.....
Stop chatter and take to learning. This duty to keep in one's talk can be named
an essential condition of all culture and all learning; one must begin by becoming
capable of taking up the thoughts of others and of renouncing one's own
fancies. It is usually said that the understanding is developed by questions,
objections, answer etc.; in effect however it is not thus formed, but
externally made. Man's inwardness is what is won and widened in true culture;
he grows not poorer in thoughts or in quickness of mind by silently containing
himself. He learns rather thereby ability to take up and acquires perception of
the worthlessness of his own conceits and objections and as the perception of
the worthlessness of such conceits grows he breaks himself of the having of
them.
--------- HEGEL
I.
LOGICAL
POSITIVISM
II.
HERMENEUTICS
III.
DIANOEMATICS
IV.
PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
We shall look at two schools of
thought – Logical Positivism and Hermeneutics. The first tries to assimilate
social science explanations to the methods followed in natural sciences. The
second tries to argue for autonomy of social sciences. The key is to understand
what constitutes an explanation and what should be the goal or object of study
for human sciences. Taking our lessons from both I shall attempt to sketch a
philosophy of social science.
LOGICAL POSITIVISM
In his paper ‘The Functions of General Laws in
History’, Carl Hempel makes an argument that the methods followed in a human
science like history is akin to the methods of natural science and that it has
to be so in order to be counted as a science at all. But what is the nature of
explanation within natural science? To quote Hempel:
“The explanation of the occurrence of an event
of some specific kind E at a certain place and time consists, as it is usually
expressed, in indicating the causes or determining factors of E. Now the
assertion that a set of events-say, of the kinds C1, C., . . ., C.- have caused
the event to be explained, amounts to the statement that, according to certain
general laws, a set of events of the kinds mentioned is regularly accompanied
by an event of kind E. Thus, the scientific explanation of the event in question
consists of (1) a set of statements asserting the occurrence of certain events
C1, . . . C, at certain times and places, (2) a set of universal hypotheses,
such that (a) the statements of both groups are reasonably well con-firmed by
empirical evidence, (b) from the two groups of statements the sentence
asserting the occurrence of event E can be logically deduced. In a physical
explanation, group (1) would describe the initial and boundary conditions for
the occurrence of the final event; generally, we shall say that group (1)
states the determining conditions for the event to be explained, while group
(2) contains the general laws on which the explanation is based; they imply the
statement that whenever events of the kind described in the first group occur,
an event of the kind to be explained will take place.”
According to Hempel there is only a pragmatic
distinction between explanation and prediction. Hence to explain is to discover
a general law that allows us to make accurate predictions that are capable of
being verified. General Laws are causal laws where causality is understood in
terms of a regular relation between two entities or events. Explanations may be
probabilistic; one may form an explanation sketch to be filled out by future
empirical research. Science is a body of statements where one statement specifies
the general law from which other statements are deduced by rules of formal
logic. The deduction is important for without it explanations will not proceed
and we would be unable to distinguish an explanation from a lucky guess.
Psuedo-explanations are excluded on the grounds that they lack empirical /
cognitive content (i.e. anything that is thinkable has an empirical content).
Hence explanations in terms of entelechies, God etc. are ruled out. But this
would prove too much for we shall not be able to infer theoretical entities
like protons, electron etc. which are unobservable. They are brought within the
purview of science via their empirical consequences. The factual content of
science distinguishes it from moral and aesthetic statements which lack cognitive
content and are really expressions of human sentiments.
What however is the reason to apply such a
method in case of a humanistic science like history? Hempel says:
“Historical explanation, too, aims at showing
that the event in question was not "a matter of chance," but was to
be expected in view of certain antecedent or simultaneous conditions. The
expectation referred to is not prophecy or divination, but rational scientific
anticipation which rests on the assumption of general laws.”
Hempel further tries to defuse the impression
that there is a gap between theory and practice in this case for historians
seldom resort to general laws to explain historical events. His grounds are
that the explanation of explanation that he has sketched applies implicitly
(universal hypothetical laws of social psychology or other disciplines are
generally assumed) even in case of historical explanation and is able to
distinguish pseudo-explanations in history from bona fide ones:
“All of them rest on the assumption of
universal hypotheses which connect certain characteristics of individual or
group life with others; but in many cases, the content of the hypotheses which
are tacitly assumed in a given explanation can be reconstructed only quite
approximately.”
Incomplete explanations are no bar for they
are really explanation sketches capable of being filled out in time. A
historian may resort to empathetic understanding of history but this may be an
aid to a historian it does not constitute an explanation. We need to
distinguish between the methods of discovery and the methods of justification.
Justification rests on a set of statements where the explanandum is deduced
from a general law which is the explanans.
The demarcation between science and
non-science is like setting boundaries between rational and irrational. The
reason is that rationality depends on conceptual content of thought and logical
positivists restrict conceptual content to what can be experienced via our
senses. Such restriction of applicability of contents requires an
epistemological and psychological theory and such has been provided by Carnap
in his Aufbau. Any statement that is devoid of empirical consequences lacks
cognitive content. A theory of concept seeks to understand (i) what a concept
is or what is that is thought, (ii) the genesis or the source of the concept
(this is distinct from the question of how we come to acquire a concept) (iii)
the objective validity of the concept. What are the boundaries of a concept and
why does it have those boundaries? To answer these questions we need to go
beyond empirical descriptions of conceptual thinking because empirical sciences
presuppose the validity of their concepts. Logical Positivism takes conceptual
clarification to be their only aim as philosophers so that scientists can
continue with their work without entertaining any philosophical scruples. But
given the role of concepts in scientific explanation why should we think there
is a gap between scientific understanding and scientific explanation? Any
justification depends on the correct application of concepts and the legitimate
bounds of a concept. We cannot arrive at the proper rules of deduction for a
formal logic without having an understanding of what concepts are. Otherwise
such a logic would be in Husserl’s words a logic that does not understand
itself. So to understand science itself one needs to understand the relation
between a subject and an object of knowledge and the very possibility of
knowledge. Logical positivism should be understood as a theory of concepts
where an attempt is made to restrict the validity and utility of our concepts
to an empirical domain precluding any attempt to ground concepts in a First
Principle that would take us outside the natural realm. Hence the divorce
between understanding and explanation that is being sought after by Hempel et
al amounts to an inconsistency.
There are a number of problems however with
this neat picture of scientific explanation:
1. The analysis of causality in terms of
regularity is questionable. We may adduce here one such counter-example given
by Henry Kyburg cited in Wesley Salmon’s Four Decades of Scientific
Explanation:
“A sample of table salt has been placed in
water and it has dissolved. Why? Because a person wearing a funny hat mumbled
some non-sense syllables and waved a hand over it - i.e. cast a dissolving
spell upon it. The explanation offered for the fact that it dissolved is that
it was hexed and all hexed samples of table salt dissolve when placed in water.
In this example it is not being supposed that any actual magic occurs. All
hexed table salt is water soluble because table salt is water soluble. This example
fulfils the requirements for D-N explanation, but it manifestly fails to be a
bona fide explanation.”
