Simon
Foucher an academic sceptic made an argument that representation is not
possible in the Cartesian system. Hence mind is incapable of knowing matter and
the problem of objective validity can never be solved. This argument was very
influential. Cartesian like Desgabets, Arnauld, La Forge, Malebranche tried to
find a solution. The arguments are mentioned in Pierre Bayle’s dictionary and
through it Locke, Berkeley and Hume got to know it. Foucher’s argument is
two-fold. The first objection is along the following lines:
According to Cartesian Dualism only two
things really exist - mind and matter and everything else that can be said to
exist - exists either as modifications of mind or matter. Now why does
mind-matter interaction problem arise in this worldview? For Descartes the
relation of a substance to its modification is a causal relation and it is
unique and individuative. To illustrate: wax may be modified in endless ways in
endless shapes but all these modifications of wax would necessarily be
modifications of a single substance - their apparent diversity apart - they
would all really be wax. For Descartes what exists is either a substance or one
of its modifications. These modifications cannot belong to any other substance
- the substance is the material out of which they are made while it in itself
remains constant. Every modification bears an identity badge as it were -
informing us of what substance it is made of and it belongs necessarily to that
substance and no other.
Now for one thing to cause another implies that the cause imparts something to the effect - there is a transfer of energy or properties from the cause to the effect. Transfer implies possession; you cannot feed the hungry if you do not have food yourself. But on the Cartesian worldview as explained above possessions necessarily belong to their substance; transfer of energy or properties is not possible from one substance to another - it is only possible within the substance itself. One substance cannot modify another - for one modification belongs to one substance only. A substance is in this way a self-contained world. And two substances thus cannot interact; they can run parallel to one another but cannot interact for no transfer of properties is possible. Milk can modify itself into curd but not gold bangles. And substance and its modifying itself is the only legitimate causal relation in Descartes for everything that exists is either a substance or its modifications. The substance is both the ground and the cause of its modifications. This precludes the possibility of one substance causally interacting with another.
Mind – Body
interaction is precluded in the system because mind and matter are taken to be
different substances on account of having different essences. Hence no
cause-effect relation can be established between the two. Foucher takes this as
an indication that we really do not know the essence of either mind or matter
for otherwise we would have known how they causally interact for it is part of
our everyday experience that they do. But more importantly he argues that just
as causal relation cannot be established between mind and matter on same
grounds no representational relation can be established. Cartesian theory that
‘Ideas contain as much objective reality as found within its cause formally’
depends on essential connection between cause and effect such that a cause
necessarily brings about the existence of its effect. Descartes reduced the
causal relation to substance – mode relation. The substance as he says in a
letter to Arnauld is an internal principle of change. A substance thereby can
be seen as a pure potentiality containing within itself all its possible
modification for which no external cause may be appealed to. It may require
certain occasional causes but in such cases there is no essential dependence
between cause and effect. Since an Idea is a modification of the soul; the
latter is its cause on which it essentially depends. There can be no essential
dependence between a modification of the soul and matter for the two are
separate substances with different essences. Hence no cause-effect relation
between Ideas and Matter can be established. For the same reason no resemblance
relation between the two can be established and hence no representational
relation between Idea and Matter can be established understood either as
causality or resemblance.
Foucher’s
second argument is that the Cartesians cannot consistently draw the distinction
between primary and secondary qualities. The distinction was drawn on the basis
that secondary qualities like colour, taste etc. cannot be found in a material
body in an observer-independent manner. The same dish may seem tasty to one
subject and not so to another. A bucket of water may seem hot to one and cold
to another depending on the temperature of his hand. The same object may appear
to have different colours if viewed from different angles. But Foucher points
out that even in case of primary qualities like extension difference of the
distance from which we may see an object – it may appear of different size and
magnitude. Even in case of primary qualities relativity cannot be eliminated.
