Tattva in Indian Philosophy

 Reality or Tattva is an abstract noun formed by adding the inflection –ness to the demonstrative ‘that’ which we use to point out to something. So that-ness means something that is capable of being referred to as a that or in other words something that has a certain character or svabhava. Nagarjuna believes that svabhava is really a prajnapti sat or merely a conventional existent like say a chariot, the chariot is neither in the parts nor a whole apart from the parts nor a configuration of the parts, it is merely a name. Depending on certain factors or collocations something is conferred with a name and mind takes it to be an independent existing reality. So there are then two ways to refer to reality, one from an ordinary standpoint where the name has a practical significance in worldly transactions. The sage does not upset conventional truths. Another standpoint is the transcendental standpoint where reality is referred to as essentially ni-svabhava, taking it to have a svabhava is what leads to clinging to the object while understanding its emptiness leads to cessation of desire. Nagarjuna does not say that the real is the absolute but only denies that any independent existent can be real. Dependence is involved in the very nature of existence and nothing can exist independently of anything else – not even an absolute. It is for this reason he said that emptiness itself is empty so that one does not reify shunyata to an absolute.

Now lets discuss the question of consciousness and reality. The aporia of cognition is that the object of consciousness is peculiar; it is somehow both immanent in consciousness and transcendent to consciousness. If it is not within the boundaries of consciousness then no cognition of the object will be possible and if it is transcendent then also it cannot become the object of consciousness. The Idealist is faced with the question – if the object of consciousness is completely immanent to consciousness like the feeling of pain then how is it that it is attributed to something existing outside consciousness? Pain unlike color, shape, size is not attributed to an external object or referred to an external reality. On the other hand the realist is faced with the question that if the object exists independently of consciousness then how it become an object to a consciousness. Realists like Nyaya believe that consciousness is intentional or it refers to an external object. Jnana is usually translated as cognition. Cognition is the only thing that has intentionality or the property of being directed at the world. It reveals objects in the world towards which goal directed action can be initiated. It is of the nature of illumination like a lamp and generates awareness in the subject of is objects. It is always used in an episodic sense and never in a dispositional sense; samskaras are dispositional. Jnana is used to connote mental states like perception, memory, introspection, assumption, doubt, belief etc. Jnana is divided into anubhava and smriti. Anubhava is of the nature of presentation of its object while smriti is recollection of a previous experience. Anubhava of an object makes an impression in the mind of the subject and is stored there. When it is revived due to diverse factors it leads to memory of its object. So anubhava is presentational, of the form ‘I experience an object’, while memory is derivative on anubhava for its content. Hence it is through anubhava that new information is gained by the subject. Also it is anubhava which is true or false judged by the way it reveals the world. Anubhava is divided into: Perception, Inference, Verbal Testimony etc. depending on which modes of awareness we regard as pramanas. Pramana-s are instruments of valid cognition. Prama is valid cognition or knowledge.

The function of a pramana is to reveal the correct nature of the object whereby it can become the object of a successful action. Hence we can see the connection between Tattva / Reality and a pramana. Tattva is possessing a character and pramana is what for us establishes us the correct character of an object. Both existent and non-existence has a character and hence Being (Tattva) includes existence and non-existence while excluding Non-Being. When it comes to Non-Being Nyaya says we cannot assert nor deny anything about it because it lacks a character and hence Madhyamakas are seen as arguing for Non-Being of the world which according to Nyaya flatly contradicts the testimony of pramanas. Tattva is what is capable of being referred to and hence this mode of reference can be divided accordingly into different types of padarthas (or word objects) and further Nyaya argues that whatever is nameable is knowable and vica-versa, since Non-Being is not nameable it also not knowable. Hence they further bring the charge that Madhamakas negate something whose counter-positive does not exist and they talk about absence of svabhava which talk is meaningless because the name does not refer to any object. We see an element of idealism even in Nyaya in this sense that Tattva by its very definition is something that is knowable or can be referred to by consciousness and so what cannot be referred to by consciousness cannot be known or cannot become an object of consciousness at all – so by definition Tattva is knowable and defined in terms of possible reference to consciousness.

Now if all assertions are governed by pramanas then if Nagarjuna is asserting that everything is shunya then there must be a pramana for this but if there is a pramana then the claim of shunyata is invalidated. If there is no pramana then the assertion is groundless; not false but devoid of meaning – meaningful assertions can only be made about Tattva and nothing else. To this in his Vigrahavyavartini Nagarjuna replies that he would be at fault only if he is making an assertion (pratijna) but since he is not, he is not at fault. If shunyata was something that is apprehended through one of the pramanas then it would have been incumbent to show the pramanas through which one has apprehended shunyata but shunyata is not an object of cognition at all and hence the pramanas cannot reveal it. Nagarjuna says he neither affirms nor denies the shunyata of the world (recall non-being according to Nyaya can neither be affirmed nor denied).

Nyaya brings the charge of self-contradiction in this case – what is established through the pramanas cannot be invalidated or denied by Nagarjuna and hence he is bound by the pramanas to accept the reality of the world. Nagarjuna denies that this is binding. Notice in this case Nagarjuna can be seen as overcoming the assertions of others while not making any independent claims of his own and this is the way he is trying to establish the shunyata of the world – via negativa. Nyaya’s dictum is – negation is also an affirmation or position (there is no pot here means there is a pot elsewhere but if there is no pot at all in the world then it cannot be negated) and with this dictum Nagarjuna would have taken an issue – he establishes shunyata by negation but not affirming anything – which also implies he is not affirming the existence of an absolute either which in Advaita Vedanta is the remainder of what is negated. If he was negating Asat he would have reached Sat but he is negating both the Asat and Sat and hence there is no remainder. So we see here how meaningful discourse is possible for Nyaya only in realm of pramanas (since Tattva can only be referred through pramanas), in case of Advaita Vedanta Shankara says that the absolute’s pure existence, pure consciousness means nothing more than negation of what does not exist and what is not consciousness and hence existence and consciousness are not qualities predicated of the absolute. But for Nagarjuna if I deny non-existence then I also deny existence and this is how he gets his catushkoti.