Such counter-examples may be indefinitely
multiplied. Whatever may be the correct way to understand causation it seems
Hempel has put the cart before the horse. Laws do not constitute an explanation
they themselves are in need of an explanation. Instead of explaining causality
in terms of laws one should understand laws in terms of causation. By taking a
law to be simply a description of a regular sequence Hempel ignores the context
of scientific inquiry. One needs to understand why two things are always constantly
conjoined together and what the relation between the two is. This is what
propels a scientific inquiry and calls for a scientific explanation. To explain
is to give a reason and if to give a reason is to cite a cause then a better
account of causality is needed.
2. The exclusion of entelechies and like
entities is not neat for as we have seen it would throw out theoretical
entities from the sphere of scientific explanation. And if noting empirical
consequences is a basis of inferring unobservable entities then it is not clear
why the same courtesy should not be extended to metaphysical entities like
entelechies. The analysis of meaning in terms of empirical or verifiable
content is not so clean and does not play the regulative role that logical
positivists intend it to.
3. It has been pointed out that the source of
rationality of a science lies within its concepts. The application of these
concepts within scientific practice depends on a method. But when logical
positivists insist on uniformity of method within natural and social sciences
they seek to reverse the priority of concepts to a method. This is necessary
for we cannot go outside science to determine the validity of science. All our
standards for valid thought come within the realm of scientific practice. Hence
it is the scientific method that has the priority and our theory of concepts
depend on that and hence method is the source of rationality of a science (cf.
Neurath’s Boat, Schlick et al denied their foundationalism was of the
traditional type). The scientific method itself is what demarcates the rational
from the irrational and science from pseudo-science. But I shall argue that the
source of rationality of a science cannot lie within the method. To do that I
shall have to sketch a picture of human rationality.
Any successful action
requires conception and execution. First is the ability to see - to grasp the
fundamentals of the situation and then adapt action to circumstance. Methods
are mechanical procedures to execute a vision - they themselves do not provide
a vision. Their inflexibility is their virtue for they require action to follow
a basic set of rules and circumstances in which those rules can be properly
implemented. They require a constancy in circumstances and cannot adapt to
change in circumstances. Without conception methods cannot adapt to situations.
It is the prerogative of vision to decide which methods would be best to use in
certain circumstances - by setting a goal and a strategy to achieve that goal
it gives action a direction which it cannot provide itself by itself. Methods
do not tell us which goal is worthy of achievement - what value we should
attach to it; what value we should use to evaluate it. They also do not tell us
which strategy we should adopt to achieve that goal - for there may be
innumerable ways to achieve a goal – not all equally effective - that
assessment would depend on the circumstances - the end, the means to achieve
that end, current situation and the likely consequences of the action. And if
there are new facts that alter the circumstances then the methods need to be
varied to achieve the intended result. But methods can work only when we assign
to them a task - they cannot set a task for themselves. Selection of method
requires intelligence to assess a situation, set a goal and the means by which
that goal should be achieved. If selection of method itself requires a method
then the selection of that method would require using another method about
which the same problem would arise. The regress terminates in an intelligence
that is able to see which method should be the most appropriate to use. A
method is like a tool - its proper use depends on an intelligent agent. The
fashioning of the tool itself requires an intelligent agent.
Philosophy is the science of wisdom and wisdom
is the ability to grasp principles. The use of the word ‘principles’ in this
case indicates an understanding that is able to grasp the ‘why’ of things.
Comprehension of principles requires insight which is not mechanical - for
there cannot be a method to choose a method. Hence insight into principles is
needed. Every effective way of thinking requires generality of thought to be
adapted to the individuality of particular situations. First thought abstracts from
the particulars of a situation to arrive at principles that remain constant
through situations (for e.g. you can see in the case of laws of physics). It is
the job of principles to explain why things are the way they are. Principles
capture the rational structure inherent in situations - making them
intelligible to thought - allowing foresight to anticipate the unknown on the
basis of known. Because these principles are abstract accuracy cannot be
guaranteed but they can minimize the risk of inaccuracy and they allow us to
assess how far short we are of our ideal. They come under the domain of
theoretical rationality as opposed to practical and procedural rationality i.e.
they are concerned with truth - determination of the way things are and their
rationalization. Practical rationality steps in when we are concerned with
application of these principles - which is different from procedural
rationality for we are not yet concerned with execution. We are concerned with
how a principle ought to be applied to particular situations and again there
are innumerable ways not equally good or valid for all situations by which the
principles be applied to particulars of a situation and even here we need to
select which one is the most salient. Principles here are like ‘ideals’ they
cannot be completely applied to particulars of a situation for if they could
then they would cease being ‘ideals’, but they can serve as a benchmark - that
provide us a standard of evaluation to judge our actions. The closer we are in
spirit to the principles the better. Only after a course of action has been
decided does procedural rationality come in - which requires speed of action,
physical energy, practice and discipline and like virtues. Procedural
rationality is about skills - it requires blind execution of rules or a method
you have acquired via practice which has become habit. But it is only a part of
human rationality not the entire thing and is empty without theoretical and
practical rationality to which it ought to be subordinated for that is its
proper place and each thing is valid only within its proper sphere.
The source of rationality of a method lies in
the intelligence that selects it and hence a theory of concepts that looks to
understand the relation of a subject and object of knowledge should not be
restricted to following a rule or a method blindly. We can make four more
points here. First any human endeavour requires taking values seriously. It is
only by subordinating our actions to certain values that we can have the
ability to decide the validity of our actions. In case of cognitive enterprises
Truth is such a value. Second, this shows that the exclusion of moral and
aesthetic cognition on grounds of lack of factual content is not valid. For
normativity is an essential feature of any human endeavour and cognitive
endeavours are not free from normative considerations themselves. And these
normative considerations and not factuality are what determine whether an
activity is rational or irrational. Third, this undercuts the assimilation of
history to method of natural sciences on grounds of uniformity of method.
Fourth, the task of philosophy cannot consist only in conceptual analysis for
philosophy needs to understand what constitutes an adequate or successful
analysis and where do these norms come from. Kant pointed out that every
analysis is preceded by a synthesis. First we have a vague conception of the
whole, then via analysis we dissect it into parts giving our attention to them
and then conclude with a more distinct synthesis. Simply to build a mathematical
simulation model is not to understand something for initial indistinct
understanding will be carried forward to the translation of the concept in a
mathematical model. Far from improving our understanding it would be as
misinformed as our initial defunct understanding. This is revealed in economic
theories of perfect competition in theoretical markets and rational choice
theory of agents which assumes as it were that human beings are like Robinson
Crusoe in a lone island. The phenomenon of rational irrationality shows that it
is a mistake to consider an individual in isolation from the system and the
need to consider his choices as embedded within the system itself. The
situation is much different in real life. Economists building such theories
were living in mathematical paradises and their theories were simply
mathematically elegant but lacking empirical application. Hence we see the
switch to behavioural economics in recent times in study of economics.
