Proof of Idealism - Berkeley and Vasubandhu-Dignaga

 

The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the arguments given by Vasubandhu in Vimsatika and Dignaga in his Alambana-Pariksha on the one hand and George Berkeley in favour of idealism on the other.

 

BERKELEY’S ESSE IS PERCIPI ARGUMENT

 

Berkeley's argument for esse is percipi idealism is

 

(1) ideas can exist only in being perceived

 

(2) sensible objects (stones, trees, mountains,etc.) are ideas

 

(3) therefore, sensible objects can exist only in being perceive

 

 

The rationale for premise (1) can be explained through contrasting it with the views of Locke’s theory of Ideas which is opposed by Berkeley:

 

“I must here in the Entrance beg pardon of my Reader, for the frequent use of the Word Idea, which he will find in the following Treatise. It being that Term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks . . . or whatsoever it is, which the Mind can be employ’d about in thinking. (ECHU I/i/§8)”

 

“Whatsoever the Mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call Idea. (II/viii/§8)”

 

So Idea is being defined in terms of whatever is present to consciousness when we are perceiving, thinking, imagining something. This does not make the definition circular because Idea is being used as an all-inclusive term for anything that we are thinking at that particular moment. So the object of thought does not have any existence independently of thought; there is no appearance – reality distinction pertaining to the Idea – it’s being consists in being thought. There is nothing wrong with defining Ideas in terms of presence to consciousness because this is an irreducible notion.

 

But for Locke the sensed object can be abstracted from sensation and can be posited to be an external cause of sensation through inference whose cognitive ground is the sensation itself (only in cases of primary qualities). This abstractionist move is blocked by Berkeley through his ontological principle:

 

“Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell: for myself I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself, must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. . . . To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which though they are united in some object, yet, it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated. (PHK intr. §10)”

 

The principle states that the distinction between X and Y is an ontological distinction only if X can be perceived to exist independently of Y and vica-versa; otherwise the difference between the two is a mere semantic distinction. Applying this to the above case the sensed object does not exist independently of the sensation. We can abstract it from the sensation as much as we like but what we cannot do is ascribe this abstraction any ontological distinction. Since the sensed object has no independent existence from the sensation (for e.g. pain is nothing apart from painful sensations) Berkeley’s first premise in justified. The Idea and the Ideatum are defined in terms of presence to consciousness and as incapable of existing independently of one another. In his Commonplace Books he touches on the importance of this innovation:

 

“Twas the opinion that Ideas could exist unperceiv’d or before perception that made Men think perception was somewhat different from the Idea perceiv’d, that it was an Idea of Reflexion whereas the thing perceiv’d was an idea of Sensation. I say twas this made ’em think the understanding took it in receiv’d it from without which could never be did not they think it existed without. (C 656)”

 

And,

 

“I Defy any man to Imagine or conceive perception without an Idea or an Idea without perception . . . Consciousness, perception, existence of Ideas, seem to be all one” (C 572 and 578)

 

Thus the distinction between consciousness of the sensation and the existence of the sensation is simply a semantic distinction with no ontological consequences. This repudiation of the act-object model of consciousness forms the first step in Berkeley’s proof of idealism.

 

Coming to premise (2) Berkeley gives the following justification for it in his Dialogues between Hylas and Philonaus:

 

“Ask the gardener, why he thinks yonder cherry tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask him why he thinks an orange tree not to be there, and he shall tell you, because he does not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he terms a real being, and saith it is, or exists; but that which is not perceivable, the same, he saith, has no being. (3D234)”

 

And in PHK 4:

 

“If we thoroughly examine this tenet, it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures, in a word the things we see and feel, what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas or impressions on the sense; and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may indeed divide in my thoughts or conceive apart from each other those things which, perhaps, I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far I will not deny I can abstract, if that may properly be called abstraction, which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects, as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it.”

 

Berkeley consistently insists that he is not changing anything but is with the common man in his proof for idealism because he is merely making plain the meaning of the word ‘existence’. Philosophers preceding Berkeley had made a division in the sense of existence in order to make it more precise. The criteria for existence was causal efficacy and the only properties or qualities that survived this criteria were primary qualities like shape, size, mass, power etc. We cannot think of an object devoid of these qualities but an object can exist without colour and hence this quality is not on a par with others more essential to an object. Also primary qualities are essential ingredients in the endeavour to explain the causal efficacy of an object. Hence the sense in which the former exists is different from the sense in which the latter exists. Also the former qualities are stable and constant whereas colour is an inconstant quality; an object seems to be of a different colour in broad daylight compared to when it is in shade or when some reflection is falling on it and in complete darkness the colour is not perceived at all. Hence there is a double sense of existence – one that can be applied to primary qualities which is the sense in which something external to the mind is said to exist and secondary qualities which have a mind-dependent existence and are hence observer relative. Berkeley repudiates this picture to form a single sense of existence which is more in keeping with the practices of the vulgar.