Hence we also cannot draw a distinction between Ideas and sensations on grounds
that the former has greater objective reality than the latter in as much as
sensation can only allow us to infer that something exists but not what that
something is. Ideas can allow us to know the object that produced the Idea
within us. But if primary – secondary qualities distinction collapses then
Ideas cannot claim to provide us with knowledge of the external object in
itself and they would be on a par with sensations. Sensations can allow us to
infer that there exists a world independently of us but cannot inform us about
the nature of this independent reality. Malebranche accepts the force of this
argument (in his appendix to the Search after the Truth though he does not name
Foucher there) and is forced to accept that reason cannot allow us to infer
conclusively an external reality. Even if God were to give us Ideas with no
corresponding reality that would not make God a deceiver contra Descartes.
Reason combined with faith or scriptural revelation can however allow us to
infer the existence of the external world. But Foucher correctly points out
that this is not a matter of religious piety. Theological concerns should not
be imported within philosophy which depends on reason alone. Malebranche
however frequently blurred these boundaries and to accept his philosophy unlike
of someone like Descartes or Leibniz required that one be a Christian agreeing
to that faith. It is however to the credit of the philosophers of those times
that many philosophers were opposed to mixing theology with philosophy and were
generally in agreement to keep these matters apart.
To
answer these objections Cartesian have resorted to non-resembling
representational relations:
a)
Representational Relation is like between word and its object – it does not
depend on any resemblance between sign and signified. To this Foucher replies
that words represent in virtue of Ideas hence the middle term ‘Non-Resembling
Representation’ is not found in this example.
b)
Representation relation can be taken as primitive but this assumes what is
intended to be proved.
c) Foucher
also points out that if there can be non-resembling representations then why
are sensations deprived of being representative on grounds that the sensed
objects have no resemblance to how things are out there in the world. Also is
not extension itself sensed? Is it possible to sense a colour or a figure
without extension? Do we not grasp extension via touch? Cartesians point out
that extension is not sensed but is grasped by Reason. When we observe that
objects touch us at different points we infer that the object is extended.
Foucher points out that such an argument should prove that soul is also
extended and besides the argument begs the question for unless we know that
different sensation are caused from different places we cannot infer that their
cause is extended.
d) The
most common objection to Foucher’s argument is that it is not necessary that
there be resemblance for there to be representation. But that is beside the
point. For there to be representation there has to be something in common
between the sign and the signified. But in this case Cartesian Ontology forbids
any commonality hence no representational relation can exist between Mind and
Matter. Even God cannot bridge the gap here because even if he forms a relation
between sign and signified – that knowledge would be meaningful only for him.
Since the signified is precluded from our vision we cannot have any knowledge
of sign – signified relation. Consciousness forms the boundary of what we can
know in the Cartesian system hence anything beyond it is bound to remain
unknown. What powers Reason can have to make the unknown known in this case
depends on its representational capacity which Foucher’s argument have but in
doubt. Foucher’s argument is really stronger than this because for him even God
cannot form a sign – signified relation between Idea and Matter if he does not
find something common between the two. Representation is a relation and there
is no relation without relatums. For a relation to connect two terms it
requires as footing in each but then each of the two terms must have something
in common for there to be a relation between the two which can connect the two
together. This is what is missing in the Cartesian system.
Leibniz agrees with Foucher; all phenomenal qualities whether it be colour or
extension are mind-dependent. In Leibniz’s terminology they are phenomena bene
fundata (Leibniz uses the simile of a rainbow to elucidate this notion) and
even space and time are classified under that list. Space is the order of
co-existent entities and time the order of successive entities. But concepts of
space and time are derived from objects but are not presupposed by objects.
Phenomena Bene Fundata are however distinguished from dreams for unlike the
latter the former are well founded or founded on the activity of the monads.
Phenomena Bene Fundata are aggregates and thus presuppose simple entities. They
have a certain order and connexion due to the order and connexion of the monads
and hence coherence is a test of reality in their case. They are confused
perceptions and known through the senses. But the order of experience is a
contingent order. It lacks metaphysical necessity and could have been different
from what it is subject to God’s Will. Hence the criteria of truth with regard
to this order provides us with moral certainty of its existence but not
metaphysical certainty. In his ‘On the method of distinguishing real from
imaginary phenomena’ Leibniz says:
“Yet the most
powerful criterion of the reality of phenomena, sufficient even by itself, is
success in predicting future phenomena from past and present ones, whether that
prediction is based upon a reason, upon a hypothesis that was previously
successful, or upon the customary consistency of things as observed previously.