The fear that
on this picture of human rationality empirical facts would lose currency in
favour of metaphysical principles and that we would be adjusting facts for
theories rather than theories for facts is unwarranted. The point of a
principle is to explain a fact. Facts can be understood only via principles for
facts do not explain themselves - principles need to be appealed to in order to
explain facts. Locke seeks to reverse the priority. His reason is in a way
understandable. In the age in which he lived we find an extreme forms of
rationalism prevalent. For Aristotle study of empirical facts was necessary -
for principles are found in the facts because they instantiate a Form or
Essence - that explain why certain facts are the way they are. To know a thing
in essence is to know it truly. An explanation has to hold true of an object in
its essence. Consider a doctor who can recognize the disease by its symptoms
versus a doctor who knows the disease in essence. The former can treat the
symptoms but the latter has a greater chance to find a cure. Aristotle begins
with common experience or common opinions and via a dialectic whereby
considering different perspectives on a topic he seeks to arrive at the correct
way of thinking about something. But beginning with Descartes we find a sharp
division between facts and principles thereby giving priority to principles
over human experience. If the latter is in conflict with the former - so much
the worse for the latter and Principles are justified purely by intuition.
Clearly Reason is credited with way too much power in order to justify dogmas
of religion. And we are asked to be more certain that we should be about our
conclusions. Without considering diverse opinions or diverse perspectives on an
issue - being certain amounts to being dogmatic. And it is this dogmatism Locke
was opposed to.
But like his
opponents he too separates facts from principles. As often happens two mutually
opposed options seem to be mutually exclusive. But the mutual opposition is
based on a substantial agreement which in this case is the separation of fact
and principle - whereas Rationalists like Descartes clear away experience in favour
of Reason - empiricists like Locke go to the other extreme and clear away
Reason in favour of experience. But what we need is a balance between the two.
Without facts principles cannot be applied and without principles facts cannot
be explained. Science cannot replace philosophy because by itself it cannot
yield scientific understanding. We need to distinguish between science as a
skill and science as knowledge. As a skill it is a tool for prediction of
phenomena but as knowledge it demands explanation of facts. And to explain what
an explanation is we need philosophy.
4. We have seen that law-like regularity and
uniformity of methods fails to be a consideration for assimilating human
sciences to natural sciences. Nancy Cartwright in her ‘How the Laws of Physics
Lie’ shows that laws are really idealizations based on experiments conducted
within controlled laboratory conditions. Even within natural sciences laws do
not play an essential role the way logical positivists would have us believe.
Neither are any strict laws discoverable in social phenomena given its
complexity nor can be make any idealizations based on controlled laboratory
conditions. Even then human sciences need not cease to be rational as the
preceding considerations show.
We have resisted the subsumption of human
sciences to natural sciences but now we need to resist another extreme that
claims autonomy of social sciences from natural sciences on grounds that the
nature of explanation markedly differs in the two cases. I support the autonomy
case but on different grounds.
HERMENEUTICS
Gadamer’s Hermeneutics is about experience of
Truth and this experience occurs in an aesthetic consciousness. Human sciences
differ from natural ones since they are about culture. In a lecture at a 1995
conference Gadamer says:
“To be cultured is obviously to cultivate a particular form of distance.
Hegel already wondered what constituted a cultured person. The cultured person
is the one who is ready to admit as plausible (literally, to value) the
thoughts of others. I say that we discover here a remarkable description of the
uncultured person: it is typically the person who maintains in all possible
circumstances and all possible contexts and with a dictatorial assurance
whatever wisdom he has picked up by chance. On the contrary, to leave something
undecided is what constitutes the essence of those who can ask questions. The
person who is not equal to recognising his own ignorance and, for that reason,
to keeping the open character of some decisions precisely in order to find the
right solution, will never be what is called a cultured person. The cultured
person is not the one who displays superior knowledge, but only the one who, to
take an expression from Socrates, has not forgotten the knowledge of his
ignorance.”
Jean Grondin comments on this (in his
Philosophy Of Gadamer Tr. Kathyrn Plant):
“Such is the ideal of culture which has always been that of the
human sciences, and indeed that of the human condition. It is a matter of
knowing limitations and humility. The essential is not to store items of
knowledge, but to realize one’s own ignorance when in contact with historical,
literary, linguistic and philosophical knowledge. By this hold of
self-awareness, one is raised to a certain universality. Gadamer was inspired
here by Hegel’s pedagogic texts: if the essence of culture or of formation is to
raise us to universality, it is because we are taught to open ourselves to
other approaches, to other and more general perspectives.18 To be able to adopt
a distance with respect to particularity, beginning with one’s own, is what
constitutes essential knowledge, that of culture and formation, because it
transforms us.”
How does culture transform an individual? This is the key
question. The answer is that the more we learn the more we become aware of our
ignorance. But learning takes place through our openness to different
perspectives. Learning requires humility and it makes us aware of our finitude.
It is not solely about the object known but also about the impact learning has
for an individual. This is what distinguishes human sciences from natural
sciences. In the latter our sole concern is the fact and the one who looks for
facts is not in any way transformed by finding facts. Hence natural science is
not a cultural pursuit.
Jean Grondin elaborates on this point:
“What is formed here is thus a capacity for judgement, or taste,
but this concept no longer has anything other than a trivially aesthetic
sense….. Gadamer already associates the nature of this historical knowledge
with the Aristotelian idea of practical wisdom. Several crucial elements are
common to these types of knowledge: as is indicated by the Aristotelian
distinction between the practical and the technical, it is not a matter of
learning rules, but of a wisdom in life; further, this virtue is not taught, it
is formed or cultivated; this wisdom has no particular content and is not
dogmatic, but rather consists of a capacity to adapt itself to particular
situations. It is a matter of knowledge, or better, of a sense, or better, of a
common sense since it allows us to transcend particularity. Science seeks the
universal in the form of laws, but we must recognize, with Aristotle, that we
are here talking about knowledge of another sort.”
But example how is this formation of transformation of the
individual effected? It is not possible by cultivation of a method because it
is not a technical achievement. This transformation occurs in understanding.
Understanding is not acquisition of knowledge or conceptual interpretation. It
is an event and it has to be understood via aesthetic experience. Aesthetics
has been taken to be a matter of taste and hence subjective as opposed to the
objective methods of science. But this way of thinking needs to be challenged.
An aesthetic experience reveals to us the truth in art; through aesthetics we
can arrive at a perspective of Truth which is more important than the narrow
perspective ingrained within us by practice of natural sciences. Experience of
art opens us to Being or Essence or Meaning of the work of art. In Heideggerian
language this disclosure of Being is Truth. Gadamer takes his cue from
allegories often ignored in aesthetics. The reason is that an allegory conveys
something or represents something else whereas in aesthetics we are used to
take art as an object in itself. An allegory on the other hands reveals or
presents (Darstellung) something. It is this presentation of the Being of a
being or the meaning of a work of art that is the experience of Truth. It
reveals Being to us and hence Gadamer talks about the ontology of art. Truth is
not a prerogative of cognitive endeavours. A very weak conception of Truth
informs such endeavours. In this case the experience of Truth transforms an
individual; as Grondin says reality is transfigured because rediscovered. Art
mediates this experience which leads to recognition (Mimesis) of Being. This is
the key to aesthetic consciousness which brings us to Truth; the Truth we
aspire in Human Sciences or in cultural pursuits.
