as given in A-Edition where synthesis of apprehension was shown to presuppose reproduction and recognition but there it was given in greater elaboration. In footnote to B163 Kant says:

 

“In this way we prove that the synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, must conform necessarily to the synthesis of apperception, which is intellectual and is contained wholly a priori in the category. The spontaneity that brings combination into the manifold of intuition is one and the same in the two cases: in apprehension it does so under the name of power of imagination; in apperception it does so under the name of understanding.”

 

The argumentative structure is the same we found in section 20, unity of intuition presupposes a synthesis, in this case the relevant unity if formal unity of intuitions – spatial and temporal intuition. Kant however further explains this through two examples, I consider here one of these:

 

“When (to take a different example) I perceive the freezing of water, then I apprehend two states (fluidity and solidity) as states that stand to each other in a relation of time. Since the appearance is inner intuition, I lay time at its basis. But in time I necessarily present synthetic unity of the manifold; without this unity, that relation could not be given determinately (as regards time sequence) in an intuition. However, this synthetic unity, as a priori condition under which I combine the manifold of an intuition as such, is if I abstract from the constant form of my inner intuition, i.e., from time the category of cause; through this category, when I apply it to my sensibility, everything that happens is, in terms of its relation, determined by me in time as such. Therefore apprehension in such an event, and hence the event itself, is subject-as regards possible perception to the concept of the relation of effects and causes; and thus it is in all other cases.”

 

The succession of two states of water, fluidity and solidity is grasped in time because time is the order of succession but to grasp something as before and another as after presupposes a synthetic unity or else no relation between the two events in time would be noticed since they would be absolute unities. Just as I Think is an analytic unity unrelated to a manifold of intuition, instants of time too would be bare unities if they also did not presuppose a synthesis. So this synthetic unity found in time is the a-priori condition under which a manifold of intuition is combined. The same succession if I see abstracting time from it, then I can apply the conditional form of judgement to the succession and understand it in terms of the relation of cause and effect. The same synthetic unity thought in terms of time or sequence of events in time now is seen in terms of the relation of cause and effect. This synthetic unity was brought about by means of synthesis in a manifold of intuition by logical functions of understanding in their capacity as rules for combination of a manifold can be seen both in terms of spatial and temporal ordering and in terms of categories because the synthetic unity is the same in both cases and they are brought about through a synthesis presupposing categories in an intellectual synthesis and by abstracting the form of intuition they can be applied to empirical intuition through a figurative synthesis.

 

Finally Kant ends by again referring to transcendental unity of consciousness by raising the question of how categories could prescribe laws to nature without getting those laws from nature itself:

 

“Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances, and hence to nature regarded as the sum of all appearances (natura materialiter spectata). And now this question arises: Since the categories are not derived from nature and do not conform to it as their model (for then they would be merely empirical), how are we to comprehend the fact that nature must conform to the categories, i.e., how can the categories determine a priori the combination of nature's manifold without gleaning that combination from nature? Here now is the solution of this puzzle.”

 

Kant’s answer is:

 

“…appearances themselves must agree with the form of a priori sensible intuition. For just as appearances exist not in themselves but only relatively to the subject in whom the appearances inhere insofar as the subject has senses, so the laws exist not in the appearances but only relatively to that same being insofar as that being has understanding.”

 

“As mere appearances, however, they are subject to no law of connection whatever except the one prescribed by the connecting power. Now what connects the manifold of sensible intuition is imagination; and imagination depends on understanding as regards the unity of its intellectual synthesis, and on sensibility as regards the manifoldness of apprehension. Now all possible perception depends on this synthesis of apprehension; but it itself, this empirical synthesis, depends on transcendental synthesis and hence on the categories. Therefore all possible perceptions, and hence also everything whatever that can reach empirical consciousness, i.e., all appearances of nature, must in regard to their combination be subject to the categories.”

 

Empirical synthesis is the three-fold synthesis referred to in A-Edition Deduction and all possible perception depends on these three-fold synthesis since they depend on synthesis of apprehension which depends on synthesis of reproduction and recognition and this empirical synthesis I have identified with figurative synthesis which depends on transcendental synthesis or intellectual synthesis presupposing the categories. Thereby categories become applicable via figurative synthesis to empirical intuition i.e. to all possible perceptions and whatever that is within the reach of empirical consciousness which is all appearances in time as regards their combination are now subject to the categories. Even though particular empirical laws are not completely derivable from a-priori laws of combination and their discovery requires experience still one can now say that they must be based on a-priori laws or the uniformity of nature. Kant in this way has answered Hume.