Indeed, even if this whole life were said to be only a dream, and the visible
world only a phantasm, I should call this dream or this phantasm real enough if
we were never deceived by it when we make good use of reason. But just as we
know from these marks which phenomena should be seen as real, so we also
conclude, on the contrary, that any phenomena which conflict with those that we
judge to be real, and likewise those whose fallacy we can understand from their
causes, are merely apparent.”
Foucher argues that on Leibniz’s view it is possible for a soul to think that a body moves without the body actually moving like a man sleeping dreams that he is moving in different places. Thus there is nothing to distinguish real phenomena from imaginary phenomena. Leibniz may reply that in his system the burden of representation is not carried by a single monad but by the entire system of monads. Every monad represents every other and is represented by every other. Representation is a unity in multiplicity and this multiplicity is the basis on which Leibniz can infer the existence of other minds:
“For at bottom all
our experiences assure us of only two things: first, that there is a connection
among our appearances which provides the means to predict future appearances
successfully; and, second, that this connection must have a constant cause. But
it does not follow strictly from this that matter or bodies exist but only that
there is something which gives us appearances in a good sequence. For if some
invisible power were to take pleasure in giving us dreams that are well tied
into our preceding life and in conformity with each other, could we distinguish
them from reality before we had awakened? Now, what prevents the course of our
life from being one long well-ordered dream, about which we could be undeceived
in a moment?”
The argument proceeds from pointing out to order and connexion between our Ideas and demanding a reason or a constant cause for this order and connexion. Why cannot a monad itself be the cause of this order and connexion? In his ‘On the method of distinguishing real from imaginary phenomena’ Leibniz agrees that one may say that the cause of this phenomena may be the nature of the mind but such a person even though would not be affirming a falsehood would nevertheless not be giving us the whole truth. There must be a reason for our own existence and a reason for the existence of the mind may be demanded even if mind is eternal. This reason must be sought either in the essence of the mind itself or outside it. Leibniz does not continue with why it couldn’t be the former. He moves to argue that ‘there is nothing to prevent innumerable other minds from existing as well as ours’. The reason he gives for this is (i) all existing things are interrelated and (ii) minds of another nature can be conceived to exist interrelated with ours. But (i) seems to beg the question for it already assumes that there are other existing things interrelated with us. Leibniz however tries to prove this by arguing ‘otherwise no one could say whether anything is taking place in existence or not’. What this means is that if there were only one monad within the world no change would occur in the state of that monad and a reason or cause for a change must be sought for. Hence the need to appeal to other monads. But eventually since causal interaction between monads is ruled out because ‘every predicate is in fact contained in the nature of the subject’ and thus a subject has that predicate necessarily a cause for the interrelations between monad must be sought in God because we regard one thing the cause of another if that thing expresses or signifies another clearly and distinctly compared to another. And God expresses the nature of the universe clearly and distinctly; hence he is the cause of the interrelation between monads.
To see whether this argument is successful or not we need to make a digression and consider an objection raised by Pierre Bayle in his Dictionary entry Rorarius:
“It is clearly
conceivable that a simple being will always act uniformly if not hindered by
some external cause. If it were composed of several parts, like a machine, it
would act diversely because the particular activity of each piece might change
the course of that of the others at any moment. But in a unified substance,
where can you find the cause of the change of its operation?”
Bayle asks us to conceive an atom surrounded by vacuum on all sides. This atom has a certain power for self-movement and it does not require the aid of anything else for moving nor can anything else retard or hinder its movements. Such an atom will have uniform motion always moving along the same line without moving either right or left or even backwards. For the atom to change course there has to be (i) either some obstacle which is not possible in an empty space or (ii) a desire to move but an atom has no power for thinking or (iii) must have some inner springs that start operating to change the direction of the movement but this is incompatible with the atom being absolutely simple.
