Skip to main content

Anarchism

 I think what motivates anarchism as an ideology is a wrong concept of freedom which is seen as freedom from authority or complete self-determination but this concept is impossible. Perhaps the preachers of anarchism feel that the root of all evil is submission to authority and hence if we are free from authority we are then free from evil. But an anarchic state would be the same as Hobbesian state of nature where everyone would have a right over everything. So in such a state my freedom would exclude yours, so we would have an either-or situation. Or to put it in other words my freedom would cancel yours, so if I am free you cannot be. Clearly in such a situation there can be no rights and no freedom; you don’t get either without certain limits and a right to everything dilutes those rights and freedom that is exclusive ceases to be freedom at all. Hence the correct idea of freedom demands not exclusion but inclusion for it is inextricable bound by the idea of good. This is easy to see, consider for instance that you end up buying products you do not need based on advertisements. In this case you think you have made a free choice but you haven’t because if you can be manipulated to act in a certain way over and over again, then you cannot be free. Freedom implies to act for one’s own good which in this case you haven’t because you were swayed from it prompted by an external stimulus.

Concerning the need for a state one can see that individual aspirations would clash and cancel each other out unless there is a general principle we all agree upon and can reconcile ourselves with and which principle is the source of legitimacy of our decisions and actions. To actually bring this principle into force i.e. to actually reconcile individual aspirations with general consensus in a way where none of our genuine interests, individually and collectively are hampered, we need a third party in order both to persuade and enforce. If this third party is however an individual then its mediation would be based on its own will or its whims and fancies. But if it is based on certain moral values we all can agree upon (I will return to this point again), then we get a state or government whose authority consists in putting these values into action since they are not self-implementing.

It can be objected that there are no moral values we can agree upon. That is not however correct. Disagreements are of two kinds, one is about what is right and what is wrong, both parties think they are in the right, so in this case the principle is the same but the implementation is questioned. Another conflict is about right and wrong or the principle themselves. Take for example the game of chess, when two players are playing according to rules, through the rules of the game one winner is selected and another is declared a loser. But for this to happen both players have to play the game according to its rules. I may cheat but what I cannot do is make the rules according to my own whims and fancies for otherwise there is no game to be played. Disagreements in current times are not about right or wrong, but about who gets to decide right or wrong - might is right. It is power shedding the need for justification for it wants to become its own justification. And that is what should be called an anarchic state - power without justice.

 

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Ramanuja and Nimbarka

  The primary question for any Vedanta philosophy is what is the relation between Brahman and the world and Brahman and the individual souls. Nimbarka takes this relation to be one of identity and difference. He gives the analogy of a coiled snake and of sun and its rays. Brahman is both immanent and transcendent; the souls and matter are really just the different manifest states of the one Brahman. The concern with such a philosophy is to show that the immanence of Brahman does not compromise its unity and the impurities that accrue to the soul and matter do not thereby affect Brahman. Ramanuja believes that this is not possible in the Bheda-Abheda system (his criticisms of Bhaskara would with certain modifications apply also to Nimbarka). The reason is identity and difference cannot be affirmed simultaneously of the same object. Identity is an absolute relation or in the logical terminology of Nyaya it is a locus pervading relation. In terms of Modern Logic identity is a reflexiv...

SCHOOLS OF INDIAN THOUGHT - PART 2 - NYAYA EPISTEMOLOGY

  I. JNANA Jnana is usually translated as cognition. Cognition is the only thing that has intentionality or the property of being directed at the world. It reveals objects in the world towards which goal directed action can be initiated. It is of the nature of illumination like a lamp and generates awareness in the subject of is objects. It is always used in an episodic sense and never in a dispositional sense. The later job is done by samskaras. Jnana is used to connote mental states like perception, memory, introspection, assumption, doubt, belief etc. Jnana is divided into anubhava and smriti. Anubhava is of the nature of presentation of its object while smriti is recollection of a previous experience. Anubhava of an object makes an impression in the mind of the subject and is stored there. When it is revived due to diverse factors it leads to memory of its object. So anubhava is presentational, of the form ‘I experience an object’, while memory is derivative on anubhava for i...

Anyathakhyativada

  Anyatha-khyati-vada basically says that error involves seeing something different from the way it actually is. Every cognition is structured in a certain way; we see something as something. Thus in the cognition: This is a red tomato; tomato is seen as possessing red color; so schematically the cognition is of the form a-R-b where (a) is the qualificand and (b) the qualifier and R the relation between the two which in this case is inherence. The qualifier resides in the qualificand and distinguishes it from everything else that does not possess that qualifier. Thus red color here is the distinguishing feature of tomato which is the qualificand and distinguishes it from anything else possessing a different color. In erroneous cognition the qualificand is seen as qualified by something that does not reside within it e.g. black color in case of a cognition of what really is a red tomato seen as black. Now for Nyaya in a false cognition a and b are both real entities but they are wro...