Against Relativism

Relativism is the idea that there can be two incommensurable realities, each equally valid. So we have two simultaneous assertions: something is real, and it is real relative to me, and these assertions contradict each other. The underlying thought is this: to be finite is to be limited by another, and the other is the infinite. To be finite, then, is to be the negation of the infinite. Finitude, then, is to be understood only in reference to the infinite. If you sever this connection, then the finite in itself becomes the infinite. It comes to be considered as both finite and infinite at the same time. This is relativism. A finite perspective on reality is treated as both reality as such and as finite. If it were not finite, then an equally valid alternative reality would not be possible. But we have a reality which is valid-for-another. This shows the finitude of my own perspective because I am urging my perspective to be treated as absolute while at the same time I am limited by what is other than me. Relativism suppresses the fact of this limitation. When relativism says that there is an equally valid ‘reality’ which is valid-for-another, it conveniently ignores that this alternate reality is the negation of the reality valid-for-me. The suppression of this negation is what prevents conflict or contradiction between reality-1 and reality-2, allowing us to regard both as equally valid. It allows relativism to consider a finite perspective as both a perspective and a reality at once. This is the contradiction — the finite is treated as both finite and infinite for-itself, which infinity is no infinity.

The Analytical Philosopher Donald Davidson argued against Quine that there cannot be two incommensurable conceptual schemes. The fact that I can interpret alternate conceptual schemes implies that there is a grand conceptual scheme that is valid for both of us. To be able to understand the perspective of another implies that the other’s conceptual scheme is not incommensurable with mine. It is because we share a common reality that we have a common conceptual scheme, and this single reality makes different perspectives possible and also makes it possible for us to understand perspectives different from our own. Reality is not in the absence of differences but in the convergence despite differences. That the argument requires the possibility of a priori knowledge is an issue for another day.

Also, consider how we come to change our views. It is often complained that information alone does not compel people to change their views because they have a framework to interpret the information in their own way, and often people interpret counter-evidence as evidence for their own views. Information, however, is not theory-neutral; it makes sense only within a framework. Facts are nodes within a network of theory. The important point is that people will not change their views unless there is conflict between their views and reality, leading to a conflict within themselves. Say there are two views, A and B, in conflict with each other, and I realize that I cannot hold both together. This can lead to a change in our framework itself if A and B both have to be true within it. However, if I choose A, I must give up B, and this implies giving up the framework I have been working with. Those who never see any conflict between their framework and reality make the finite infinite, and this is totalitarianism in the true sense, not the absence of a shared reality or a meta-perspective. The absence of a sense of reality leads to what the Greeks called hubris.

It is because we live in a space of shared reality that there can be conflict between our views, and the resolution of that conflict leads us to change our perspective. Truth is the whole, and the most comprehensive view is the truest. If I can integrate what is true in your perspective and you cannot do the same, then my framework is more comprehensive than yours, while yours is abstract and one-sided. In the above example, it turned out that A was part of a different framework incompatible with B. I took A out of the framework; I took what was true in this old framework and understood that A is a member of a different framework and did not belong in the older one.

There is no truth that is not the negation of falsehood. If A and B had been equally valid, belonging to different realities, then there would be no conflict and no change in our views. I will end up making my own perspective absolute because I would fail to see it as the negation of another perspective.

But this equal validity comes from suppressing negation. If I see a murderer advancing towards me and then think ‘I should defend myself because I do not believe that I should die’ and ‘the murderer is correct from his perspective to think that I should die’, which of these thoughts am I going to act upon? If the former, then the latter thought cannot be true and if I choose to act on the latter, then I am dead. Well, I could both defend myself and think that the murder is justified, and think that I should die at the same time. That is possible if the perspectives are seen as parts of an overarching reality, not as alternate realities. If different perspectives are taken as equally valid, then my action has already contradicted me; by defending myself, I have placed myself outside the scope of someone else’s perspective, i.e. I have taken what is valid-for-another to be not valid-for-me. Consequently, what is valid-for-me is in relation of contradiction with what is valid-for-another, and it is valid-for-me only because it negates what is valid-for-another. I was able to regard my own perspective and the murderer’s perspective as equally valid because I suppressed the negation — that one perspective negated another.