 

The meaning of existence is to be determined in terms of what meaning it has for us. The meaning it has for us is revealed through actual sensation which is understood not only in terms of presence to consciousness but as being inseparable from its consciousness. While in the rationalist tradition meaning or definition of something depended on whether we can conceive it without contradiction – which principle itself is derived from the Principle of Non-Contradiction and is made manifest through principle like Nothingness has no properties therefore if there is something then it possesses some property or other. But Berkeley’s empiricism begins not with rational principles but with asking what Ideas we have and all Ideas are intimately tied to sensations. So if we have to clarify the meaning of existence then we will have to look at the sensation or impression through which we acquire the notion of existence. This project of tracing the origin of ideas back to their source in sense-impressions are begun by Locke but it was made concrete through Berkeley and completed later by Hume. Why Berkeley’s case for tracing the source of the concept of existence to the actual sensation is stronger than Locke’s can be understood from the fact that Locke’s critique of innatism is vulnerable to Rationalist counter-arguments that even if sensation is required to acquire the notion of existence that does not imply that the meaning or definition of existence itself depends on this source. This practically was the retort Locke got from Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning Human Understanding.

 

But Berkeley is not similarly vulnerable. The reason is that firstly Berkeley has tightened up his case through his use of the separability principle which allows him to define the existence of the sensed object to sensation itself. Thus sensation is not a representation of something external but is a reality in itself. It is both the sensation and what is sensed. The inference to external sensed object is blocked on this way to understand sensation. Secondly it is important to understand that if Berkeley can show that the psychological means through which a concept is acquired contributes to the content of that concept then rationalism is undermined. Thus sensation does not simply reveal the meaning of existence but determines or constitutes that meaning. Hence the meaning of trees, grass etc. that the gardener learnt has as its necessary component the sensation of trees, grass etc. and thereby what he means that trees etc. can exist unperceived is that currently he has not sensation of trees and grass. As a consequence just as pleasure and pain cannot be predicated of external objects regarded as the cause of pleasure and paid similarly the application conditions of a concept is similarly limited to the consciousness which is the defining feature of that concept and thereby the concept of existence is restricted to the purview of actual sensations and cannot be applied to external non-sensory objects for that would be as Berkeley says in PHK 4 ‘a manifest contradiction’. This interpretation is further supported by a passage that has troubled commentators but which otherwise is amenable to be understood through this interpretation:

 

“But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it: but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not show that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself. (PHK I §23)”.

 

We can see the process through which we have reached this point. First Locke defines idea as whatever is the object of thought or consciousness. Them he considers the status of the existent object or the sensed object in the sensation or the Idea. Since Locke does not ascribe to separability principle he takes the existence of the object of consciousness to be inseparable from consciousness (appearance = reality principle) on grounds of his the nature of mind being a substance which cannot apprehend anything apart from its modes. But he allows through a process of abstraction the extraction of the sensed object (in case of primary qualities only) from the sensation and through inference posit its existence as an external reality. Then Berkeley comes into picture and through his separability principle he blocks this abstractive move confirming the definitional identity of the sensed object and the sensation thereby espousing a psychologism which though implicit in Locke was not endorsed by him or even intended by him. This radically changes the nature of the debate between rationalism and empiricism; something that Hume realized, as he says in his Treatise 1/1/1:

 

“’tis remarkable, that the present question concerning the precedency of our impressions or ideas, is the same with what has made so much noise in other times, when it has been disputed whether there be any innate ideas, or whether all ideas be derived from sensation and reflexion. We may observe, that in order to prove the ideas of extension and colour not to be innate, philosophers do nothing but show, that they are conveyed by our senses. To prove the ideas of passion and desire not to be innate, they observe that we have a preceding experience of these emotions in ourselves. Now if we carefully examine these arguments, we shall find that they prove nothing but that ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions, from which they are derived, and which they represent.”

 

 

More importantly for the proof of idealism the psychologistic explication of existence justifies the move of taking sensed objects (like trees, birds, tables etc.) as nothing apart from their sensations. Berkeley does not deny that through abstraction we can treat sensed objects and sensations as different but he points out that this is merely a semantic difference without being an ontological difference.

 

 

VASUBANDHU’S PROOF FOR IDEALISM

 

Vasubandhu in the beginning of his Vimsatika presents his proof:

 

“All this is indeed only consciousness,

because of the appearance (in it)

of non existing objects,

as the vision by the taimirika

of an inexisting net of hairs, etc.”