But how and why does such an event or moment of understanding
occur? We do not know how understanding occurs but we know that it does and it
has an effect on the individual. But the nature of this understanding has to be
understood clearly. It is not an a-temporal understanding because we are not
a-temporal beings. We are finite and temporal beings and a historical
consciousness of ourselves has to be temporal and would reveal our finitude. A
finite individual is embedded in certain temporal circumstances from which he
cannot free himself. His social practices have an effect on his capability to
think. He begins with a certain prejudice-structure but this does not hamper
understanding on the contrary it facilitates it. A text just like an individual
interpreter has its own temporal horizon. In interpreting a text an individual
comes to it with questions pertinent to his own temporal horizon but the
answers to which he can get only via an openness towards the horizon of the
text. This openness leads to an understanding of the text where there is as it
were an integration between two different horizons. The meaning of the text is
appropriated within the horizon of the interpreter. This openness to an
alternative perspective is the experience of Truth.
There is much to admire in this elegant picture of human sciences.
But it is also vitiated by certain serious problems:
1. Truth and falsehood, knowledge and ignorance always come to us
in pairs. We cannot have one without the other. Does the experience of Truth
allow us to distinguish between Truth and Falsehood? Does the experience
determine for us the correct interpretation of the text? If it does not what
Truth is exactly revealed to us? Is it possible for different people living in
different horizons to have the same experience of Truth? Can dialogues and
interpretations converge on a single fact of the matter? If not then is not the
entire exercise (or game as Gadamer would call it) pointless? If a reason given
for one interpretation is in principle not stronger than another then we do not
have Truth but rather end in a nihilism. The pursuit of Truth puts us under
certain normative obligations or standards to meet. The point of norms is the
ability to distinguish between Truth and Falsehood. But without being able to
discriminate between the two our experience of Truth is pointless; Truth loses
its meaning here because we cannot distinguish Truth from falsehood.
2. What exactly is revealed to us in this experience of Truth? If
the answer is Being then can we ask what is Being? For Gadamer like Heidegger
we cannot ask what is Being because Being is not a something. But in what way
do we distinguish between Being and Nothing in this case? What makes an
experience an experience of Being? The point is not that we should be able to
articulate what we experience. The point is that an experience cannot be called
recognitive or one that leads to understanding and ineffable at the same time.
What have we understood and is there anything apart from a feeling that tells
us that we have truly understood it. What meaning is revealed? If it is
something we can recognize then it is capable of being grasped by us or is
rational or intelligible. If it is ineffable then how do we distinguish between
an understanding of something and an understanding of nothing which is really
no understanding at all? Stanley Rosen criticizing Heidegger’s Ereignis
(E-Event) in his The Question of Being makes this pertinent point:
“Either the E-Event is thinkable or it is not. If it is thinkable,
then there must be some content to our thoughts, in which case the E-Event is
though 'as' such and such, which is directly contrary to Heidegger's
intentions. On the other hand, if we are to avoid 'thinking' the E-Event in any
sense that connotes content peculiar to E-event, since there is nothing in
Being 'about' which to think we are left with the sole alternative of thinking
about what eventuates, that is, about beings.”
The point can be made with the same force against Gadamer. If
there is no such thing as Truth then expectation would always lead to reality.
But since there is distinction between appearance and reality our expectations
can be frustrated. However the opposite picture seems to hold in Gadamer as a
consequence of his views.
3. We have seen that Truth ceases to play any regulative role in
Gadamer’s hermeneutics. However to think that Truth plays such a regulative
role is not instrumentalist thinking. Knowledge deployed for practical purposes
need not be pursued for those same reasons. But there is nothing wrong in
application of knowledge to everyday life. Gadamer and Heidegger too wish to
effect a transformation of the individual. This does not however make their views
on understanding instrumentalist.
4. Which prejudices facilitate understand and which ones are
obstacles? How do we make this normative assessment? Gadamer is not blind to
this problem, he says that the:
“….. Central question, the fundamental question from the point of
view of the theory of knowledge can be formulated in this way: on what is to be
founded the legitimacy of prejudices? What distinguishes legitimate prejudices
from all those innumerable ones which critical reason must incontestably
overcome?”
Grondin elaborates:
“An important question, but one that hides an even more important
paradox: if we see in prejudices the conditions of understanding, do we not, by
the very fact of the same confirmation, cut ourselves off from the things
themselves?”
And again:
“………in Truth and Method at least, has Gadamer clearly succeeded in
“going beyond epistemological interrogation” in hermeneutics when he still
gives such an epistemological emphasis to the problem of the truth of
prejudices? Does the concept of truth that he tries to elaborate from the
experience of art not try to frustrate too epistemological, too instrumental an
understanding of truth?”
Gadamer never gives an adequate solution to the problem and
Grondin underestimates it seeing it as just a minor difficulty.
5. Can Truth be temporal? A-temporality seems essential to Truth.
But then take the discovery of the fore-structure of human being and his
consequence finitude. Is that not an a-temporal Truth? Truth is not a value
that is subject to human prejudices and social practices. If rational and moral
standards originate in social rules then our very ability to think morally
depends on attestation by social standards. How would then we be able to
evaluate social standards themselves? What would we test them against? More
standards? Where would they come from? How could we make a statement like JK
did that social morality is immorality. Would we be constrained to accept
slavery because social conventions favour it? If we do then there would be no
way out for a victim of tyranny because for the latter anything goes. The same
would apply to rational standards. I think Gadamer destroys Truth as a value
which is to say that instead of his explicit promise to provide us with an
account of experience of Truth in Art he has really destroyed Truth itself.
6. Can a change in consciousness be effected by a fusion of
horizons? For Gadamer the penetration effected between two different horizons
affects the underlying structure of our fore-knowledge and thus causes change.
It is the passivity of understanding that effects a change within us. While it
is known since Hume pronounced reason to be a slave of passions yet without
rational control a change within a prejudicial structure is not possible; not
simply given the passivity of understanding. This is not to deny what can be
expressed in Niccolai Hartmann’s words: “Emotional awareness of reality lies at
the bottom of all cognitive activity.” Character can be seen as a ground for
feelings and emotions that predispose us towards certain values. Acquisition of
knowledge does not require merely intellectual skills but also a feel for the
Truth that motivates the search for the Truth. The value system of the
individual counts but feelings and reason have to be co-ordinated together to
effect a change.
Also it will be useful to distinguish between prejudices and
pre-judgements. For instance if I am a teacher and I have a low opinion of a
student and someday I receive an essay written by that student and I read it to
find to my astonishment that it is actually good. Not too good for then I
should suspect plagiarism but good in a way that reflects that the student has
worked hard and made some progress. If in such a case I would still give him
less marks to be consistent with my previous judgement then I am prejudiced. But
if I change my opinion and give him marks he deserves then my previous
judgement does not have a hold on me to an extent that it hinders my present
judgement and hence that is not a case of prejudice. Pre-formed judgements can
be an aid in an inquiry as they help in orienting us in a particular direction.
For example a cop has to begin somewhere with a murder investigation. Certain
pre-judgements about the case assist in giving his investigation a direction.