 

This is also the conclusion of the A-Edition Deduction:

 

“Therefore the manner in which the manifold of sensible representation (intuition) belongs to one consciousness precedes all cognition of the object, as the intellectual form of that cognition, and itself amounts to a formal a priori cognition of all objects as such insofar as they are thought (the categories). The synthesis of this [sensible intuition] by pure imagination, and the unity of all representations by reference to original apperception precede all empirical cognition. Hence pure concepts of understanding are a priori possible, and in reference to experience even necessary, only because our cognition deals with nothing but appearances. For the possibility of appearances lies in ourselves, and their connection and unity (in the representation of an object) is to be met with merely in us. Hence this connection and unity must precede all experience and must also make experience, in terms of its form, possible in the first place. And our deduction of the categories has indeed been conducted on this basis-the one and only possible basis.”

 

So it is reasonable to conclude that both A-Edition and B-Edition Deduction give us the same argument and establish the same conclusion that understanding is the lawgiver or the legislator of nature.

Maimon's Objections

In this section I shall consider two objections Solomon Maimon makes against Kant’s transcendental philosophy and that puts into doubt Kant’s success in replying to Hume and his transcendental deduction. The first objection questions Kant’s solution to the problem of quid juris and the second objection argues that Kant has not answered quid facti.

Coming to the first objection against the solution to quid juris Maimon (Essays: 32) says:

 

“The question then is: quid juris?, i.e. is the objective use of this concept legitimate or not? - and if it is, what kind of law does it belong under:26 for the concept is related to objects of intuition given a posteriori and hence is certainly illegitimate with respect to the matter of intuition, which is given a posteriori. How I then can we make it legitimate? The answer to this, or the deduction, is as follows: we do not apply this concept directly to the matter of intuition, but merely to its a priori form (time) and by this means to the intuition itself. So, if I say a is the cause of b, or if a is posited, b must also necessarily be posited, then a and b are not determined with respect to their matter or content, but only with respect to particular determinations of their form (the preceding and the succeeding in time): i.e. the reason that a is a and not b is not that a has a material determination that b lacks (for this cannot be subsumed under the a priori rule in so far as it is something a posteriori), but rather because a has a formal determination (the preceding), that b does not have. And it is the same with b: it does not become a determined object different from a through a material determination but rather through a formal determination (the succeeding) of their common form (time). So in this case the preceding stands to the succeeding as the antecedent stands to the consequent in a hypothetical judgement.”

 

We have seen that this represents Kant’s views in Transcendental Deduction in its second half from section 22 to 26 where Kant is concerned with showing the applicability of the categories to empirical intuition. This answer is found wanting by Maimon due to the following reasons:

 

 

“However, the following question can still be raised: what determines the faculty of judgement to think the rule-governed succession as corresponding to the rule of the understanding itself (so that, if a comes first and b follows, but not the reverse, then the faculty of judgement thinks the relation of cause and effect between them), and to think each particular member of this sequence as corresponding to each particular member of the rule of understanding (the preceding corresponding to cause and the succeeding to effect)?”

 

Let us recapitulate how Kant intends to solve the problem of quid juris and then put Maimon’s objections in that perspective. According to Kant a subjective succession can be distinguishes from an objective succession (A193-196/B238-241) only if one member succeeds the other according to a rule of understanding: “In accordance with such a rule, therefore, what precedes an event as such must contain the condition for a rule whereby this event always and necessarily follows. But I cannot go, conversely, from the event backward and determine (through apprehension) what precedes.” For example fire can be seen as the cause of smoke if the relation between the two is irreversible in space and time. Hume’s objection to the category of causality was that no universal and necessary connection is found between fire and smoke because when we think of fire we do not necessarily think of smoke and vica-versa. Against Hume it has to be shown that fire is the cause of smoke because understanding is the author of our experience or the a-priori condition of the possibility of experience of fire as the cause of smoke. Categories make experience possible by determining an object of intuition for cognition but given the heterogeneity between intuition and concepts, categories are shown to be applicable to empirical intuition not directly but through the form under which any object of appearance could be given to us i.e. space and time. The rule of understanding for cause-effect relation is an application to intuition of the hypothetical form of judgement which conditions the spatial-temporal ordering of fire and smoke in space and time i.e. the reason we have an objective sequence in time where fire always precedes the smoke is due to the rule of understanding. We can legitimately apply the concepts of cause-effect to fire and smoke because these concepts determine the objective sequence that we find in nature. Constant experience informs us of the irreversibility of the relation between fire and smoke, they appear to us as objects of intuition in a certain order and this order is due to concepts that make the objects of experience possible from which we can infer their objective validity. Hence for Kant quid juris is solved.