The case of the atom is similar to the case of the soul in Leibniz’s system. Bayle elaborates on this objection:
The only change possible in this case is analogous to the change in location of the atom moving but only along a single line:
“If I suppose that at a certain moment Caesar's soul sees a tree in flower and with leaves, I can conceive that it may immediately wish to see one that has only leaves and then one that has only flowers, and that in this manner it will form for itself several images that will arise one from another. But one cannot set forth as possible the strange changes from black to white and from yes to no, or those tumultuous leaps from earth to heaven, which are common in man's thoughts.”
For Leibniz the soul is at the same time causally self-sufficient in terms of the production of its representational states and also tracks changes outside it in order to adjust its states in accordance with an external world. Bayle feels this is incompatible with the simple nature of the soul conceived by Leibniz. To this Leibniz replies:
“Thus a thing not only remains in the state in which it is, insofar as it depends on itself, but also continues to change when it is in a state of change, always following one and the same law. But in my opinion it is in nature of created substance to change continually following a certain order which leads it spontaneously (if I may be allowed to use this word) through all the states which it encounters, in such a way that he who sees all things sees all its past and future states in its present. And this law of order, which constitutes the individuality of each particular substance, is in exact agreement with what occurs to every other substance and throughout the whole universe.”
And,
“We must also take into consideration that the soul, however simple it may be, always has a feeling [sentiment] composed of many perceptions at once, a fact which serves our purpose as well as if it were composed of parts like a machine. For each preceding perception influences those which follow in conformity with a law of order which is found in perceptions as well as in movements.”
We have seen that
against Foucher Leibniz has argued that a monad cannot be the sole cause of its
states or of the changes that occur within it because the changes within the
soul can take place only by taking into consideration the changes that take place
outside the soul. The soul has an inner law that both tracks changes outside it
and changes its own course accordingly. If there were nothing outside a monad
there would be no tracking of changes that occur outside and there would be no
variety of changes to occur within the soul which would be like Bayle’s atom
coursing through uniform line of movement. Against Bayle Leibniz says that the
simplicity of the soul is not compromised by this inner mechanism for we see
every perception of the soul to be composed of an infinite variety of
perceptions and all this variety is experienced to be attributed without any
contradiction to the soul itself which is a unity in multiplicity.
Now we are saddled
with two questions:
1.
What is the cause of the changes that occur
within a monad? And do these changes signify an external cause and thereby constitute
a reply to solipsism?
2. Is it possible for the soul or the monad to
be united (or simple) and causally self-sufficient with respect to its states
and yet depend on something outside itself to enact this role?
Regarding the
first question we may observe that Leibniz does not claim to give a
demonstration for the existence of other minds but regards it as a proposition
possessing moral certainty. But this certainty itself depends on there being a
pre-established harmony between different monads which itself inferred on the
basis of consistency in variety of perceptions found within a monad. Without
the ability to represent other monads the changes that occur within a single
monad cannot be explained. But one monad can be said to represent another only
if there is a constant relation between one monad and another and this
presupposes an order which is the product of a pre-established harmony between
monads. In order to see ‘variety of perceptions’ in a monad to be a sign of the
existence of other monads because soul itself cannot be the cause without the
ability to represent other monads comes down to being a circular argument.
Hence Leibniz cannot even claim moral certainty for the existence of other
monads.
Regarding the
second question consider this objection raised by Lotze:
“Perception . . .
is the general activity of all monads; but what do they perceive? You will
hardly find an answer to this in Leibniz; the monads, each of them from its own
point of view, mirror the universe, but the universe itself consists only of
other monads.... Therefore, what each monad can reflect is only the way in
which it itself is reflected in others and these are reflected in one another;
there would be no independent state of affairs or content in the universe to
serve as grist for this process of reflection.” (Quoted in Mates 1986)
The
basis of difference between one monad and another and a monad and God lies is
the role it is assigned in accordance with a script. As a consequence the monad
is simply nothing over and above a role which is the law of sequence of its
successive states. To use one of Leibniz’s metaphors the servant carries out
his actions in accordance with the instructions of his master. Even though he
is simply carrying out his order he is still an autonomous source of action.