Perhaps people he suspected turn out to be innocent but he has to get a start
and adapt according to the situation. Ultimately change is effected only by
adjusting our actions in light of our experiences and our comprehension of
those experiences and our ability to adapt to different situations and mitigate
the influence of those prejudices that hamper our ability to respond to
different situations or challenges. We see and act but Gadamer’s seeing causes
an unbridgeable chasm to develop between seeing and acting in fear of
epistemological or instrumental readings of understanding creeping in.
DIANOEMATICS
This is a term used by the French Philosopher
and Historian Martial Gueroult to denote an inquiry into the philosophical
value of history of philosophy. It is an inquiry akin to Kant’s Transcendental
Deduction into the possibility of history of philosophy as a discipline. In his
paper ‘The History of Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem’, Gueroult frames
the aporia for history of philosophy in this way:
“On the one hand, the problem arises
necessarily from the moment one considers the definition that all philosophy
gives of itself: philosophy presents itself as an expression of the truth and
as something timeless and eternally valid, since truth is by definition
timeless. And on the other hand it arises from the moment one considers the
fact that philosophy also presents itself as a series of doctrines succeeding
one another in time and swallowing up one another in the completed past. As
something past, philosophy can without difficulty be the object of history,
which is defined as the effort to exhume all that is past. But as past that is
completed, past that is surpassed, it seems to exclude the history of
philosophy. For is it not, by virtue of being completely past, not truth, since
truth does not pass? Philosophy could not therefore be the object of a history
of philosophy since, being without truth, it would be without philosophy.
History is only possible by virtue of a value which raises its material to the
dignity of a possible object for history. But if the past of philosophy is,
thanks to being historically past, deprived of the value (truth) which would
justify it as an object worthy of history, the history of philosophy is
philosophically illegitimate. Hence this problem: how to reconcile the
historicity of philosophy with the philosophical truth of all philosophy. And
then this: how to define, correlatively, the concept of philosophical truth.”
And,
“Can philosophy, which is always expressed
through a doctrine given as truth, and thus as timeless, allow itself to be
submitted to history, which reduces all philosophy to an event which passes,
thus to something without truth (since truth never passes)? Reciprocally, can
history, which reduces all philosophy to a passing event, admit a philosophy
which always claims to be a truth, which in itself escapes the vicissitudes and
laws of history, even though it came into being at a certain moment of history?”
The formulation of the problem sees philosophy
as Truth and hence timeless and thus philosophy can either be past in which
case it would not be philosophy or Truth in which case its historicity is an
accident.
Further ahead in the paper Gueroult enters
into a very instructive discussion regarding why a philosopher can never be
free of history of philosophy (contra Descartes) and how history of philosophy
differs from history of science. Gueroult argues against reduction of
philosophy to history on grounds that philosophy is a science – a body of
knowledge held together by internal reasons that make a claim to Truth:
“Philosophy emerges from the necessary
sequence of notions. It presents the character of unity and rational
interiority. The history of philosophy, on the contrary, brings doc trines,
notions, and concepts from the outside, as facts. It is therefore the negation
of philosophy which, far from being the passive acceptance of ready-made
solutions or the empirical knowledge of an external giver, is knowledge through
internal reason. Philosophy, by definition, challenges any history because it
is science grasped in its fundamental form as the necessary sequence of evident
truths which owe their certainty to this evidence, and their usefulness to this
certainty. History, the knowledge of facts, a knowledge exterior to its object,
can never be deduced from internal reasons; accordingly it is uncertain and
consequently useless. Even if it reaches certainty about a fact, this knowledge
of contingent and single facts never leads to a science properly speaking,
which is always necessary and universal. To wish to subject philosophy to
history under these conditions is to bring the corruption of philosophy to its
highest point.”
The history of philosophy is a history of
doctrines or systems succeeding one another while at the same time making
claims to a timeless and universally valid Truth. A historian of philosophy
unlike a historian of science is not free of the past for previous doctrines
remain with him as “a collection of latent philosophical possibilities offered
for meditation, from which the philosopher can indefinitely draw his inspirations.”
Thus on the one hand history of philosophy professes to be a temporal
phenomenon to be studied by a historian like any other piece of history. Yet a
philosophy presents to a historian as an eternally present system that is still
living and from which still philosophical truths may be drawn. Faced with such
contrary tendencies the historian has two choices. The first and the one
Gadamer has taken is:
“Considering philosophies not as eternal
truths, but as temporal and contingent events, the historian will explain them
historically, like other historical events, by the conjunction of individual
and social factors, milieu, time, etc. He will not explain them by the
connection between the thoughts and that absolute of truth which legitimize
them in their own terms. Taken to the limit, this tendency leads to treating
the details of contents and the techniques used to establish and demonstrate
doctrines as illusory epiphenomena, and to reducing them to a small number of
fundamental themes, which would be the only ones to which historico-psychological
causes are applicable. One will not go deeper into the mysteries of the system,
just as classical psychopathology does not trouble itself to note the details
of a raving man's visions, rather contenting itself with characterizing them in
order to diagnose the nosological entity. Similarly, reduced to the state of
symptoms of psychological or social complexes, philosophies will be stripped of
the details of their insights and summed up in terms of their outlines which
reveal the underlying tendencies of a man and of a society. The psychological
and sociological will ultimately be substituted for the philosophical in
establishing the essential of a history of philosophy which would no longer be
philosophical.”
But the historian of philosophy can never
really go that far because he finds himself torn by an equally forceful
philosophical tendency. By substituting a psychological or social explanation
for a philosophical one he essentially destroys his object of study. The desire
for explanation limits the tendency to explain a philosophy via external
reasons alone and makes one see the internal point of view of a philosophical
doctrine.
The second tendency is one where history is
sacrificed for philosophy. History as Gueroult points, out requires a sense of
the past and is directed towards historical truth and not philosophical truth.
Gueroult points out that this tendency marks itself in polemics where the
existence of the past in not understood and needs to be got rid of. Philosophy
is the eternal truth and can have no history. Or else past philosophers may be
seen as progressing towards the one true point of view which it is the prerogative
of the present to propagate (Gueroult agrees with Dilthey that this is the turn
that study of history of philosophy took with the advent of Christianity and
the excommunication of tradition in name of philosophy peaked within the
Cartesian System. The polemical tendency on the other hand is found in
Aristotle).
Gueroult finds both alternatives distasteful
and looks for a third. There are however certain things that any alternative
should accommodate: a) Every philosophy though in a way is a break from the
past is nevertheless incapable of completely separating itself from the past,
b) unlike a scientist a philosopher needs history of philosophy to get a grasp
of philosophy, c) even though historical and scientific interests can be
separated in philosophy the two are ‘intimately intermingled’, d) historical
truth and philosophical truth cannot be dissociated unlike in other sciences.
The historian of philosophy is motivated to
study history of philosophy for not simply a historical value but for a
philosophical value. This philosophical value has to be Truth. But this Truth
is not representative Truth or scientific Truth that divides different
philosophies and is a bone of contention between them but an internal truth of
inner reasons that unites a body of doctrine. Like Gadamer Gueroult too invokes
aesthetic sense to explicate his notion of an inner truth of doctrines:
“Philosophies stand as monuments of thought
having their own value, which is impervious to history; they are as much
eternal objects for meditation as artistic monuments are eternal objects for
contemplation and emotion. Their paradoxical permanence does not lie in their
representative truth, defined as adaequatio rei et intellectus; indeed on the
contrary it is through it that they appear to be frail, contradicting one
another, and running counter to the science of today and tomorrow. It is due to
their intrinsic truth, that is, to the concept that they enclose something real
(sui generis), born of their systematic and architectonic constitution. Now,
what constitutes the immortal substance of all works of arts is precisely an
intrinsic truth, veritas in re, which is heterogeneous with all truths of
judgment.”