 

So the first question that Maimon raises is why on finding an irreversible spatial-temporal relation between fire and smoke we are entitled to believe that the succession of objects in this case is due to a rule of understanding i.e. why do we think of objects of intuitions in terms of rules of understanding? Kant would say the objects of intuitions were determined in a certain order of succession by the pure concepts of understanding because these concepts are the condition of possible experience since intuition itself is incapable of determining an object of intuition and hence the need for a category based synthesis. But Maimon is arguing that we have been given a rule that if you find two objects in an irreversible relation of succession then think the preceding member in terms of cause and succeeding in terms of effect, but what we still do not know is why this relation is seen to obtain between fire and smoke and not some other set of objects i.e. why doesn’t this rule of understanding determine another set of objects instead of fire and smoke into the relation of cause and effect? Why it is the case that fire and smoke in particular are found to be joined together in the relation of cause and effect? Couldn’t the rule of understanding have determined a different set of objects say water and smoke in an irreversible sequential relation or determined the order of succession in such a way that smoke always precedes fire? What is it about fire and smoke that these objects and no other have to be thought in terms of the relation between cause and effect? Maimon argues:

 

 

“….we do not in fact have any insight into the ground of this correspondence, but we are not for all that any the less convinced of the factum itself. We have several examples of this type: for example, in the judgement that the straight line is the shortest line between two points we have an apodictic cognition of a correspondence between two rules that the understanding prescribes to itself for the construction [Bildung] of a certain line: (being straight I and being the shortest). We do not comprehend why these two must be combined in one subject, but it is enough that we have insight into the possibility of this correspondence (in so far as they are both a priori). It is the same here [i.e. with the concept of cause] - we did not want to explain this correspondence analytically by answering the question quid juris? by means of a deduction, but merely to demonstrate its possibility since the fact is synthetically certain through intuition; in other words we merely wanted to make this cognition into an a priori cognition and not into a pure cognition……even if I already see the meaning of the proposition that a straight line is the shortest between two points (by constructing a straight line), I still do not know how I arrived at this proposition. The reason is that this relation does not specify merely a universal form that must be in me a priori, but rather specifies the form or rule of a particular object (the necessary connection between being straight and being the shortest), so that here the question quid juris of the explanation of possibility understood in this sense, is totally unanswerable; for how is it conceivable that the understanding can establish with apodictic certainty that a relational concept (the necessary being together of the two predicates) that it thinks must be found in a given object? All that the understanding can assume with certainty in the object is what it itself has put into it I (in so far as it has itself produced the object itself in accordance with a self-prescribed rule), and not anything that has come into the object from elsewhere.” (Essays: 32-33, 35-36, emphasis mine)

 

