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Overview of the Advaita-Dvaita Debate Literature

Madhusudana Sarawati’s Advaita Siddhi is a polemical work - a reply to Vyasatirtha’s Nyaya-amrita who belonged to Dvaita School of Vedanta. Both works show a high level of dialectical skill and take advantage of advancement in study of logic due to Navya-Nyaya School.

Madhusudana Saraswati also wrote Advaita-ratna-rakshanam a polemical work in reply to both Dvaitins and Nyaya philosopher specially Shankara Mishra’s Bhedaratna.

The Advaita - Dvaita debate does not end with Advaita Siddhi. Ramacharya wrote Nyaya-amrita-tarangini criticizing Advaita Siddhi. Nyaya-amrita-kantakoddhara of Anandbhattaraka was another counter-attack on Advaita Siddhi.

Madhusudnana’s disciple Balabhadra wrote a commentary on Advaita Siddhi called simply Vyakhya. Like Vijayandra-tirtha’s commentary Amoda on Nyaya-amrita it is not a reply to any other polemical work.

Brahmananda’s Guruchandrika was a reply to Tarangini and Kantakoddhara. Gauda Brahmananda was a very famous logician and in Advaita tradition it is famous that Advaita tradition begins with Gauda (Gaudapada) and ends with Gauda (Gauda Brahmananda). The abridged version of Guruchandrika is called Laghuchandrika. In the 19th Century Panchpagesha Shastri commented on this work - it is called Bhavapraksha which has another commentary on it called Tippana by V.Subramaniya Shastri. Brahmananda’s Nyayaratnavali is a commentary on Madhusudana’s Siddhanta Bindu.

From Dvaita’s side Vanamali Mishra wrote two polemical works in reply to Brahmananda - Nyaya-amrita-tarangini-saurabha and nyaya-amrita-saugandhya. From Advaita’s side Vitthalesha’s commentary on Guruchandrika is considered the final work after which the debate ended - in whose favor is debatable. But according to a modern dvaitin - R Nagaraja Sharma - in his book - Reign Of Realism In Indian Philosophy Vitthalesha’s work consists of no reply to Vanamali Mishra. However in 20th century a famous advaitin N.S. Anantakrishna Shastri did write a work to criticize Vanamali Mishra in his Saugandhya Vimarsha.


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