A Philosopher's Ruminations

  The consideration that led us to seek a first cause also lead to the consideration that the first cause is immaterial. Consider the properties of matter: Composition: matter is something composed of parts, and every part is external to the other parts. Matter is parts outside parts. The first cause must be simple or incomposite; otherwise, we would have to seek the cause of the unity of the first cause, in which case it would not be ‘first’. Potentiality-Actuality: This is a consideration from the Aristotelian framework. Matter is something indeterminate and is something determinate (capable of being referred to as a this-x) because of the presence of a Form. For Aristotle, the first cause must be something actual, or it would not be the first cause of motion. The idea is that if everything were merely in potency to another, then there would be no motion. If the First Cause were in potency in relation to another, it would require another cause to explain its motion. Space-Time: A...

  This would not be true even in a subjective idealism like that of Berkeley because even if there is no matter and the esse of the world is its percipi, it is not the percipi of common human beings but of God. So, if the question pertains only to human beings the answer is yes, the world can exist even if no one is watching. But perhaps the question goes deeper. It concerns the objectivity or the reality of the universe. It is believed that there can be no genuine objectivity if it is relative to the subject. Consider Kant’s thing-in-itself; we arrive at the latter by subtracting everything subjective. The purely objective is then something unthinkable because if I could think it, it would be subjective. But if it is unthinkable, it is also unknowable. Many scientists think that physics informs us about the Kantian thing-in-itself, but if Kant is right, the thing-in-itself is outside the reach of science because it cannot be reached at all. It is so objective that it is as good as...

The concept of ‘coming from’ of becoming requires not just something but also nothing because becoming is the coming forth of that which was not. In Parmenides’s Eleatic Monism, we find that Pure Being is the first principle, but this led him to deny the reality of becoming because this involves negation. If we hold fast to the principle that what is, cannot not be, and what is not, cannot come to be, then becoming is impossible. I concur with Hegel on this point - pure being is indistinguishable from nothing, it resides neither in pure being nor in non-being but in their combination - being and nothing. Anything that is or has being also has the opposite, which is nothing. For anything x that is, it is in so far as it is distinct from something else y, this is to say it is through negating something other than itself. There is no identity without difference and no difference without identity. This leads us towards the concept of unity, which is a unity of opposites that holds together...

Instrumentalists believe science is not in the business of explanation, and ontology is not its concern. Science is concerned only with making successful predictions based on observable data. If positing electrons, protons, etc., helps make these predictions, then we need not bother ourselves with the further question about their existence. If they do not exist, then they also need not explain anything. Quine, an empiricist, joined pragmatism with realism. Our most successful theory of the world is true in the sense that it gets the world’s ontology right. But he also adds that the only evidence we have for deciding between two competing theories is sensory evidence, and it is possible in theory that two incommensurable theories may fit all observable evidence without our being able to tell which is the correct one. He concludes that there is no fact of the matter that decides which theory is the correct one, and ultimately, the choice of preferring one over the other will be pragmatic...

  What is consciousness? Generally consciousness is taken to be illumination; either of something outside itself or of itself or both. But Bhartrahari points out that illumination of content does not allow us to discriminate that content. Mere illumination is blind, deaf and dumb. Real illumination involves discursivity; the ability to discriminate a content of consciousness from everything else and in every movement of consciousness we always note there is some discriminatory capacity. Even when we are walking and our mind is elsewhere we are not explicitly conscious of the ground we are walking on but even then there is some discrimination occurring because in a way I know what kind of ground I am walking on and I can note any significant change in it that may occur suddenly. So there is no state of consciousness without discursivity and hence illumination of consciousness is intertwined with Vak (speech). However Vak if understood as audible sound then the proposition is manifes...

  In the following passage, we find JK linking thought, identification and possessiveness, the sense of me-mine that is at the root of all conflict: “It is thought that is breeding violence — my house, my property, my wife, my husband, my country, my God, my belief, which is utter nonsense. Who is doing this, creating this everlasting ‘me’ opposed to the rest? Who is doing it? Education, society, the establishment, the church are all doing it, because I am part of all that.” “Thought must inevitably divide; look what has happened. Thought says ‘Nationalism is pretty rotten, it has led to all kinds of war and mischief, let us have brotherhood, let us be united’. So thought forms a league of nations or United Nations, but thought is still operating separatively and maintaining separation: you who are an Italian, you keep your Italian sovereignty and so on. Talk about brotherhood and yet keep separate, which is hypocrisy; that is a function of thought to play double games with itself....

  The ability to distinguish right from wrong is a sign of good moral sense; the ability to distinguish good reasons from bad reasons is a sign of rationality. Our conduct in everyday life depends on the ability to distinguish what is good from what is bad; whether that be morally or rationally. We allow our thinking and our actions to be regulated by a value system where it is necessary to distinguish the good from bad in order to achieve a certain goal which in case of a theoretical inquiry is Truth. The Philosopher tries to understand the normative force behind this rational order – what is a reason, what makes a certain reason good or bad, what is Truth and can we know what is true. This investigation requires that we understand the subject and the way he experiences the world and the place of the subject within this world. Down the ages the best minds of the world have been engaged in resolving this question but with no unanimity in sight. Philosophy differs from other discipl...