That a certain combination is found within us is a fact, we combine straight line with shortest distance between two points and fire and smoke but the question is what is the ground for this particular combination. Kant on the other hand gives us a universal form that does not determine a particular form. What would be an instance where the universal determines the particular? Maimon finds this in the law of non-contradiction or the law of identity. When I say everything is identical with itself this rule is applicable to all objects in general because it applies to any object in so far as it is an object and no object can violate this law i.e. there is no possibility of an object that is not identical with itself and hence the law is objectively valid (Essays: 36). The law determines the objects to which the law has to be applied. To make the point using a legal example, we need to give a legal definition for embezzlement of public funds and when it is seen that a particular action fits this definition, only then does the law become applicable and a punishment is decided in accordance with that law. Kant’s rule of understanding in contrast is a universal form which does not tell us why particular objects or a particular form should be counted as falling under the rule of understanding. What is missing is the legal definition that determines the particular use of the law and thereby determines the right of the law. We need to know how the law is to be applied to particular cases and so it is not correct to urge against this that Kant himself admits the indeterminacy of natural laws and accepts that experience is required to determine which combination holds. The issue is that a particular form or combination must be seen as determined in accordance with a law and the universal form must contain conditions for determining the valid use of the law in particular cases. Why a particular form should be seen as having its ground in the law just as a particular action should be seen as punishable under a law because it counts as embezzlement, so how does a particular combination count as a combination due to the rule of understanding. There is a gap between the universal and the particular that is absent in the case of law of identity, we may replace a is a with any object for the value of a and the law would remain applicable to that object because it applies to any object in general but in the case of cause and effect, a is the cause of b, we need a reason to determine why fire for instance should be replaced with a and smoke with b i.e. we need a rule for determining the valid use of a law which tells us why this particular combination must be seen falling under this universal law. Kant’s definition of causal relation in terms of irreversibility does not tell us why the rule prescribes that fire should be counted as the cause of smoke, what is it about fire that it rather than smoke should be counted as the cause, irreversibility of a and b does not tell us why a should be considered as the cause of b and it is not clear what relation irreversibility has to understanding so that a and b have to be seen as determined by a rule of understanding, what is missing is the analogue of the legal definition of embezzlement of funds which justifies the application of a law to a particular action. One has to show that the action fulfils a condition specified in the definition of embezzlement for instance to be counted as punishable or coming under a law. The action (matter) must have the form that is given in the definition.

 

We need to understand why Maimon thinks that this problem is insoluble for Kant. To answer this question we first need understand Maimon’s distinction between a-priori cognition and pure cognition. A-priori cognition is a universal cognition which is the form or condition of all particular cognitions and a cognition is pure if it is the product of understanding alone (Essays: 34). The proof of objective validity is the proof that the categories are the conditions of the possibility of the object of experience. This is possible only if understanding is applicable to objects of intuition but the problem is that intuition is a distinct, heterogeneous source of cognition. We saw that the answer Kant gives is that the conditions for the possibility of thought (analytic unity of apperception which depends on synthetic unity of consciousness) is also the condition for the object of possible experience (unity of manifold of intuition depending on a synthesis based on a concept or rule). So the synthetic unity found in the manifold of intuition which gives unity to intuition also makes thought or cognition possible (A79). The role that understanding plays in this is of bringing a combination within intuition but it is not responsible for the genesis of the intuition itself. So understanding even as the author of nature is responsible solely for the form of nature not the matter of nature. Understanding gives a shape to matter but it is not the cause of matter itself. Now Kant says that understanding can find in a combination only what it has put there. Since it is not responsible for the matter found in the combination it can have no right over it. This is to say in Maimon’s terms we can have no pure cognition and so no objective validity because the latter pertains solely to the form but there is no reason to believe that the form is the form of the matter since the latter’s separate existence renders it indeterminate. Again in Maimon’s terminology this precludes understanding’s claiming any legitimacy in cognition. Secondly, we see how no claim to truth can be made:

 

“For a cognition to be true, it must be both given and thought at the same time: given with respect to its matter (that must be given in an intuition); thought with respect to the form that cannot be given in itself, although it receives its meaning in an intuition (because a relation can only be thought, not intuited). That is to say, the form must be of such a kind that it also belongs to the symbol considered as object, as in the principles of identity and contradiction: a is identical to a, a is opposed to not a. In this case the question quid juris? falls completely aside because the I principles are rules of the thinkability of things in general, without regard to their matter. On the other hand, with synthetic propositions (whether mathematical or physical propositions), the question quid juris? always returns, i.e. although the fact is indubitable, its possibility remains inexplicable. This can be extended generally to the relation between every essence [Wesen] and its properties because the properties do not follow [folgen] analytically from the essence according to the principle of identity (as is the case with the essential parts) but merely synthetically, and so the possibility of the properties' following is incomprehensible. By virtue of the factum we can at best ascribe the highest degree of probability to propositions of this kind, but there is no way that we can ascribe apodictic certainty to them. To be able to do so we must assume that the (for us) synthetic connection between the subject and the predicate must have an inner ground so that if we, for example, had insight into [einsehen] the true essence [Wesen] of a straight line, and accordingly could define it, then this synthetic proposition would follow analytically. On this supposition the evident nature [Evident] of mathematics would indeed be saved but we would then have no synthetic propositions. I So I can only think that Kant assumed the reality of synthetic propositions merely with respect to our limited understanding; and in this I am readily in agreement with him.”

