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Buddhists and Nyaya on Knowledge of Absence

 In the Buddhist View Knowledge of absence arises as follows:

First there is perception of something - like the bare ground where one expects to see a jar but finds it missing. Knowledge of absence arises because of its counter-positive (pratiyogin) i.e. the absentee. The manner in which the counter-positive figures in the negative judgement determines how we acquire knowledge of absence of something. The primary role here is played by thwarted expectation and a negative judgement is formed by inference to the effect that if a jar would have been there it would have been perceived; since it is not perceived it is absent. For Buddhists there are no negative facts. Negation is just the presence of something else than what one expected to see. It is the product of the imaginative activity of the mind.

For Buddhists the division of subject, cognition and object of cognition is an imaginary distinction; what is real is a series of conscious moments. On the other hand for Nyaya cognizability depends on something’s possessing a certain character that allows it to be comprehended. This applies to both positive and negative entities classified as Beings (Tattva - something that can become an object of a demonstrative ‘that’) because of their possessing a certain character. For Nyaya thus there are negative facts and they are apprehended via perception. Without negative facts there would not be a real basis of distinction between different objects. For e.g. consider a statement, ‘a cow is not a horse’, if there are no negative facts then the contradictory of this statement should also be regarded as true. Thus the Law of Non-Contradiction on this view is a metaphysical law while for Buddhists it rests of imaginary distinctions and is hence psychological.

In Nyaya absence is known via perception. Again the important point is how is the counter-positive known. Negative facts are seen as qualifiers of positive facts. For e.g. the absence of the jar qualifies / distinguishes the ground where there is an absence of the jar. In perception via a special eye-object contact called samyukta-visheshanta; the eye in contact with the ground also has cognition of the negation of the jar.

Since Buddhists distinguish between perception and inference as two radically different sources of knowledge - only positive facts can be perceived. After synthesis of perceptual data by imagination; the entities that are perceived are known by inference not perception. What we perceive without intrusion of the mind is truly perceptual. Perception thus on this view is a gauge for segregating ontological significance from imaginary constructions of the mind. Only positive facts thus can be perceived but negation involves activity of the mind and hence is a constructed fact not a real positive fact. Hence it cannot be regarded as perceived. In the Madhyamika View there is no source of knowledge that carries any ontological significance whatsoever.

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