But this is possible only if his role in executing certain orders in not
essential to his being a person; his role as a servant is not his essential
quality but an accidental assignment to fulfil his role in the hierarchy of the
system he is a part of. But in Leibniz’s case since monads simply are roles
their unity in compromised by the unity of the system for they cannot exist
independently of the system and are necessarily dependent on the whole which is
inconsistent with regarding them as an autonomous source of activity. Leibniz’s
system like Descartes’s is thus on the brink of collapse into Spinozism. We can
say – the connexion between a predicate and its subject is that of identity.
Yet a predicate cannot be found in a subject without reference to an external
subject. It isn’t simply the case that to grasp the reason of the existence of
a predicate within a subject we need to take into account other subjects too.
Any monad or a subject of a predicate is individuated only with reference to
other monads and hence any identity of the predicate with the subject
necessarily implicates the entire system of monads. This reference to the
system is essential to every single monad. Hence no monad can be causally
self-sufficient with respect to its states. No change can occur in a monad
without implicating other monads. If Leibniz emphasizes this dependence on
other monads to reply to Foucher then he compromises their self-sufficiency and
if in order to reply to Bayle he emphasizes the causal self-sufficiency of
monads then the dependence on other monads becomes inexplicable. Leibniz
evidently sought to reconcile these two notions. But a monad cannot be the
necessary and sufficient condition of the changes that occur within it and also
dependent for the changes on other monads. It cannot both be simple unit and
independent of the entire system of monads and dependent on the whole at the
same time. Even if Leibniz is right to insist that no contradiction has been
pointed out in this case even then it may be replied that Leibniz has failed to
smooth over the difficulties for he too has not given us a clear and distinct
conception wherein the two seemingly contradictory characteristics of monads
are reconciled in his philosophy.
We
can understand the problem by seeing what the aporia of cognition is. The aporia
of cognition is that a subject and an object stand against each other -
separate from each other yet a cognitive relation exists between the two that
somehow manages to overcome the gap. The German word Gegenstand means standing
against or upto a cognizing mind. Erfassung is literally 'grasping' - a subject
grasps an object (Gegenstand). Mind grasps something which it cannot confine
within it yet which cannot be completely transcendent. How does an external
object come to stand upto a subject and how does a subject grasp something that
resists or stands upto it? If Foucher is right then it is not possible for
there to be representations in Cartesian system. On the Cartesian view
consciousness is confined to the boundaries of the mind yet it can somehow
transcend those boundaries and reach to an object outside. As Husserl would
point out the object of cognition is both immanent to consciousness and
transcendent to it. But in the Cartesian view there is nothing immanent that
can at the same time point to a transcendent object. We saw that Leibniz seeks
to evade scepticism only if he reduces Being to Idea and both to the unity of a
substance. The object of cognition is immanent in consciousness and there is no
transcendental object. But this unity is compromised in his system and contrary
to his intention he cannot balance the independence of parts with their
dependence on the whole and vica-versa. The reason is the monad cannot simultaneously
be both causally self-sufficient in respect of its representational content and
essentially dependent on other monads for it. This leaves it unclear how the
monad can be the ratio of its successive states.
Leibniz can try to
dodge this argument by saying that ultimately it is God who is the object of
representation. After all it is God who is the ground of the entire
representational system in virtue of bringing about a pre-established harmony
between the monads. The entire world is represented within the clear and
distinct perception of God who is the reason or the ground of the entire series
of monads. But is the relation of God to monads analogous to the relation of
substance to its properties? If yes then a collapse into Spinozism is
inevitable. If not then the application of Principle of Sufficient Reason is
hindered. Also is God part of the series of monads (the highest monad as
Leibniz calls him) or is he situated outside the series? Leibniz himself was in
two minds with regard to this question. The reason is if God is taken to be
part of the series then it is unclear how he could be the cause of the series
since its insufficiency to be the reason of its own existence was invoked to
infer something outside the series. Also wouldn’t the existence of series of
monads then be metaphysically necessary following from God’s nature – a
Spinozist view that Leibniz sought to circumvent through his theory of monads?
