A Philosopher's Ruminations

Relativism is the idea that there can be two incommensurable realities, each equally valid. So we have two simultaneous assertions: something is real, and it is real relative to me, and these assertions contradict each other. The underlying thought is this: to be finite is to be limited by another, and the other is the infinite. To be finite, then, is to be the negation of the infinite. Finitude, then, is to be understood only in reference to the infinite. If you sever this connection, then the finite in itself becomes the infinite. It comes to be considered as both finite and infinite at the same time. This is relativism. A finite perspective on reality is treated as both reality as such and as finite. If it were not finite, then an equally valid alternative reality would not be possible. But we have a reality which is valid-for-another. This shows the finitude of my own perspective because I am urging my perspective to be treated as absolute while at the same time I am limited by wha...

If nothing exists, then there is being, and if nothing does not exist, then by the law of double negation, something exists. This is the Parmenidean problem: what-is-not cannot be thought or spoken of because we can only think and speak of what is. So there is no absolute nothingness because the category contradicts itself. Parmenides used this insight to argue against the reality of motion. Advaita Vedanta believes that pure being has no opposite; it knows no non-being. But the world is negatable; hence, it cannot be pure being. It still appears as an object of consciousness, and so it is different from non-being. Being and Non-Being then are contraries whose negation can be found in one substratum. Dvaita Vedanta firmly advocated against this that Being and Non-Being are contradictories — the negation of Being is Non-Being, and the negation of Non-Being is Being. In this case, then the negation of Being is Absolute Non-Being, and they believe we can talk about what-is-not without mak...

The reason Kant made a distinction between two sources of knowledge — understanding and intuition was because we are finite beings who do not have an intellectual intuition. So, simply from our concepts we cannot draw any conclusions about existence (as we do in the Ontological Argument) without the aid of sensible intuition. The issue here is that this seems to saddle us with a new kind of dualism — of concepts and reality. Kant admits that these two apparently distinct sources of knowledge could have an identical root, but this root remains incomprehensible for us. So we have to accept this duality from our finite perspective. The Jewish philosopher Solomon Maimon argued that this duality is fatal to the prospects of Kant answering Hume. In principle, Hume would have no problem in conceding that there are a priori concepts of understanding that determine the possibility of experience by organising the sensible matter of cognition. The issue is that this matter itself does not have a ...

Is it possible, simply through the study of psychology and without knowledge of mathematics, to tell that 2+2=5 is wrong? Simply through the survey of the internal contents of the mind, can you make any judgement about what is true or false? You cannot tell whether affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent are fallacious forms of reasoning or not. For that, psychology has to turn to other sciences, and so it must necessarily presuppose others. Or take Transcendental Phenomenology, which is the study of phenomena - the subject matter of this science. To arrive at this phenomena we have to abstract from real existence and concentrate on how things appear to consciousness. This epoche, as Husserl calls it, drives a wedge between meaning and reality, but this separation is presupposed within the science and not justified within it. The phenomenological reduction is, as a consequence selective; it knows what it negates and what it preserves. There is already a duality of meaning a...

  Reality cannot be only what our brain perceives because the finitude of all our claims demonstrates the opposite. Is ‘true for me’ true? If it were, it would not conflict with another truth claim. If it is said there is no conflict because ‘true for me’ is true, then there is conflict. If I say ‘this is sweet’ is true for me, and ‘this is sour’ is true for another, and there is no conflict between the two claims, it should be asked whether true for me means the same as true or not. If it doesn’t, then that implies true-for-me and truth are not identical; if it does, then there are two contradictory truth claims, and that means ‘true-for-me’ and truth are not identical. What is real is also objective - applicable across subjective perspectives. If I run into a thief who believes it is right to murder me for money, and if I think I should not die, but if I also believe that he is right from his perspective to think so, then I am going to die. Can I, however, think that I am right t...

  I disagree. Theism or any form of belief in God is based on the idea that the world and finite human beings lack genuine existence, and their existence in a relevant sense about which they may differ is derived from a higher source, which is the ground of all existence. This ground of all existence is God, and its existence is self-explanatory. Atheism denies this because the search for grounds leads us to an infinite regress, because there is nothing whose existence is self-explanatory, so everything that is, is conditioned by something else, and that by something else and so forth. This comes down to - anything that is finite is through another finite entity and does not require the other of finitude, the infinite to explain the finite. Whichever position is correct, there is no reason to think that one is logical and the other is purely emotional. Even Kant, who criticized proofs of God, conceded that Reason, due to its intrinsic nature, cannot relinquish the search for the ul...

