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The Difference Between Advaita Vedanta And Madhyamika Buddhism

 For Advaita Vedanta but not for Madhyamika, everything except Brahman is unreal. Why is it unreal? Because they lack a self or an essence. What lacks an essence has no genuine identity, because what is dependent on another cannot also be identical with itself. A chariot, for instance, is nothing over and above its parts arranged in a certain way. It has no essence, no existence that is not dependent on the parts. It has no existence outside of human conventions that treat these myriad parts as a single entity. These conventions have no foundation in reality, and everything is a conglomeration of parts to which we ascribe an essence. For Advaita Vedanta, everything different from the self or anything that is or can be an object of the self is unreal. The Self is something that necessarily exists and is unnegatable, while the existence of the world is transitory and is negated in Brahman-realization, like dreams are sublated upon waking up. Why does the world appear to us if it is unreal? The world does not have the absolute existence that is mistakenly attributed to it, but merely a conventional existence. The ultimate principle, the void, is not opposed to the existence of the world because what is opposed to another is limited by another. For Advaita Vedanta, the object of appearance is not completely non-existent, or else it would not appear as the object of consciousness. It is neither sat nor asat but a category in between - that can appear to consciousness as real and still be negatable.

The difference between Advaita Vedanta and Madhyamika comes down to this - Brahman is the only thing that does not lack a svabhava, it is an intrinsic existent, not dependent on any causes and conditions, pure consciousness and pure existence, it is the true referent of the word ‘I’ and so the substratum of the world-illusion. The Madhyamika’s ultimate principle is that there is no such principle. The Absolute is prapancha-shunya, where all modes of thinking in terms of existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence, neither existence and non-existence fail to be applicable. But they also warn us not to reify this absolute. The Absolute truth is identical with the conventional truth. It is not the case that the absolute is one thing and the world another and then the characteristics of one are attributed to another, as is the case in AV. The absolute truth is nothing over and above the lack of an essence of things, their being conditioned by causes and conditions, their dependent existence. There is no real substratum that grounds the existence of all dependent beings. In their lack of an essence, all entities are on a par. The essence of anything that exists is its lack of essence, and something whose essence and existence is identical cannot be found.

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