And if God is outside the series how could he be the ultimate object signified
or represented by the series? And if the series of monads doesn’t represent God
in howsoever confused manner then on what basis could he infer God as the cause
of the series of monads. Also if there is no Highest Monad then wouldn’t the
law of continuity be violated? Imagine a continuum with gradation of scale
moving from less perfect to more perfect but not ending anywhere. If there is
no most perfect in the series then on what basis can we decide the gradation of
other elements of the series? Leibniz sees monads as ‘fulgurations of the
Divine’, and still insists that no collapse into Spinozism in inevitable. But
this seems inconsistent.
Robert Latta
(1898) has given a very good account of the problems that arise in Leibniz’s
system is due to the opposition between the principle of non-contradiction (or
what comes down to the same thing – identity) and principle of sufficient
reason. Principle of Non-Contradiction really asserts the identity of something
with itself A = A. A thing is identical with itself in all circumstances of
changes and in variety of relations. Thus it excludes permanence over change
and unity or being over becoming:
“In other words,
it insists on the reality of Terms, making relations subordinate or fictitious.
Consequently a philosophy whose dominant principle is that of contradiction, in
this sense, must (consciously or unconsciously) treat whole and parts as exclusive
of one another, asserting the reality of the one as against that of the other.
For if the whole be real it must be simple, it must exclude as unreal all
relations or differences. Otherwise it will not be purely self-identical, but
may receive a variety of real predicates. And as it is simple it can have no
real parts. Since A cannot be not-A, and since not-A includes B, C, &c., it
cannot be true that some A is B or C. Some A can only be A without further
distinction. On the other hand, if the parts be real and purely self-identical,
if the reality of each is self-centred and is determined without regard to its
relations to the others, then there is no real whole, but only a numerical
collection of individuals which may even be contradictory of one another. The principle
of contradiction, considered as meaning merely that the real is that which is
not self-contradictory, yields either a whole, which has no real parts or
determinations because it is equally indifferent to all possible determinations,
or a bare collection of severally possible, but jointly 'incompossible' parts.”
If monads are seen
as merely essences then there is no possibility of relating one monad to
another. Creation demands that these several monads are related to one another
and this requires their self-sufficiency must be compromised. But Leibniz’s
philosophy contains conflicting demands to on the one hand preserve the
self-sufficiency of monads and on the other hand to make every monad depend on
every other within a system of pre-establishes harmony to explain the variety
of changes in each:
“The principle of
contradiction requires that real substance must contain its whole nature within
itself in such a way that it may be analytically deduced. The notion of
substance is self-explicative. Every true proposition must be analytic. Thus
the Monad must be self-sufficient. But now the principle of sufficient reason
is added to explain that the analysis is not necessarily completed in every case,
that, while substance must be self-sufficient and self-explicative, its
self-sufficiency is not necessarily in every case fully realized. Its self-identity
is not static but dynamic: it is not immediately self-explaining, but
progressively self-revealing. Many true propositions are not actually but
potentially analytic. While the predicate of every true proposition must in
some way be contained in the subject, it does not follow that in each
particular case the relation can be made perfectly and self-evidently clear.
The predicate must have a sufficient ground or reason in the subject, but not
necessarily a self-evident one. The Monad must be conceived as sufficiently the
reason of its changes or varieties, though not self-evidently the reason of
each. In other words, the various perceptions which are the variety or change
in the Monad, the manifold [multitude] in the simple substance, have reality
even though they are not all perfectly clear and distinct…The principle of
contradiction requires nothing but a pure simplicity in the individual
substance; any kind of simple substance would satisfy it. But the principle of
sufficient reason imposes the further condition that the simple substance must
have relations to other simple substances and to the whole, and that only those
simple (self-consistent) substances are real which are also consistent with the
real unity of the whole. For otherwise every real substance would have its ground
or reason wholly in se, and those things for which we must be content with a
ground or reason , in alio would be entirely illusory. Thus the combination of
self-consistency with consistency in relation to the whole is what Leibniz
means by the character of the Monad as at once exclusively individual and
representative or perceptive of the whole universe from its particular point of
view.”