 

The Hetu or the middle term here is ‘appearance of non-existing objects’ and the example is people infected with the disease taimira in which due to the defect of the eye black shadows appear as hair. The paksha or the minor term is consciousness. The meaning of the qualifiacation ‘non-existing’ in the hetu is meant to exclude real objects or mind-independent objects because the existence of objects within consciousness cannot be regarded as non-existent. The use of the term inexistence or intentional inexistence to designate the status of the object appearing to consciousness is misleading because intentionality implies signification to an external object but from the context we can gather that Vasubandhu is talking about what appears to consciousness or what itself is an object of consciousness and hence this object is not intentionally directed to another outside consciousness. The claim of the object to exist independently of consciousness is due to the influence of vasanas which as in the dream state mislead us into thinking that dream objects exist independently of mind. This is in contrast to Berkeley’s view who sees the error to lie in abstraction of the two.

 

Through the method of kevala-vyatireki Vasubandhu has to show that in every consciousness state there is an appearance of a non-existent object and in every case where consciousness is absent the said appearance is also absent. The vyatireki however does not require a separate proof because it is generally accepted in the Indian tradition. The positive concomitance is proved by consciousness itself since in no case is the object of consciousness seen to be independent of consciousness. But Vasubandhu does not make use of this proof because if dictates of consciousness are to be followed then consciousness is always seen to be consciousness of something that itself is not consciousness and it is this that he has to remedy. He has no reason to intimately tie the together in a way that by very definition an object of consciousness is inseparable from consciousness. Hence he resorts to indirect proof or eliminative reasoning by arguing against the very possibility of a mind-independent real object:

 

(An external âyatana) cannot be

the object of a cognition

either as one

or as multiple in (isolated) atoms;

neither can these (atoms),

(when they are) conglomerated,

(be object of cognition),

because (in this case) the atom

cannot be proved to exist.

(Vimsatika 11)

 

Interestingly Vasubandhu does not argue that consciousness cannot apprehend anything outside itself and hence the object of consciousness has to enter within the confines of consciousness in order to be apprehended. The reason seems to be that this does not preclude the possibility of an external object causing a conscious state with a particular form as an effect like in the case of Locke or nearer home the Sautrantikas. Hence he tries to show that the very conception of an external object is imperfect and hence this defect in the said real object is what precludes its possibility of being an object of consciousness because of which he tries to prove that ‘the atom cannot be proved to exist’.

 

Dignaga’s proof in Alambanapariksha is on the same grounds but only more sophisticated in its details of argumentation. He realizes that there is no need to show the impossibility of an external object being formed out of atoms but only that even if that were correct still such an object cannot be considered to be the Alambana or support of consciousness:

 

“Even if the atoms are

the cause of the cognition through the senses,

since (the cognition) does not appear

under the form of those (atoms),

the atoms are not the object of that (cognition),

in the same way as the sense-organs (are not).”

 

In order to be considered an object of consciousness two conditions have to be met: a) it has to be the cause of cognition b) the form of the cognition has to be the same as the form of the object that causes the cognition:

 

“Those who postulate that the support of the cognition through the eye, etc. is an external thing, consider that either the atoms are (the cognition's support), because they are its cause, or that a conglomerate of those (atoms) is (the cognition's support), because there arises a cognition which appears under the form of that (conglomerate).”

 

In case of external objects either the atoms are the cause of the cognition but do not appear in that form or what appears having a form in a cognition cannot be regarded as the cause since the causes are the atoms. Hence no external object meets these two conditions simultaneously. So the conclusion that the object of consciousness is a form or property of consciousness itself is inseparable.

 

 

“The knowable internal form,

which appears as external,

is the object (of the cognition)

because it (=the knowable internal form)

is the form of the cognition

and because it is also its determining condition” (6 a-d)

 

Note that the cause is in this case the ‘internal form’ and not vasanas for otherwise the latter theory would also fail to fulfil the tests for being the object of consciousness just like the external object. Even though the vasanas are a cause of the internal form it is the latter that is regarded as the cause of cognition. This however raises important concerns because the effect has to come after a cause and hence an external object is regarded as a cause because it pre-exists the effect i.e. cognition. But in Dignaga’s case the cognition and the internal form appear simultaneously. So how can the one be regarded as the cause of the other. Dignaga’s reply in effect is to repudiate the temporality of causation in favour of necessary dependence which is fulfilled in this case because without the one the other is not found. Hence simultaneity in causation is not a problem. Hume would be aghast.