  

Maimon distinguishes between two kinds of explanation of possibility (Essays: 35). The first explanation involves making a symbolic concept intuitive and the second is to give a genetic explanation. If someone lacks the concept of colour we need to show a colour to him but to someone born blind this explanation will not be possible. In the second case we have an intuition corresponding to the concept but the possibility of the combination remains problematic because the ground of the combination is not known. If for instance we knew the essence of fire then we could have deduced smoke from it and so we would have a ground for the combination of fire and smoke but the essence is not known. Truth of a combination requires the coincidence of form and matter i.e. what is given must be thought in terms of the form it does actually possess which form is the essence of the object and so any thought that thinks an object in its essence will also be true of the object i.e. objectively valid. On the other hand Kant gives us rules for thinkability without consideration of matter. The point can also be understood in this way, the principle of non-contradiction is a negative criteria of truth because it makes a number of combinations possible. To understand the possibility of synthetic thought we need to inquire into possibility of combination that ensures material truth just as PNC ensures formal truth. Maimon finds Kant wanting in his proof of possibility of material truth which is what objective validity comes down to. Unless the object itself is seen in terms of the form it actually possesses we cannot have material truth.

 

Thirdly, to solve the problem of quid juris we need to see that a particular combination must have an inner ground i.e. in principle it should be possible to analytically deduce the existence of smoke from fire which would be possible if we knew the essence of the fire. The notion of essence is peculiar because it connects form with matter. An object is thought in terms through which it should be thought i.e. in terms of a form it actually possesses. But if we assume that form and matter coincide in this way then we need to do away with the duality of sensibility and understanding and so we need to dispense with the possibility of synthetic a-priori judgements unless it is seen as relative to our limited understanding though in themselves they are analytic but they can be analytic only for an infinite understanding. It is here that Maimon introduces his ideas of understanding:

 

“An idea of the understanding is the material completeness of a concept, in so far as this completeness cannot be given in intuition. For example, the understanding prescribes for itself this rule or condition: that an infinite number of equal lines are to be drawn from a given point, so that by joining their endpoints together the concept of a circle is produced. The possibility of this rule, and hence of the concept itself, can be shown in intuition (by rotating a line around the given point); and this also shows the formal completeness of the concept (completeness of unity in the manifold). But its material completeness (completeness of the manifold) cannot be given in intuition, because only a finite number of equal lines can be drawn. So this concept is not a concept of the understanding to which an object corresponds, but I only an idea of the understanding, something that we can come infinitely close to in intuition by means of the successive addition of such lines, and consequently a limit concept.”

 

The ideas of understanding are the means through which pure concepts of understanding and intuition are related to each other and the problem of quid juris solved (Essays: 102-104). Even if pure concepts of understanding are exhibited within intuition the possibility of synthetic a-priori judgement would still remain problematic because till the material completeness of the complete concept is realized within an intuition we would not have grasped its possibility. I may know the rule for constructing a circle but till I have not drawn a circle whereby it is given to me intuition I cannot know that the rule is possible. In case of a complete concept its material completeness cannot be exhibited in intuition since that would require an infinity. Thielke’s essay (2003) misses this point since he takes Maimon’s proposal to be in line with the current conceptualism-non-conceptualism debate and to be the same as McDowell’s who believes that spontaneity must determine receptivity if the given is also to be thought but from Maimon’s point of view this would establish only that objects have to be thought in a certain way but not the coincidence of form and matter. So contra Thielke infinite understanding is not dispensable within Maimon’s philosophy. This is the most crucial aspect of Maimon’s thought:

 

 

“I maintain that the representation or concept of a thing is not so heterogeneous with the thing itself (or with what belongs to its existence) as is commonly believed. For me, the thing itself outside its representation, or the existence of the thing in itself, is complementum possibilitatis, i.e. what belongs to its possibility without us having insight into it. The reality of the former stems merely from the negation or limitation of the latter. For an infinite understanding, the thing and its representation are one and the same. An idea is a method for finding a passage from the representation or concept of a thing to the thing itself; it does not determines any object of intuition but still determines a real object whose schema is the object of intuition: for example, our understanding is the schema for the idea of an infinite understanding. In this case, the schema indicates the idea, and the idea indicates the thing itself or its existence, without which this idea and its schema would themselves be impossible.” (Essays 187-188).  

