Anyathakhyativada

 Anyatha-khyati-vada basically says that error involves seeing something different from the way it actually is. Every cognition is structured in a certain way; we see something as something. Thus in the cognition: This is a red tomato; tomato is seen as possessing red color; so schematically the cognition is of the form a-R-b where (a) is the qualificand and (b) the qualifier and R the relation between the two which in this case is inherence. The qualifier resides in the qualificand and distinguishes it from everything else that does not possess that qualifier. Thus red color here is the distinguishing feature of tomato which is the qualificand and distinguishes it from anything else possessing a different color. In erroneous cognition the qualificand is seen as qualified by something that does not reside within it e.g. black color in case of a cognition of what really is a red tomato seen as black.

Now for Nyaya in a false cognition a and b are both real entities but they are wrongly seen as related to each other. And here a problem arises. From where does (b) the qualifier come from? In a shell-silver illusion there is sense-object-contact with shell but how is it that silver is bodily present to consciousness? This is explained by positing an extra-ordinary contact called jnana-lakshana-sannikarsha where silver existing somewhere else comes into contact with sense-organs propelled by memory of silver aroused by similarity of silver to the shell. This however is not in accordance with the knowledge we possess in modern physiology and optics.

Also in case of sensible qualities like color and sensations like pain Nyaya accepts an act-object analysis. In case of a sensation of pain for instance pain is the object of cognition which is different from cognition or awareness of pain. The latter is the act or event through which pain is cognized. In case of colors this comes in conflict with the distinction between primary and secondary qualities drawn in current times. Again Nyaya would need to defend that colors are resident in objects they are seen to qualify in accordance with quantum physics and optics.

As for the logical analysis of illusion Anyatha-khyati-vada is not without problems. For Nyaya phenomenology of a cognition is determined by an object actually present to consciousness and such presence is possible only if the object exists. Thus it is compelled to posit an extra-ordinary sense contact. The difficulties of Nyaya can be understood by contrasting it with Abhinav-khyati-vada of Dvaita Vedanta. For Dvaita something non-existent can be present to consciousness. This theory is similar to Niralambana-vada or Asatkhyati of Madhyamika School of Buddhism. Dvaita distinguishes this theory from Madhyamikas on the basis that for the latter every experience is devoid of a real object while for Dvaita only a false cognition is without a real object (niralambana). The basic idea seems similar to some Medieval Western Philosophers and more recently to one worked out by Brentano and Meinong. According to this within every cognition is an intentional concept which directs that cognition towards a real object but there need not be a real object for cognition to be directed towards an object. It may purport to be about something but fail to do so. Similar line of reasoning is also behind Frege’s sense-reference distinction. The issues are vexed here for they concern the relation between consciousness and its object in general and perceptual consciousness in particular. These are the most often discussed and difficult questions of philosophy. The dilemma here is real we need to make sense of what this intentional object is; is it something real or unreal? How does it direct consciousness to something beyond itself? Is it possible that something non-existent be present to consciousness and if yes why not generalize this step to include within its scope even what we regard as veridical cognition? On the other hand if something non-existent cannot be present to consciousness how can we account for error?

So while anyatha-khyati-vada is not an adequate explanation of error it can still be defended if somehow it can be brought in consonance with modern physiology and optics and quantum physics.