But there is an important distinction between
art and philosophy that should not be overlooked:
“Such a parallelism ought not nevertheless to
mask one essential difference. Contrary to what takes place in art,
philosophies do not take it upon themselves to build self-sufficient monuments,
but to attain, as in science, to a truth of judgment, to resolve a problem by
means of a theory. In this they are closer to science and further from works of
art. To be sure, this confirms that their permanence is based on an intrinsic
value (veritas in re), not on a truth of judg ment (veritas in repraesentando),
but it also confirms that they have the latter truth and not the former as
their aim. Thus experience reveals that philosophical works seem to preserve
their inde structibility in the way works of art do, by means of an internal
truth (veritas in re) which is entirely different from their claimed truth of
judgment (veritas in repraesentando). But it reveals at the same time that in
order to create these works, the philosopher does not aim at them in and for
themselves, but always, like the scientist, at the discovery of a truth of
judgment, of a theory conforming to the reality of things. The union of these
two characters is what establishes the irreducibility of philosophy to either
science or art neither of these characters can be stricken out to the benefit
of the other without mutilating the fact. To uphold that all philosophy is
created like a work of art because it can maintain itself like a work of art
through the very value of an intrinsic truth, is to mutilate the experience
which teaches us, on the contrary, that the two creations are utterly
different. Consequently, to uphold this would render the solution to the
transcendental problem impossible, a problem of legitimacy which can only be
resolved when based on the unmutilated fact.”
We have here a very interesting picture of
history of philosophy and also for philosophy of history. Gadamer we have seen
sought to assimilate Truth to experience of art and he sees a philosophical
text as a work of art embedded within its time but nevertheless suggesting
something to us to understand which requires a fusion of horizons between the
work of art and the historian. But Gueroult would point out that this is
possible only if the work of art possesses an inner truth that is capable of
being grasped or understood by the historian. This inner truth may differ in a
work of art, in history of philosophy or political or social history. But it is
this inner truth that allows a historian to access and understand the piece of
art he is striving to comprehend. If our problem was confined to art then
Gadamer’s understanding of Truth may have sufficed. Art is a mediator in
suggesting to us the true meaning that is disclosed or uncovered in aesthetic
consciousness where the meaning presents itself. But the case of history of
philosophy presents a problem that shows we cannot extrapolate this case to
every case of study of history and hence it is not a model for human sciences. The
truth we are after in human sciences is not the same Truth that Gadamer finds
in art. So either he is wrong in working out an ontology of art or else his
idea of Truth is too restrictive and unsuitable for human sciences. For
Gueroult art is an object of study in itself because of the inner truth it
presents. In this way his understanding of aesthetic consciousness is different
from Gadamer’s.
The demand that history of philosophy saddles
on a philosopher and historian alike is to accommodate the structure of a
philosophical system with its historical truth. The structure itself is
a-temporal but history is a study embedded in time. Gueroult says this is only
possible if there is an inner truth or structural truth within philosophy that
is posited in virtue of a claim to scientific truth. This inner truth can be
the object of study both for the philosopher and the historian (the two really
cannot come apart in this case) because the inner truth is posited in virtue of
a claim to scientific truth and the two are related; so the study of one
necessitates the study of the other. A science needs to be a body of knowledge
justifying its claim to Truth via an inner truth of the order of reasons so
arranged that it can be assessed by standards of scientific Truth. We cannot
have one without the other. Seen as an inner order of reasons a philosophical
system is like a work of art capable of being studied for its own sake and as a
past monument built with a pretension of serving as absolute truth. So the
historian’s demand is satisfied. This way contra Gadamer we don’t need to reduce
philosophical truth to truth of art and we don’t need to see contingent factors
of its existence (social factors for instance) as essential to it. Contra
Gadamer a work of art can be studied for its own sake and can have an inner
truth. Its truth does not consist in its suggestiveness or mediation or
implicit reference to another. Contra Logical Positivism philosophy is not
simply a science; its claim to absolute truth is not factual but based on an
inner truth of reasons which may survive the failure in its claim to absolute
truth so that a philosopher still has something to learn from his past unlike
the scientist.
But how do we see the relation between one philosophical
system and another? It is here that we need to depart from Gueroult. Historians
of philosophy like Gilson take philosophical systems to be a system of abstract
concepts that are discovered and worked out by individual philosophers. Victor
Delbos believes that the force of a philosophical system depends on its
flexibility in structure. Contra Gilson it is not an eternal and static
structure of concepts. To quote Delbos:
“……if the internal force of a doctrine is
measured by the degree of organization it implies, one could also say,
conversely, that its historical influence is measured by the degree of
disorganization it can sustain without becoming fundamentally denaturalized.”
Consequently, “what we must aim a rediscovering and unearthing is the strong
and flexible unity of a philosophy which, without modifying itself essentially,
has managed to adapt to the most different conditions of existence.” (Tr.
Mogens Laerke in his article Structural Analysis and Dianoematics)
Gueroult’s conception is closer to Gilson’s
when he says, “Philosophy appears to itself as eternally valid in itself,
a-temporally” but he departs in his understanding of philosophia perennis in so
far contra Gilson there is no abstract structure: “There are no general
structures, but only individualized structures, inseparable from the contents
attached to them.” (Tr. Mogens Laerke in his article Structural Analysis and
Dianoematics) The structure of a philosophical system is imparted to it by an
individual like a work of sculpture owes its form to the sculptor. There is no
one philosophia perennis but many. Hence Knox Peden in his Spinoza Contra
Phenomenology characterizes Gueroult’s system as ahistorical and pluralistic.
It is a study of radically disconnected systems of philosophy. This has
striking consequences because every philosophical system is incommensurable
with another. What happens to the common reality that every philosophical
system stakes a claim to? Gueroult answers:
“The relation to the real is the condition of
possibility of all philosophy. By this, however, it is by no means determined
what reality it is about, nor the nature of that reality.”
And,
“The common reality has been posited as
indeterminate and open to all the determinations that the different systems
manage to attribute to it, each within its sphere.”
“The common reality appears as an internal
law, purely formal, of philosophizing thought; a law that is indeterminate with
regard to content; a law that grounds the necessity through which the different
real syntheses of the interior and the exterior are possible for the
philosophizing thought, syntheses each of which constitute a system or
philosophical reality.”
“…….the concept of a completely undetermined
common reality remains as the condition of possibility of the living
philosophical experience in history”
(Tr. Mogens Laerke in his article Structural
Analysis and Dianoematics)
Contra Gueroult if these radically
incommensurate antagonistic systems were mutually exclusive then there couldn’t
be a common reality and hence no conflict and what can then one hope to learn
from another philosophy. If the common reality they aspire to is indeterminate
then either every philosophical system posits the Truth or the very attempt to
arrive at Truth is hopeless. And is Gueroult’s history of history of philosophy
one way to understand history of philosophy or the only way to do so. If Gueroult
claims the latter then he is contradicting himself. Hence we see in the end
Gueroult stretches the a-temporality of philosophy to an extreme from where it
precipitately falls from into the ditch from where he sought to rescue it.