We need to see here Leibniz’s criticisms of Cartesian theory of concepts to see how a tension
is found within his system. But first we shall consider more fully Leibniz’s
criticism of Cartesian theory of concepts. Our focus will be on the Letters to
De Volder who was advancing a Cartesian theory of substance. He argued that
something is a substance if its conception does not require conceiving anything
else. We will call this the Independency Criteria:
X is a substance
if it can be conceived in and through itself
Against this
Leibniz argues that (i) since every entity that exists is an effect except the
First cause; it should be conceived through its cause. To conceive something
through its cause does not mean that we have to specify the mode of generation
of the effect from its cause. It means we should have an a-priori demonstration
of its possibility through some formal cause. This condition is the result of
Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason and this principle is implicit within
Cartesian theory too for the rationalist paradigm is reduce everything to its
perfect essence and show how it can be derived from it. The essence is the
reason for the existence of that something. Hence its insistence does not beg
the question. What is different is the way Leibniz wields it against the
Cartesian theory of concepts. The question is what is it that is thought when
we think something. Even though motion cannot be thought of apart from the body
we need to ask what we think about when we are thinking about motion. Leibniz
points that in the concept of motion we do not think only about body and change
but also the reason for the change which cannot be a body because it is
passive. In thinking of extension we are not thinking of a simple concept but a
derivative one because extension is itself derived from a continuity and
plurality of things since it is a diffusion. For Leibniz the concept of
extension is an abstraction; it is not even a mode and hence not real but like
space, time and numbers it is abstracted from something real and does not tell
us anything about the nature of the substance just as the number 3 does not
tell us anything about the nature of the things numbered. Space similarly is a
mental construct that imposes order on simultaneous entities and time which
imposes order on successive entities. Which concept corresponds to something
real and which is an abstraction depends on the reason because of which it is
found within a subject. PSR is being used to unearth the content of a concept.
We do not consciously think of action and passion when we think of motion but
consciousness is not a guide here. What is contained in a concept depends on
the structure of the thing itself – the reason for its existence is clarified
by specifying its cause. We cannot claim to be in possession of an adequate
concept if we cannot derive the reason of the effect through its cause. And to
give a reason is to give an a-priori demonstration that derives the effect from
the cause thereby proving the possibility of something. This is equivalent to
giving a definition of something. Unless we are in possession of such a
demonstration we cannot be sure whether we are being deceived in taking a
composite concept to be a simple one. To trace a concept back to primitive ones
is to trace their reason back to their causes which contain them. Hence
Cartesians prematurely take their analysis to lead them to simple concepts even
when they have not sufficiently traced the reason for something back into its
cause. For every demonstrable proposition whose demonstration we do not yet
possess must contain within it an unanalysed term. This brings us to the second
condition which repudiates the independency criteria. Leibniz argues that (ii)
the conception of everything involves the conception of every other since a
simple monad is like a microcosm that reflects the entire cosmos from its
standpoint. We have seen that this condition is essential in order to do
justice to synthetic truths which cannot simply be reduced to a substance
isolated from the rest of the world.
Next we shall
examine the concept of a mode. I will dub this as the dependency criteria:
If the concept of
something involves another then that concept is a concept of a mode.
If this criteria
is accepted then in Leibniz’s philosophy there would be no substances because
the concept of everything involves every other thing. Leibniz urges on the
insufficiency of this criteria on the grounds that if a mode is found or
contained within something this does not exclude the possibility that the
conception of something x which is not a substance would involve conception of
a substance. Leibniz is pointing out that it is possible that even if there are
two things A and B which do not share any property whatsoever there could
possibly be a third thing C whose concept involves both A and B. The concept of
action is an example which requires in its conception one thing acting on
another and thus its concept involves two different substances. But by the
definition of modes these substances would be reduced to being modes. “It does
not follow then that a mode which requires many things is not a unity but a
composite of many modes.” Apart from this point Leibniz argues that the
definition would apply both to essence and to properties because both depend on
the substance.