 

But the superiority of Dignaga’s view can be seen quite clearly. Simply poking holes in your opponent’s point of view does not validate your alternative and Vasubandhu gave no reason to believe that the object of consciousness must be a form of consciousness. Dignaga however did exactly that – first he formulated a criteria for regarding something as an object of consciousness and then showed that only the internal form can fulfil that criteria. Secondly he showed that there is a necessary relation between the internal form and the cognition since one is never found without other pointing to a necessary relation between the two which relation is the relation of causality their simultaneity notwithstanding.

 

CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE TWO ARGUMENTS

 

Even though both sides believe that consciousness cannot grasp anything not within its own boundaries still the manner of proof is very difference. In Berkeley what is important is to establish first the connection between the object of consciousness as such and the consciousness itself. He proceeds by showing the essential identity of the two in the case of sensations like pleasure and pain and then showing that the case of sensed objects like middle-sized objects we encounter in everyday life are on a par with sensation in this respect. He achieves this through his separability principle and psychologism. On the other hand Vasubandhu seeks to show that the very concept of an external object is replete with contradictions while Dignaga attempts to show that no external object even if it exists can be the object of consciousness. But while Vasubandhu does not explicitly tell us about the relation of consciousness and object of consciousness; Dignaga takes it to be causality even though an instance of simultaneous causality. The relation is still a necessary one and it is reasonable to believe that the view is implicitly present even in Vasubandhu because of his theory of vasanas. That the actualization of a vasana would demand an appeal to the law of karma is a different issue but most philosophical traditions in India believe the physical and the mental to be subordinate to the moral dimension of the world – even in case of an atheistic religion like Buddhism.

 

We can assess the strength of the two arguments by comparing their response to Trendelenburg’s Neglected alternative objection. This object was originally raised by Trendelenburg against Kant. He argued that even if we grant that space and time are a-priori intuitions of sensibility and appearances owe their spatial and temporal form to this constitution of the human mind even then is it still not possible that things in themselves are still spatially and temporally ordered? Why do they have to lack that order and why cannot spatial and temporal notions be not applied to things in themselves?

 

Kant and Berkeley both can escape this objection through their psychologism. Considering Berkeley in particular he regarded space and time to be abstract ideas and hence nothing more than representations and hence cannot be ascribed to external objects that themselves are not representations. But he never denied that there cannot be a ‘third nature’ (Dialogue Between Hylas and Philonaus 3D239) which can exist independently of the human mind provided we keep in mind the separability principle and the restriction on the application of mental concepts to non-mental reality. As he clarifies:

 

“I do not deny the existence of material substance, merely because I have no notion of it, but because the notion of it is inconsistent, or in other words because it is repugnant that there should be a notion of it. Many things, for ought I know, may exist, whereof neither I nor any other man hath or can have any idea or notion whatsoever. But then those things must be possible, that is, nothing inconsistent must be included in their definition”

 

The ‘third nature’ even if it can exist would mean nothing to me because the source or origin of meaning lies in sensation and the existence in sensation as we have seen is inseparable from the sensation itself because the two are identical.

 

Coming to Vasubandhu I cannot see what response he can give to Trendelenburg except by criticizing his notion of an external object. But then we have no reason why an external object cannot be different from the manner of conception usually found in the schools of thought prevalent in Vasubandhu’s time and why a form cannot both be a property of a consciousness and also a distinct external existence. Dignaga too does not fair better in this case because as is well known he has no way to ground modal notions like necessity in the framework of his empiricist logic. As a Humean would naturally retort if the object of consciousness and consciousness itself are different then there is no reason to deny why one cannot be found without the other even if they appear simultaneously. On the other hand if he regards them as identical then no causal relation between the two is possible just as a mountain cannot be regarded as the cause of a valley – distinct existence is need for a causal relation to exist. But then Dignaga has pointed out no reason to regard the two as identical especially since simultaneity does not entail identity. This then shows the greater superiority of Berkeley’s proof since he can argue for identity given his separability principle he has reason to tighten the connection between the existence in consciousness and the consciousness of that existence by showing that the two can be separated in thought but not in reality. Locke believes that the sensed object has a resemblance to an external object it is possible that it is identical with sensation and yet there be a resembling external object outside the sensation. He also argues for the identity of the sensed object and sensation on external grounds. But Berkeley made it possible to assert the identity of the two on internal grounds. In his case the inseparability and consequent identity of the two is established by consciousness itself because we never perceive an object of consciousness independently of consciousness and this test of kevala and vyatirekin i.e. agreement in presence and in absence warrants the relation between the two to be regarded as an identity since through his separability principle he shows that the two are separable only in thought but not in reality. The identity of the two is established thereby by the testimony of consciousness; their semantic distinction notwithstanding since it can be shown to be bereft of ontological significance thanks to the separability principle.

 

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