 

We need intuition because in our limited understanding we have separated representation from the object and as we go on closing this gap the need for intuition decreases and in the case of an infinite understanding there is no need for intuition because the essence of intuition and the essence of thought are identical. Ideas of understanding contain this identity or the complete concept of an object and they determine progress in empirical knowledge in so far as in our limited understanding we try to approach this ideal of identity of knowledge and object of knowledge.

 

This point will become clear in responding to Paul Franks (2003) who argues that Maimon and Kant are committed to two different projects because the former believes in infinite intelligibility and the latter believes in finite intelligibility. The former believes that there is a sufficient reason for everything and the series of reason ends in absolute reason while the latter believes that there is a reason sufficient to that thing but the series of reasons cannot terminate with ultimate presuppositions of intelligibility. Maimon calls his system rational dogmatism, empirical scepticism which Franks finds contradictory or atleast inconsistent and he believes that committed as Maimon is to infinite intelligibility he is bound to find empirical knowledge short of or really devoid of any a-priori elements though he finds a-priori knowledge in mathematics. I shall show that this understanding of Maimon is wrong, but now my concern is with the blind spot Franks attributes to Maimon because of his supposedly rationalistic commitments. His distinction between two kinds of intelligibility has some basis atleast in what Kant says based on what he says in B145-146 for example and in his letter to Herz in answering Maimon:

 

“…..all this happens in relation I to an experiential cognition that is possible for us only under these conditions, and so from this point of view it is subjective; but at the same time it is objectively valid because the objects [of cognition] are not things in themselves but mere appearances so that the form in which they are given is also dependent on us (according, on the one hand, to what is subjective in these objects, i.e. what is specific to our type of intuition, and on the other hand, to the unification of the manifold in one consciousness, i.e. to the thought and cognition of these objects, which depends on our understanding); as a result, we can have experience of objects only under these conditions, and if intuitions (objects as appearances) were not in harmony with these conditions, they would be nothing for us, i.e. not objects of cognition at all, not of [our cognition of] ourselves nor of [our cognition of] other things…..But how such a sensible intuition (as time and space), a form of our sensibility is possible, or such functions of the understanding as those which logic develops out of it are possible, or how it happens that one form is in harmony with another in a possible cognition, [all] this is absolutely impossible for us to explain any further, because to do so we would need another kind of intuition than the one we have and another understanding so that we could compare our understanding to it and moreover, an understanding that could present things determined in themselves to each of us. But we can judge all understanding only by means of our understanding and likewise all intuition only by means of our intuition. And in any case it is not necessary to answer this question.” (Essays: 232-233, emphasis mine).

 

Kant is saying that experiential cognition is possible only under certain conditions but how and why these conditions obtain within us, why we have the form of sensibility we have and why we have the form of understanding we have is unanswerable and if asked about the origin of these faculties, Kant says further in the letter the best we could reply is that the ground of these faculties might be in God (“we can cite no further ground than our divine creator”). Would Franks count this as a violation of finite intelligibility? There is a certain tension here, is it the case that the origin of the faculties has an intelligible ground irrespective of whether we can know it or not and this ground could lie in our divine creator or is it the case that the question is unanswerable because there is no ground.