The next objection
that Leibniz raises is a very interesting one. He says that the Cartesian
theory of substance which has one principal attribute and consequent properties
cannot explain how the diversity of modes can arise from it. This we can
recognize is the reason why Leibniz had to invoke the principle of fitness or
harmony for explanation of synthetic truths which is not possible within the
Cartesian system. A Cartesian substance has only one principal attribute and
only one mode could really arise from it. Only one effect can arise from one
cause whence then the diversity of effects that we witness in the world? How
can the diversity of material bodies for instance arise from extension alone?
As a matter of fact the situation is worse – why should there be even one mode
arising from the principal attribute and not simply the principal attribute
itself? The inadequacy lies within the nature of the Cartesian substance which
in itself lacks any principle of activity and requires God to constantly
re-create it. Whereas on Leibniz’s view a monad is essentially a centre of
activity – to be active is the very essence of a monad and God has in a way
predetermined within the monad all the predicates that will be found within it
but which will unfold due to the intrinsic activity of the monad without the
interference of God. Contra Spinoza Leibniz also points out that we do not have
a conception of a substance with only one principal attribute. We cannot
conceive an attribute which is simple and conceived by itself because the
conception of every attribute requires the conception of every other.
We have gone
through Leibniz’s excellent critique of Cartesian theory of analysis. Now
however we should concentrate on the problems found within Leibniz’s own
theory. These problems arise because of the tension between ideal grounds and
real grounds or between the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of
harmony:
By the Principle
of Harmony:
a) The concept of
an X includes the conception of every other thing X2, X3……Xn
By the Principle
of Non-Contradiction:
b) The reason for
existence of every predicate is resolvable back to its subject and to its
subject alone.
How is one monad
related to every other? A monad M1 represents every other monad M2,
M3……Mn. But by PNC the representational states of monads
are the consequence of its essence. By Principle of Harmony they are the
consequence of every monad being essentially related to every other otherwise
the diversity of representational states within monads will be left
unexplained.
Now (a) and (b) do
not entail each other. Thus by PNC:
c) It is not
necessary M1 will represent every other monad M2, M3……Mn.
But by Principle
of Harmony:
d) It is necessary
that M1 represents every other monad M2, M3…….Mn
Now the necessity
involved in c) and d) are different. The necessity in c) is a logical necessity
while the necessity in d) is a metaphysical necessity because it involves a
choice made by God on grounds of fitness of a monad in relation to every other.
But why does then Leibniz think that even if one monad is destroyed every other
will be destroyed? Doesn’t this imply that the reference to the entire system
of monads is essential to a monad? On a weaker claim Leibniz would be saying
that with the destruction of the monad the system and not the other monads
themselves would be destroyed because the system is external to the existence
of monads (but every external denomination is based on an internal denomination
by Leibniz’s principles). But a monad is simply an active force which Leibniz
regards as the most real thing and it is in the activity that one monad is
distinguished from every other. Without reference to the diversity of the
predicates that emanate from a monad which contains them there is no way to
distinguish between one monad and another. So if:
e) A monad by its
very essence requires reference to every other M2, M3……Mn
Then it becomes
difficult to reconcile this with Leibniz’s definition of a substance as
something that lacks parts. Leibniz’s problem is to account for the unity of
the concept of a substance together with its essential reference to every
other. Leibniz does not feel he has a problem at hand here because the
phenomena of unity of consciousness reveals that a simple substance is capable
of having a diversity of states and hence no contradiction is found in this
case. While he may be right to think that no contradiction exists between his
principle of identity and principle of fitness that does not mean that they are
found reconciled within his system. Merely appealing to the unity of
consciousness does not explain why and how a simple substance despite being
simple is capable of grounding a diversity of predicates. We cannot end an
inquiry at a point from where it should begin. The principle of identity and
principle of fitness runs parallel within Leibniz’s system crying out to be
reconciled but Leibniz never feels the need to do so. He asserts them together
but does not integrate them in order to come up with a more unitary system.
This also affects his theory of concepts. How can a concept of a unitary entity
be both simple and involve reference to every other? The reconciliation of
identity and difference or unity and diversity is the very raison d'etre of
Leibniz’s system. Hence he should have made an attempt to resolve this tension.
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