  The consideration that led us to seek a first cause also lead to the consideration that the first cause is immaterial. Consider the properties of matter: Composition: matter is something composed of parts, and every part is external to the other parts. Matter is parts outside parts. The first cause must be simple or incomposite; otherwise, we would have to seek the cause of the unity of the first cause, in which case it would not be ‘first’. Potentiality-Actuality: This is a consideration from the Aristotelian framework. Matter is something indeterminate and is something determinate (capable of being referred to as a this-x) because of the presence of a Form. For Aristotle, the first cause must be something actual, or it would not be the first cause of motion. The idea is that if everything were merely in potency to another, then there would be no motion. If the First Cause were in potency in relation to another, it would require another cause to explain its motion. Space-Time: A...

  This would not be true even in a subjective idealism like that of Berkeley because even if there is no matter and the esse of the world is its percipi, it is not the percipi of common human beings but of God. So, if the question pertains only to human beings the answer is yes, the world can exist even if no one is watching. But perhaps the question goes deeper. It concerns the objectivity or the reality of the universe. It is believed that there can be no genuine objectivity if it is relative to the subject. Consider Kant’s thing-in-itself; we arrive at the latter by subtracting everything subjective. The purely objective is then something unthinkable because if I could think it, it would be subjective. But if it is unthinkable, it is also unknowable. Many scientists think that physics informs us about the Kantian thing-in-itself, but if Kant is right, the thing-in-itself is outside the reach of science because it cannot be reached at all. It is so objective that it is as good as...

The concept of ‘coming from’ of becoming requires not just something but also nothing because becoming is the coming forth of that which was not. In Parmenides’s Eleatic Monism, we find that Pure Being is the first principle, but this led him to deny the reality of becoming because this involves negation. If we hold fast to the principle that what is, cannot not be, and what is not, cannot come to be, then becoming is impossible. I concur with Hegel on this point - pure being is indistinguishable from nothing, it resides neither in pure being nor in non-being but in their combination - being and nothing. Anything that is or has being also has the opposite, which is nothing. For anything x that is, it is in so far as it is distinct from something else y, this is to say it is through negating something other than itself. There is no identity without difference and no difference without identity. This leads us towards the concept of unity, which is a unity of opposites that holds together...

Instrumentalists believe science is not in the business of explanation, and ontology is not its concern. Science is concerned only with making successful predictions based on observable data. If positing electrons, protons, etc., helps make these predictions, then we need not bother ourselves with the further question about their existence. If they do not exist, then they also need not explain anything. Quine, an empiricist, joined pragmatism with realism. Our most successful theory of the world is true in the sense that it gets the world’s ontology right. But he also adds that the only evidence we have for deciding between two competing theories is sensory evidence, and it is possible in theory that two incommensurable theories may fit all observable evidence without our being able to tell which is the correct one. He concludes that there is no fact of the matter that decides which theory is the correct one, and ultimately, the choice of preferring one over the other will be pragmatic...

  What is consciousness? Generally consciousness is taken to be illumination; either of something outside itself or of itself or both. But Bhartrahari points out that illumination of content does not allow us to discriminate that content. Mere illumination is blind, deaf and dumb. Real illumination involves discursivity; the ability to discriminate a content of consciousness from everything else and in every movement of consciousness we always note there is some discriminatory capacity. Even when we are walking and our mind is elsewhere we are not explicitly conscious of the ground we are walking on but even then there is some discrimination occurring because in a way I know what kind of ground I am walking on and I can note any significant change in it that may occur suddenly. So there is no state of consciousness without discursivity and hence illumination of consciousness is intertwined with Vak (speech). However Vak if understood as audible sound then the proposition is manifes...

  In the following passage, we find JK linking thought, identification and possessiveness, the sense of me-mine that is at the root of all conflict: “It is thought that is breeding violence — my house, my property, my wife, my husband, my country, my God, my belief, which is utter nonsense. Who is doing this, creating this everlasting ‘me’ opposed to the rest? Who is doing it? Education, society, the establishment, the church are all doing it, because I am part of all that.” “Thought must inevitably divide; look what has happened. Thought says ‘Nationalism is pretty rotten, it has led to all kinds of war and mischief, let us have brotherhood, let us be united’. So thought forms a league of nations or United Nations, but thought is still operating separatively and maintaining separation: you who are an Italian, you keep your Italian sovereignty and so on. Talk about brotherhood and yet keep separate, which is hypocrisy; that is a function of thought to play double games with itself....

  The ability to distinguish right from wrong is a sign of good moral sense; the ability to distinguish good reasons from bad reasons is a sign of rationality. Our conduct in everyday life depends on the ability to distinguish what is good from what is bad; whether that be morally or rationally. We allow our thinking and our actions to be regulated by a value system where it is necessary to distinguish the good from bad in order to achieve a certain goal which in case of a theoretical inquiry is Truth. The Philosopher tries to understand the normative force behind this rational order – what is a reason, what makes a certain reason good or bad, what is Truth and can we know what is true. This investigation requires that we understand the subject and the way he experiences the world and the place of the subject within this world. Down the ages the best minds of the world have been engaged in resolving this question but with no unanimity in sight. Philosophy differs from other discipl...