Fortunately there may be a way out. Gueroult’s
problem revealed in the very formulation of his aporia for history of
philosophy is that either philosophy can be temporal or philosophical but not
both. We have seen that Delbos believed that there is a unity within a
philosophical system that allows it to subsist despite change. This unity is
not static and is not opposed to flexibility of the philosophical system. So
the question is why a philosophical system cannot be both philosophical and
historical – have we not saddled ourselves with two contradictory options that
are really not contradictory at all even though mutually opposed to each other?
This seems counter-intuitive because it seems to be the simultaneous assertion
of temporality and a-temporality; clearly it is not possible for something to
be both temporal and a-temporal. But we can understand the matter this way.
There is only one philosophia perennis and not many contra Gueroult because
there is one a-temporal Truth and one common reality that all philosophical
systems aspire to. But an individualized structure of philosophy is a human
construct representing the aspiration to capture this common reality and it is
related to every other philosophical system dialectically i.e. in its attempt
to find the right internal order of reason to make the claim for Truth. Every
philosophical system seeks to get this internal order right in order to justify
its claim to absolute truth. Hence philosophy progresses dialectically via
‘asking and giving reasons’ (to quote Robert Brandom). This approach does not condemn us to seeing a
philosophical system as rigid or static instead of dynamic but rather it gives
meaning to the system which may be dynamic. A thinker’s thoughts always try to
achieve systematicity which is because every thought is in some way or other
connected with another thought and a thinker may perhaps not always grasp these
connections. Hence it is imperative to concentrate on the thought and
understand a thinker in terms of his thoughts and not the other way round. Thought
is dialectical; that it is best understood in terms of what it includes and
what it excludes and it is always opposed to some other way of thinking and
there is no way to understand the thought without understanding what it is
opposed to. Hence contra Descartes philosophy is not a solo act; but it is
essentially dialogical and dialectical which is also the reason we should be
studying other philosophers; not to bring them to judgment as Bennett et al
seek to do but to learn and practice and participate in philosophy itself. And
this is the reason why philosophers in every century have found it necessary to
study other philosophers for in the process they discovered their own
philosophy.
One approach to philosophy is akin to
Gueroult’s and of mystics and philosophers like Descartes. Elevate yourself to
a higher sphere where there is no conflict but where there is the pure light of
reason which itself will show you the way. This is the way of conquest - you
rise above conflict and find your way to truth in a sphere of
self-consciousness where the other is excluded and you are alone with truth.
The second way is the way of the dialectician and philosophers like Aristotle
where you embrace conflict instead of running away and you are self-conscious
not because of exclusion but inclusion of the other. Your self-consciousness is
determined by opposition to it and your way forward depends on a continuous
synthesis of opposites. It does not require the exclusion of the whole for the
parts or the parts for the whole. What matters here is not the end but the
means; not the destination but the journey. You steadily employ your reason as
far as your abilities allow you to and instead of looking for a knockout blow
you look for steady but sure progress. Such a philosopher is not a conqueror
but an explorer who will look at every single detail in light of the beauty of
the whole because he is in no hurry to leave it to arrive at the end.
In the sphere of logic the point can
be understood thus - instead of looking for demonstration - the kind you find
in mathematics - you look for discussion and friction to move forward. It is
reflection and serious consideration of opposing points of views which
eventually through the friction it produces allows us to see the light.
Philosophers today and even many in the past have been too impatient to arrive
at the truth and make a conquest; so much so that those who did not find a
demonstration of truths embraced scepticism or nihilism. They would have done
well to accept conflict and uncertainty; nay even embrace it for they can never
be eliminated. We have to learn to work our way despite them if not without
them. Demonstrations condemn us to one principle and one method with which to
arrive at the truth but dialectics open us to different perspectives. The world
is multifaceted and rigidity is a sign of weakness while pliability is a sign
of strength.
This does not imply that philosophy is devoid of
significance for an individual. The point of philosophy is self-knowledge.
We go about living our lives unreflectively
depending more on skills than knowledge. When we begin to reflect on practical
everyday aspect of things it turns out that even though we are familiar with
them; we do not really understand what we are doing. Through reflection we try
to bring to attention what we are used to regarding as obvious so that we can
gain a reflective understanding about its content. This theoretical
understanding can then be integrated with practice to make it all the more
effective. However the aim of theoretical rationality is truth; to understand
why something is the way it is. In order to achieve that reason is the only
tool we’ve got; it is only through rationalizing phenomena - trying to
understand why something is the way it is and not through factual knowledge
that we gain understanding.
Facts themselves yield only information not
knowledge for knowledge requires us to connect the dots and understand facts
within a theory where their correct place in the scheme of things can be found
– to understand the whole rather than just the parts. Also it is imperative
that to achieve such understanding the philosopher must rely on himself alone;
he must take responsibility of his thinking process rather than defer to
someone else’s views. The reasoning must be developed within the consciousness
of the philosopher - he must be conscious of the reasons he has for a belief
and be aware of his presuppositions as far as possible. The point of reasoning
is not just to implement a method but to be reflectively aware of why he is
employing a method and what he hopes to achieve by it. He must be aware of
what he is doing and why. This reflective control can only be achieved through
reasoning and self-knowledge - which is the primary aim philosophy.
But self-knowledge cannot be achieved in
isolating the individual from the world but in relation to rest of the world.
It should be noted here that we have departed from both Gueroult and Gadamer
while preserving what is most valuable in both. This we have done by ridding
ourselves of a false dichotomy between temporal and a-temporal Truth. Truth
itself is a-temporal but the pursuit of truth is temporal and that does not
preclude it from arriving at the absolute Truth. Absolute Truth is present to
an individual as an ideal or as a value. A value to use Hartmann’s metaphor is
like a guiding star that gives us direction. The philosophical system is a
philosophia perennis where there is no distinction between inner truth and
absolute truth because of its comprehensiveness while an individualized
philosophical system aspires to philosophia perennis but lacks that level of comprehensiveness.
In this case we can distinguish between the inner truth of a philosophical
system and the absolute truth it aspires to and in light of the latter we may
try to evaluate the former. Dialectics is concerned with the inner truth which
need not be rigid and static and incommensurable with other philosophical
aspirations. Rather the inner truth of any individualized system can contribute
to human understanding as such and allow us to improve and reduce the gap
between absolute truth and inner truth. Progress in philosophy should not be
seen as diachronic progress but as synchronic progress in terms of depth of
reflection contributing to the inner truth of a philosophical system which also
necessarily implicates the progress in inner consciousness of the philosopher.
PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
John Elster in his book Alchemies of the Mind
says that the goal of study for social sciences is to identify causal
mechanisms which he defines as: “frequently occurring and easily recognizable
causal patterns that are triggered under unknown conditions or with
indeterminate consequences.” A mechanism he says allows us to explain but not
predict. Social Sciences have not and cannot discover law-like regularities but
it can find causal mechanisms. Elster gives the examples of Alexis
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America and Paul Veyne’s Bread and Circuses, which
explore the interaction between beliefs, desires and norms of 19th
Century America and its implications within America’s political institutions.
Another example is the invisible hand theory developed by Adam Smith in his
books The Wealth of Nations. It is not the case that depending on circumstances
these mechanisms cannot come apart but nevertheless the study of these
mechanism allows us to understand our institutions and the divergences can be
instructive in their own way.
My only problem here is that this definition
is not wrong but incomplete. Selection and discovery of the right mechanism
requires as a background the understanding of a system as such or to take our
clue from the preceding discussion of the inner truth of a system or a
structure. Hence the object of study of a social science is the structure of
society or the entire system as such. I would also plead that economics and
social science should be seen identical wit political science (this is the way
Ancient Greeks used to see it but in recent times economists like Ha-Joon Chang
have argued that seeing economics as different from politics is a distortion
and impedes our vision of the social system). It is not possible to study a
structure in exclusion from its external environment. For instance floods,
drought etc. influence decisions in society to migrate. It is the dynamic
interaction between a social structure and its external environment which presents
it with challenges to elicit response that is our concern. History is concerned
with the study of social – political – economic systems (or of disciplines like
philosophy, science or art) of the past and figure out the changes that
occurred in these and their impact on the individual.
So society is a system which seeks to govern
itself in light of certain values and principles (as per its understanding) or
can be seen to fall short while retaining an inner truth or a structure or
order to approximate certain values in its conduct much like a philosophical
system outlined in the previous section. This is not to say that they share the
same structure rather they have different structures and hence we need to
adjust our methods to study them accordingly. Science has a more factual
structure but contra Gadamer culture is not the sole concern of humanities;
otherwise human beings would be cut from nature and understanding of nature is
an important part of human culture. Philosophy has a structure that is
irreducible to art or science. The structure of politics – economics – social
science is the same but differ only in emphasis.
It is important to understand what a structure
is and what the relation between an individual and the system is as such.
Society is not just a collection of individuals it is also a system that binds
people together. That is what distinguishes them from a crowd. A crowd has no
basis of unification; no common goal, no mutual interest. But a system is
created when people for a common purpose can be united together. We see that in
everyday life. Rabindranath Tagore in his book, ‘Nationalism’ distinguishes between
society and nation. Society he says is based on social adjustment and regulation
of relationship between human beings understood as social beings. Nations he
says are founded on greed, jealousy, suspicion and lust for power. Nationalism
as an ideology is a subversive instrument that is used by governments to
further their own agenda. Society is not divisive; ideologies are divisive.
The point of having a system or an order is
that it should lead to the good of an individual. If we stress on individuality
beyond a point then the system comes apart and that cannot be for the good of
an individual. The question is how to solve the antinomy between the individual
and the system. If the system is preferred over the individual then it benefits
no one i.e. furthers no good and if the individual is given preference over the
system then that would be to the detriment of the individual because without
organization individuals cannot further their own interests. We need to strike
the right balance between the two so that on the one hand an individual can
maintain his individuality without being assimilated into the larger whole and
on the other he can be a true unit or part of the whole and thereby contribute
both to his own good and towards the greater whole.
Napoleon made a very interesting statement:
1. Society is impossible without inequality
2. Inequality intolerable without a code of morality
3. And a code of morality unacceptable without
religion
1.1 If everyone were self-sufficient in every
possible way there would be no society. This is the reason for the first
statement. We are always in quest for equality; ironically without inequality
there would be no society. Nature has not created us equal; this is something
that is common to everyone so why not base the quest for equality on this. If
equality is seen as a mathematical equation or in accounting terms where both
sides should be balanced then such an equality is impossible. We should now be
aware of this seeing the fate of communist regimes. The problem with a
mathematical conception of equality is that it ignores what is truly good for
an individual. For e.g. your neighbour has bought a car and out of jealousy you
are driven to get an equally expensive car yourself despite knowing that you
don’t need to make an unnecessary expenditure. But even if the person gets an
expensive car there is no equality between him and his neighbour for the
former’s interest has not truly been served. The purpose of a just society is
to allow an individual to grow; to realize his potential - to get what he truly
wants i.e. to give him an opportunity to live his life the best way he or she
can. In this consists true equality.
1.2 But in order to achieve this end we need to
regulate the conduct of an individual towards another so that despite whatever
disparity exists between one individual and another in terms of what nature has
provided one or the advantages his birth may have conferred on him; there is a
basic and inviolable space or limit transgressing which one is liable to
misconduct. If a small plant is not given adequate protection and care it shall
not grow to be a tree. Leaving it to the mercy of everyone else does not make
it equal to everyone for his needs and his interests are different from others.
If this were not the case we should abandon small children to earn their living
themselves so that they can be ‘equal’ to other earning members. But sensibly
we do not do that because we know the kid needs adequate training and
experience to be fit enough to cope with the world. Coming back these limits
are rights and duties; both invariably go together. My right is what another
owes to me and my duty what I owe to another. Laws are intended to protect
these rights. And the rules that regulate the conduct of one individual towards
another crystallize in a code of morality that a society chooses to abide with.
1.3 But if rights are my entitlement then on what
basis do we decide who is entitled to what? Why is a code of morality not an
expression of individual whims and fancies? What then is the basis of the
mandate for rights and duties and laws in a society? Why should we follow them?
What is it that makes them moral? Hence the need to base it on a Divine Mandate
as conservatives have done. But this unacceptable for many reasons like every
religion does not have the same thing to say and what God has said is subject
to interpretation by few select men. Whence the objectivity of the mandate
then? The basic problem is our sense of morality should be a judge when it
comes to religion; rather than religion dictating what should be regarded as
right or wrong - religion itself should be judged on the basis of our moral
sense. Liberals go to the other extreme basing the mandate on human nature
which is inconstant and often immoral. Hence social rules and regulations
become a matter of practical expediency. But can we consider slavery to be
moral on the basis of its practical utility? Hence the mandate should be sought
in moral values themselves. Once the principle is determined and expressed in
terms of rights and duties one needs to be concerned about the application of
the principles to particular situations. Hence laws and constitutions are like
strategy to determine the way certain moral values should be applied and
protected from misconduct. But their force comes from social will to accept
certain moral values and accept certain limitations to regulate their conduct
in accordance with those values. This social will has to manifest itself in
everyday life practices without which laws are just ink on paper. Hence the
mandate is the social will coupled with moral values that a society chooses as
its guiding star. This does not mean it is incumbent on us to blindly follow
rules for to respond to challenges that a society meets it has to constantly
scrutinize whether its rules and regulations are serving an end to follow the
spirit of a value system or have become an end in itself. And one has to
constantly think - what is the best way to apply a principle to situations of
everyday life and there would always be more than one way to do so and there
are no rules that tell us which rules are best. Also one needs to go beyond the
liberal – conservative dichotomy.
The positions and arguments that the author
have held in this paper are admittedly sketch and need filling out. The author
has hoped to convey his general orientation to these problems and their
motivations. For further improvement he can only plead time.
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