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If reality is only what our brain perceives, how can we prove anything is truly real?

 Reality cannot be only what our brain perceives because the finitude of all our claims demonstrates the opposite.

Is ‘true for me’ true? If it were, it would not conflict with another truth claim. If it is said there is no conflict because ‘true for me’ is true, then there is conflict. If I say ‘this is sweet’ is true for me, and ‘this is sour’ is true for another, and there is no conflict between the two claims, it should be asked whether true for me means the same as true or not. If it doesn’t, then that implies true-for-me and truth are not identical; if it does, then there are two contradictory truth claims, and that means ‘true-for-me’ and truth are not identical. What is real is also objective - applicable across subjective perspectives.

If I run into a thief who believes it is right to murder me for money, and if I think I should not die, but if I also believe that he is right from his perspective to think so, then I am going to die. Can I, however, think that I am right to defend myself, and he is right to try to kill me, and so I am entitled to defend myself? Can both perspectives be equally true? The fact that I defend myself shows that I limit or oppose the actions of the thief, which I cannot do if I think he is right to do what he is doing. Even if I say both perspectives are valid, my actions would betray me because I have resisted his perspective against mine.

To live in a shared world is to live in a shared reality, and this reality allows me to exist and flourish as a finite human being while also limiting me vis-à-vis others so that I do not and cannot trespass my finitude.

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