 

Consider the portion highlighted in Kant’s reply to Maimon, objective validity is possible because the objects of cognition are appearances not things-in-themselves, unlike the latter, the former’s form is within us. Kant is saying that because the form of appearances is within us, our concepts can have objective validity in regard to appearances but are not applicable to things-in-themselves because their existence is not dependent on us. It may be asked if we could know things-in-themselves could we also know the essence of the objects that appear to us so that we could understand why certain objects appear to us the way they do i.e. we could perhaps tell why we have why we have a certain form of sensibility. The question is similar to the questions raised about colour to rationalist philosophers like Descartes and Malebranche. Is colour something within us, a modification of the soul with no relation to matter outside or does it have a connection with the external world? If colour resembles something in the external world, then the latter’s impact may explain to us why we have perception of a colour or else we must be able to deduce colour from the essence of the soul. If Kant’s answer is no, that even if we could somehow know things-in-themselves we would not know the hidden essence of our appearances then these things-in-themselves are redundant. Similarly in Franks case if finite intelligibility means we cannot know that the ultimate presuppositions of our series of reasons terminates in intelligible grounds or unintelligible grounds and if the latter means absence of ground which means there would be no synthetic a-priori judgements because absence of ground is tantamount absence of possibility. If the answer is yes, there is a ground irrespective of we can know it or not and if Kant agrees that if we could know things-in-themselves we could know why we have certain objects of appearances then we see he could agree to Maimon’s view that things-in-themselves are limit concepts. This is made possible by assuming ideas of understanding which as Maimon says (Essays: 46) are indispensable for extending our understanding and these ideas depend on an infinite understanding. The Ideas of understanding contain the determinable and determinations together (Essays: 103-104) i.e. all possible determinations an object can receive and hence the complete concept and the thing-in-itself are in principle the same but because this identity or the hidden essence of appearances is not known to us we see a difference between representation and the object of representation, concept and intuition. The coincidence of form and matter is the basis of truth and this is Maimon’s key idea, the source of rationality within an empirical sceptical system. Through extending our understanding we close the gap between representation and the object. The Idea is the means of finding the passage between the two so that the two can coincide which for a limited understanding is an ideal not a real possibility. So contra Franks Maimon is not so much trying to saddle Kant with a different kind of intelligibility, his infinite understanding is a means to salvage finite cognition. So Maimon is really trying to save Kant from himself. For Maimon the difference between sensibility and understanding is a difference of degree of completeness (Essays: 38) and he can hold this because he posits Ideas of understanding that allow us to reduce the gap between the two atleast in principle. This possibility would be undercut if there is no analytic ground for synthetic a-priori propositions so that in principle the latter are reducible to the former and for an infinite understanding there is an analytic connection between concepts and being or Ideas and reality.

 

Only an infinite understanding could be the source of Ideas of understanding that enable our limited understanding to extend our use of understanding:

 

“So the necessity of this proposition is merely subjective, but it can have different degrees up to the very highest degree where (as an idea) it attains objective necessity: the whole advantage of objective necessity (whose opposite involves a contradiction) lies merely in our conviction that it cannot be different in any other construction, no matter what the circumstances. So if I am convinced by means of a complete induction I that in a construction a triangle can only have three angles (in so far as I have constructed the triangle under all possible circumstances and other thinking beings have also constructed it under all these circumstances, (assuming this to be possible) and found this to be true) then it would be as good as if I were convinced by the principle of contradiction. But this induction can never be complete so that subjective necessity can approach ever closer to objective necessity but never completely attain it. It is the same with our judgements about natural objects. I notice that fire is warm (that the sensation of warmth arises in me after the representation of the firelight or some other property of fire); this is merely what Kant calls a perceptual judgement and according to me it cannot be turned into an experiential judgement by means of any direct operation of the understanding as Kant claims. If I notice this again and again, I so that these two appearances are ever more strongly connected in me, then at last (through a complete induction) this subjective connection reaches its highest degree, and becomes equivalent to the objective.”

 

So we can see for Maimon how rational dogmatism and empirical scepticism together are possible? Maimon’s quid facti arguments objects that there is an objective but non-logical necessity. With Hume Maimon believes we can doubt whether an objective necessary connection between cause and effect can ever be found either in experience or in thought:

 

“Kant derives the concept of cause from the form of the hypothetical judgement in logic. But we could raise the question: how does logic itself come by this peculiar form, that if one thing a is posited, another thing b must necessarily also be posited? It is not a form of possible things (like the form of the categorical judgement, or the principium exclusi tertii, that is based on the principle of contradiction that every subject A has either a or not a as a predicate). The reason is that we do not I come across it at all in this context where predicates are stated categorically of the subject and properties of the essence; even if a categorical proposition can also be expressed hypothetically, this only makes the expression not the form of the judgement itself hypothetical. So we have presumably abstracted it from its use with real objects, and transferred it into logic; as a result we must put the reality of its use beyond doubt before ascribing reality to it as a form of thought in logic; but the question is not whether we can use it legitimately, which is the question: quid juris?, but whether the fact is true, namely that we do use it with actual objects.”

 

Maimon doubts the validity of a logical form, of hypothetical judgements. He doubts whether we ever have a conception of necessity that is not logical and a necessity that is not found within experience as well:

 

“But to this David Hume would reply: it is not true in this case that I perceive a necessary succession; I certainly use the same expression that others use on this occasion, but I understand by it only I the often perceived succession of the warming of the stone upon the presence of the fire and not the necessity of this succession. It is merely an association of perceptions, not a judgement of the understanding. It is just what in animals we call the expectation of similar cases…”  (Essays: 42)

 

The argument is against the very possibility of synthetic a-priori judgements, so we have only analytic judgements and synthetic a-posteriori judgements and what seem to us to be synthetic a-priori. This radicalizes Maimon’s claim, since synthetic a-pirori are impossible even for a limited understanding and synthetic a-posteriori judgements which are materially incomplete presuppose analytic a-priori. In light of this we can understand the following remark made by Maimon:

 

“According to my theory, on the other hand, the concept of cause is not merely a condition of experience, but of perception itself. Even if the objectivity of the [particular] sequence may be doubted, it still follows first that) no one will doubt that the concept [of cause] is in general objective in relation to actual perception. That is to say, I express the principle of causation in this way: If a comes first and b is supposed to follow it (in perception), then a and b must stand under the rule of the relation of maximum identity with one another, because if they did not, then no reproduction of a on the perception of b would be possible, and hence no I relation of succession between them would be possible. Second, this rule simultaneously determines its use; i.e., I hold b rather than c to be the effect of a because the former conforms to this rule, but the latter does not. And if I treat the latter as also being a consequence of a, this does not happen directly but only through a relation of simultaneity with the former, which is a consequence of a.” (Essays: 191-192, also see 117-119, 137-138 and Letters: 172)

 

Empirical knowledge is possible not due to synthetic a-priori but due to analytic a-priori. Hence the contention of Franks (2003) and Senderowicz (2003) that no a-priori elements are found in empirical knowledge in Maimon’s view is wrong. It is objective necessity that is being denied in synthetic a-posteriori knowledge but this knowledge is based on a ground as Maimon insists against Hume and this ground simultaneously determines its right and use in case of empirical objects. In Letters: 172, Maimon says that we can and must employ pure a-priori cognitions to a-posteriori objects otherwise we would have no object of cognition in this case. The existence of one is not due to another but the cognition of effect depends on the cognition of cause and so it is cognition and not the objects themselves that are subordinated to a-priori knowledge. But as Ideas they determine the way we can extend our understanding even in the case of empirical knowledge. No object of cognition is possible without Ideas of understanding and hence even though lacking an objective necessity our empirical knowledge remains a-posteriori yet dependent on a-priori but pure cognitions of understanding. This way rational dogmatism and empirical scepticism are seen to be compatible atleast by Maimon.

Bibliography

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Maimon, Solomon. 2010 (1790). Essays on Transcendental Philosophy. Translated by Henry Somers-Hall, Nick Midgley, Alistair Welchman and Merten Reglitz. United States of America. Continuum Publishing Co.

Maimon, Solomon. 2000 (1794). Letters of Philaletes to Aenesidemus. Translated by Georg Di Giovanni in Between Kant to Hegel. 2^nd Ed. Edited by H.S. Harris and Georg Di Giovanni. United States of America. Hackett Publishing Co.

Franks, Paul. 2003. What Should Kantians learn from Maimon’s Scepticism. In Solomon Maimon: Rational Dogmatist, Empirical Sceptic. Ed. Gideon Freudanthal. United States of America. Springer.

Guyer, Paul. 1980. Kant on apperception and a-priori synthesis. American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 17 no. 3.

Guyer, Paul. 2010. The Deduction of the Categories: Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions. In Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. United States of America. Cambridge University Press.

Smith, N.K. 2003. A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 3^rd Ed. United Kingdom. Palgrave Macmillan.